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ABSTRACT
Need a theory's assumptions be true? In a since notorious
essay, the economist Friedman argued they need not be and in
abstract theories often won't be. The first part of the
thesis discusses his case, which has been widely misunderstood,.
It concludes that, whilst false assumptions may fulfil the role
of epitomising and implying truth, those in Friedman's key
economic example do not. The rest of the thesis then relates
Friedman's case to that in defence of general equilibrium theory
(the heart of orthodox economic theory) and argues that this
defence fails. Two complementary arguments against the
defenders' position are presented, the first working from the
fact that the theory's assumptions are not true and the second
considering what would happen if they were - the conclusion
being that the theory relates neither to actual cases nor to
possible polar ones. Comparisons drawn with rival economic




In an oft-quoted passage of his 1938 Address, Harrod says:
"Exposed as a bore, the methodologist cannot take refuge behind a
cloak of modesty. On the contrary, he stands forward ready by his
own claim to give advice to all and sundry, to criticise the work of
others which, whether valuable or not, at least attempts to be construc¬
tive; he sets himself up as the final interpreter of the past and dictator
of future efforts." "Telling the Truth in Economic Theory" is a
philosophical thesis about economic method, that I can only hope will
not prove boring. But in this introductory chapter, I am out to defy
another part of Harrod's charge, * by laying my claim to a cloak.
I want to disclaim, to begin with, having done much more than
dipped into much of the literature that is potentially relevant to my
general subject: a subject that might be called "the philosophy of
economics" (a term with perhaps two advantages over the more familiar
"economic methodology": firstly, that of suggesting a more philosophical
content; and secondly, that of dodging - if only temporarily - pejorative
overtones that the latter term may already be bearing). This subject
is comparatively young (setting aside any earlier existences it may
have enjoyed); and, at least partly for this reason, its literature poses
a dilemma. On the one hand, there is too little; modern works which
apply philosophical analysis to questions of economic method are few
and far between. On the other hand, there is too much; of what stands
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on the library shelves under the general headings, not only of philosophy
and of economics themselves, but also of other social sciences (includ¬
ing politics and - on some classifications - history) and of the various
natural sciences, a great deal has some potential reference to the
philosophy of economics. In this situation, one hardly knows whether
to hold to a strict diet, devouring the then meagre stock-in-trade, to
face bare shelves and basic principles thereafter; or whether to indulge
a more catholic taste, spending years of apprenticeship before even
beginning, albeit as a gourmet, to make a start on the central dish.
Discovering this dilemma gradually in the course of a basic browse,
I have since tried to steer something of a middle course. But inevit¬
ably there will be gaps, routes I take that have been tried before and
obstacles in the way that, had I but known it, could lightly have been
turned by another's hand.
Yet perhaps these very difficulties have made it easier for me to
protest against pretending in what follows to "give advice to all and
sundry". For some appeal to the principle of division of labour having
resulted, at least as much information has been accepted from some
fellow labourers, I believe, as advice has been doled out to others;
whilst there are some whom I have not been able to deal with at all.
I have had no dealings, for instance, with the historians of economic
thought; nor any with econometricians as such. And whilst The
Grundrisse makes a fleeting appearance later on, I have not entered
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specifically into the fast-growing Marxist literature either. On the
philosophy of science, as a non-scientist, I remain by and large
agnostic, accepting information on the various developments here and
trying to keep in mind, as it were, the possibility space. Then for
detailed results in neoclassical economic theory, I am generally glad
to go to neoclassical economists themselves, (though I do not go, it
must be confessed, quite cap in hand). Likewise for metaphysics,
metaphysical writings have been my source. Of advice, there may
still be plenty. Perhaps in particular it goes to those who seem to have
allowed naive impressions of results in the philosophy of science to
colour even their statement of the content of a specific text on economic
method. Texts, of course, must be texts^ but further, it is not at all
clear that conclusions based on a study of natural science, even if
correct in that sphere, can legitimately be read (much less misread)
over to matters of economic procedure too: simply to do this will surely
often be to beg the big question of how far the "dismal" science
resembles the natural ones. The approach that I am hostile to for
these reasons also seems often to appear as a species of what Ryle
has called, in a different context, "facile pigeon-holing". No cloak of
modesty here, I admit; but then, I have sought to advise chiefly those
who seem already themselves to be giving "advice to all and sundry".
Has the work, then, exposed itself to the charge of being itself
only destructive? Well, I do not think so. Again, what is most
criticised is, I think, itself somewhat negative doctrine. Then inter¬
pretation of the past, there is certainly (though I am not sure I would
claim it "final"). But dictation of the future? Rather, I hope,
suggestions. One implicit suggestion will be that there are areas of
1.4
philosophical analysis that might fruitfully be related to issues in
economic method, on a problem-solving basis (a traffic that perhaps
need not always be one-way); for it seems to me that a good deal of
progress might be made by following the, in some ways modest,
approach Emmet and Maclntyre support. They write (1970, p. ix)
that they do not hold that "first, one has to select some general philo¬
sophical standpoint - such as that of logical empiricism or phenomen¬
ology - on epistemological or other philosophical grounds, and then only
secondly to apply the methods and insights of the chosen tradition to the
problems of the philosophy of social science", continuing that "this
seems to us to get things the wrong way round. The value and relevance
of any general philosophical standpoint to the philosophy of the social
sciences can only be demonstrated by showing the contribution that it
makes to the key problems." This allows a good deal of scope to the
philosophy of economics; not least because, the subject being so young,
there is a backlog of problems to be dealt with. Joan Robinson, for
instance reports (1973, p. 122) that "the present state of affairs in
theoretical economics is very distressing. There are deep and pro¬
longed controversies going on about purely logical points."
This then is my cloak, in the main of modesty, if enlivened here
and there by a patch of stronger stuff.
l.i
Appendix I
Footnotes to Chapter 1
1. His Address (to Section F of the British Association) was, however,
about "The Scope and Method of Economics"; and the passage
quoted is just, I think, Harrod's own (attractive) way of disowning
a gown of arrogance.
2. In brief encounters with the Marxist literature, lacking previous
preparation for it, I have felt some sympathy with Joan Robinson's
remark (1973, p. 250) that "you cannot talk to a Marxist in English







Lady Jessica; "... if you arrange things not perhaps
exactly as they were, but as they ought
to have been."
Sir Christopher: "I see. In that way a lie becomes a
sort of idealized and essential truth ..."
H.A. Jones, The Liars.
"And, after all, what is a lie? 'Tis but the truth in
masquerade. "
Byron, Don Juan.
Is lying wrong? That it is was the orthodoxy of our forefathers.
But in this permissive age, and more especially since the appearance
in 19 53 of Friedman's "The Methodology of Positive Economics",
most economists are all too aware that time-honoured beliefs are now
under review. Need a theory's assumptions be true? Not a bit of it
(the Friedman line is supposed to run); all that counts is the truth of
the implications - what matters is whether the theory "works".
Friedman's message, metaphorically, has seemed to be that good can,
or indeed will, come of telling fibs; hence lying is to be tolerated, or
even positively praised.
Such heretical sentiments provoked reactions that were indignant,
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not to say shocked, on the one hand, and enthusiastic, if tinged with
wonder, on the other. There was a trickle of comment, soon swelling
to a flood. High-water came in the mid-sixties with the American
Economic Association's Symposium on "Problems of Methodology";
but the Symposium discussion of Friedman's case has itself been a
source of yet more controvery. The flow of contributions continues
. 1
still.
1974 saw the twenty-first anniversary of the dispute over
2
Friedman's "Methodology". But its very maturing has posed a
fresh problem, little publicised as yet, but yearly becoming both more
puzzling and more acute. That problem is: why is it that, so long
after his main expression of them became available, no consensus
exists about the status of Friedman's views? Evaluating literature
meanders on. Meanwhile, some practising economists take the seem¬
ing Friedman view as proven and cite it as the rationale of their testing
procedures: for example, Crew, Jones-Lee and Rowley state at the
outset of a recent paper (1971, p. 173) that "for the most part, the
methodology employed in this paper is that established by Milton
Friedman where the relevant test of the validity of a theory is a com-
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parison of its predictions with experience" (my emphasis). However
others - still lamenting with Kaldor, prior to advocating some new
4
assumption , that "unlike any scientific theory, where the basic
assumptions are chosen on the basis of direct observation of the
phenomena . .. the basic assumptions of economic theory are either
of a kind that are unverifiable ... or of a kind which are directly
2. 3
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contradicted by observation" (1972, p. 1238) ; or still insisting with
Leontief, in recommending how the subject should develop, that "it is
precisely the empirical validity of /the/ assumptions on which the use¬
fulness of the entire exercise depends . .. what is really needed is a
. . . verification of these assumptions in terms of observed facts"
(1971, p. 2) - do not cite Friedman's challenge explicitly or discuss
g
criticisms of it , and write not so much as if the issues had been
unequivocally settled but rather as if they had never even been raised.
Yet Friedman's paper is only some forty pages long; it is written in
excellent English prose; and it deals with a fairly well-defined, and
on the face of it simple, group of issues. Why then the absence of
consensus about his case, despite all the comment over so many
years? This is what I call "The Methodology Mystery".
At first, whilst knowing that dispute over "The Methodology"
loomed large in the literature on economic method, I imprudently
believed that the Mystery of why it did so would not be very hard to
solve; and that, once having solved it, one could move briskly on to
what then seemed altogether distinct, and more stirring, questions.
Having gained my initial impression of what Friedman's argument
was from merely hearsay evidence, I unfairly fancied that, in the
rather dreary debate, his opponents must simply have failed to push
7
their point right home . But the more closely I studied Friedman's
text and read hostile papers criticising it, the less satisfactory the
critics' objections appeared to be. It began to be clear that much of
the commentary (and even of the favourable commentary) has mis-
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represented Friedman's case - that his line does not run as has
commonly been supposed; and it became apparent too that issues
raised by the argument he himself presents do bear on some of the
questions I had earlier taken to be entirely independent ones. And
now the next three chapters, in their various ways, all concentrate on
the Methodology Mystery.
Chapter 3 treats of a recent contribution to the debate (Wong,
1973), published in a major economics journal; a contribution which,
I argue, is more likely to heighten the Mystery than to solve it. Wong's
paper is criticised in detail, for in two ways it seems to typify many
preceding ones - showing a general leaning towards rather brusque
dismissal of any rival position, after only cursory inspection of it;
and embodying one of the common mis-statements of Friedman's case
(for Friedman does not after all insist that predictive success is a
sufficient criterion for choosing between theories). Now here it might
seem that discovering the prevalence of misunderstandings of "The
Methodology", though quashing my first, too rash, suspicions, does
at least afford another easy, if different, answer to the Mystery. For
even if Friedman is wrong, many may yet think him right when the
main force of the opposition is directed against a position that is not
his; whilst even if he is right, there may be many who suppose him
wrong as long as his camp-followers, returning claims that far exceed
8, 9
their written warrant, still say they are speaking in his name. With
both attackers and defenders liable to mistake the issue in dispute,
neither those who have accepted Friedman's challenge to previous
presumptions about economic method nor those who have instead
rejected it may appreciate what considerations there are that might
justly be brought against their view; and, neither side having taken
to heart Mill's point that "he who knows only his own side of the case,
knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have
been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the
reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what
..10
they are, he has no grounds for preferring either opinion , an
absence of consensus is perhaps a natural result. There is a good
deal in this solution, I think, and yet still it seems a somewhat super¬
ficial one: there must be more to the Mystery than that**. For why
should neglect of significant parts of "The Methodology" have become
what amounts to the norm, with even supporters of Friedman often
failing to recognise and criticise it? Chapter 4 takes up this question
it traces only the general implications of such neglect (with more
detailed documentation of it relegated to Appendix A) and then starts
to explore the possibility that Friedman tells his story only with
studied ease, its seeming simplicity being practised too. It begins
to appear that two very different themes may have been confused, not
just in the reading, but in the very writing of "The Methodology".
This seems to be a promising track to follow; pursuing it further,
Chapter 5 at last offers what I believe to be the solution to the Mystery
whilst Chapter 6 moves on to relate the issues that have emerged as
the tangle is unravelled to the questions which form the subject of
Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
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Appendix E
Footnotes to Chapter 2
1. By my reckoning, there aremore than thirty articles in the main¬
stream of this methodological controversy. In the most recent
flow are contributions by Coddington and by Rosenberg in 1972,
and by Wong in 1973. (For the relevant papers in the A. E.A.
Symposium see Samuelson (1963) and Nagel (1963) ).
Appendix A gives a survey of the misunderstandings of
"The Methodology" that have characterised much of this literature.
2. Friedman's 1953 essay, called n [The] Methodology" for short.
3. It might be questioned how far the methodological account these
authors then proceed to give really does coincide with what
Friedman's views are commonly taken to be, since they claim
belief in "justifying /theirj central assumptions in terms of their
intrinsic realism". But they make an emphatic proviso, saying
that "a close relationship should be maintained between reality
and the assumptions of a theory, always provided that predictive
success is not thereby diminished" (my emphasis). They do
hold that "emphasis upon predictive success rather than upon
description or explanation is the distinguishing characteristic of
a positive science"; and that "the predictive test is .. . the final
arbiter" (pp. 173 and 174).
4. Kaldor goes on to argue for the adoption of an assumption of
increasing,instead of constant, returns to scale.
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5. On the moot point of how far the assumptions made in theories of
the Cambridge school themselves escape Cambridge school
criticisms of the assumptions of others, see Chapter 9.
6. In fairness, it has to be added that Leontief does distantly acknow¬
ledge, though only at a much later point in his Address, "the
prevalence of . . . the admittedly convenient methodological
position according to which a theorist does not need to verify
directly the factual assumptions on which he chooses to base his
deductive arguments, providing his empirical conclusions seem
to be correct" (p. 5). There too, though not discussing the
point, he does make laconic mention of a factor that he believes
makes such a position "untenable"; but the factor seems to be
one that Friedman might accommodate too. See Appendix A.
7. In its "popular" form, Friedman's argument comes as counter¬
intuitive to those economists who have been trained to take the
need for true assumptions as a commonplace. In being brought
up in economics with the view that once one knew a theory's
assumptions to be false one could dismiss the theory, bag and
baggage, no doubt I was not alone. But one of the P. elements
of the P.P.E. school should have warned me to be more wary
here.
8. Penrose's description (1958, pp. 9-10) of dispute about the firm
(dispute into which Friedman's essay enters), between those
living in, respectively, "the high and dry plateaus of 'pure theory'
and the tangled forests of 'empiric-realistic' research", comes
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to mind here. She writes of "border skirmishes between the
natives of the two areas . . . supplemented by formal jousts in
the medieval manner between noble knights of the opposing
allegiances, each warmly defending his faith. These encounters
have one remarkable characteristic - it seems strangely difficult
for any participant to discover precisely where his antagonist
stands, with the result that an uncommon number of thrusts
seem to be made in one direction but countered from an entirely
different direction, broad swords and rapiers forcefully cutting
the air, without really clashing. "
9. The attacks may have had force against some of these claims of
camp-followers, of course; but still they need not carry convic¬
tion for readers of "The Methodology" itself.
10. Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 2 ("Of the Liberty of Thought and
Discussion"). Mill continues by saying that it is not "enough that
he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers
That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring
them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to
hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend
them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must
know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must
feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the
subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really
possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes
that difficulty".
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. However, I here share Mill's, perhaps now unfashionable, belief
that there can be progress through serious discussion (see
Chapter 1). Some might argue that this is too sanguine: that
conflict over "The Methodology" is likely to prove irresolvable,
perhaps because it is, at bottom, conilict between Kuhnian para¬
digms (on which, see Chapter 3, note 30) or because the differ¬
ences are essentially political ones (see the end of Chapter 4,
and Chapter 6) or because contrary doctrines are held here as
matters of faith (see Chapter 9).
3.1
Chapter 3
MR. WONG GOES TO THE ZOO
In his recent paper, Wong takes a rather different view of the
current state of the Friedman Affair. He makes the present Mystery
seem a myth, holding (p. 312) that "many, perhaps most, economists
consider the debate /between Friedman and Samuelson, a challenger
of 1963_7 to be over, with Samuelson's position upheld""^. Even if
this consensus did indeed exist, however, Wong himself was threaten¬
ing it; for his avowed purpose was "to show that no substantive issues
f
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were at stake in the Friedman-Samuelson dispute". Given the
alleged support for Samuelson's view of the case, against Friedman's,
this would be tantamount to throwing down yet another gauntlet and
3
reopening the dispute.
On the other hand, were it really demonstrated conclusively that
no substantive issues had been at stake after all, then at least a formal
resolution of the dispute would have been provided; and in the longer
term it ought to be possible - after a decent interval, during which
disputants came to term s with having deluded themselves all along
and having made such a dickens of a fuss over next to nothing - to
close the file on the Mystery at last.
But does Wong succeed in demonstrating that no substantive
issues were at stake? He might do so by showing that, on every
critical issue held to be in dispute, agreement (albeit unrecognised)
exists between Friedman's and Samuelson's views; or else by show-
3.2
ing that, wherever there is disagreement, the issues are not (however
much they have been thought to be) substantive ones. But neither tack
quite coincides with the line Wong takes: he makes just a fleeting
gesture towards the first, elsewhere stressing the contrast he sees
between the two supposed positions; but yet he does not argue consist¬
ently, in accordance with the second, that the issues truly in dispute
are insignificant ones. The force of his argument is rather that there
was never much point in trying to choose between what are indeed
4
rival positions, since so much can be said against both. Now even
if some reading of the initial claim does match this argument, still
Wong's support for it, as I hope to show, is too flimsy: if this is so,
then of course far from clearing up the Methodology Mystery, Wong's
contribution is likely to intensify it.
In the paper, Wong, without blazoning the fact, takes us on a
(1959) „
visit to a zoo: to what Hutchison/calls Professor Popper's private
zoo of intellectual monsters". There he shows us six of the monstrous
inmates, singly or in various family groups; we meet with essential-
ism, with conventionalism, and with descriptivism as an offspring of
5
sensationalism, and we learn that apriorism is trying to insinuate a
paw through the bars between him and instrumentalism. But now to
the main event of our trip: seemingly the monsters are not, after
all, to be found just in the captivity to which Professor Popper holds
the key; for here is Wong, making copies of labels from two of the
cages and hurrying off to pin them on two people in the outside world -
people who turn out to be none other than Friedman (invested with
3.3
"instrumentalist") and Samuelson (dubbed "descriptivist").
Labels, of course, do often serve a purpose; but I doubt the use¬
fulness of these labels here. For Wong's attribution leads him to inter¬
pret the claims of his authors in a very narrow and rigid way. Take
the discussion of Samuelson as a descriptivist (aimed at dismissing his
position - though in favour not of Friedman's but of Wong's). Here
confusion is engendered by Wong's refusal to allow Samuelson access
to the favoured sense he gives to words himself. Wong introduces
(p. 321), with approval that is fairly customary, the argument that "all
observational terms are theory-laden"; but then goes on to say that
"the /descriptivist/ view that knowledge consists essentially of
observational reports is incompatible with the view that all observa¬
tional terms are theory-laden". Yet, prima facie, there is no contra¬
diction here. Clearly when someone labelled as descriptivist uses the
term "observations", for Wong he can only be speaking of (mythical)
non-theory-laden ones, observations supposed pure and simple; even
though whenever Wong himself speaks of observations he means theory-
laden ones, the only observations there really are on the view he sub¬
scribes to. Wong's argument that no non-theory-laden observations
exist conflicts with descriptivism only where descriptivists claim, not
just that knowledge consists essentially of observational reports, but
also that observational reports consist of totally non-theoretical state-
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ments. And whilst extreme descriptivists may indeed make this
latter claim, it cannot be shown that someone is an extreme descript¬
ivist just by citing the former one.
3.4
A similarly unsympathetic reception is given to Samuelson's
claim (1965, p. 1165) that what is commonly called an explanation is
actually 'a better kind of description and not something that goes ulti-
mately bej^ond description". It is conceivable that, as Wong supposes
(p. 319), Samuelson does "regard a theory to be only a description and
not an explanation", taking the two categories as exclusive: one read¬
ing of Samuelson's claim could be that explanations as such are too
airy-fairy to exist. Surely, however, one might rather take Samuelson
to be saying that, though not every description is given the title of
"explanation", theories, in explaining, are necessarily describing too;
that because of this explanations can be seen as boiling down to a
refined type of description; whence, if descriptions are looked on as
real enough, explanations turn out to be thoroughly real as well. That
7
he intends his claim to be read in this second way is confirmed by
context. For it is made in specific response to Garb's (1965)
criticism (understandable following Samuelson's 1964 contribution to
the debate, but still simply being echoed by Wong long after Sarnuelson's
reply to it) that "Samuelson claims that scientists merely describe,
they never explain . .. /hey believes .. . that since scientists do not
possess ultimate explanations, they are therefore left with descriptions.
But an explanation does not have to be 'ultimate'" (Garb, p. 1152).
Samuelson retorts, "when Garb says 'an explanation does not have to
be ultimate'", I think he is resaying what I said, not controverting it.
An explanation, as used legitimately in science, is a better kind of
description ..." etc. . Later in the same paper (1965, p. 1171) he
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adds "what is called an explanation in science can always be regarded
as a description at a different level - usually a superior description".
At least by 1965, then, Samuelson saw his remark that explanations
are really just descriptions as simply another way of saying "it's no
use searching for ultimate explanations", a point of view shared by
8
Wong.
Could it then be that any difference with Wong lies only in prefer¬
ences about words, in that where Wong would say a theory is explana¬
tory, Samuelson would prefer to say that it gives a superior kind of
description? If so, then Samuelson's uS"age should at any rate be
intelligible to Wong, who must himself allow the term "descriptive" to
include an explanatory element: all descriptions containing observa¬
tional terms must be theory-laden, according to Wong; and, as he
insists that theories must be explanatory, descriptions will be, so to
speak, explanation-laden too. However, Wong claims to have
established independently that Samuelson, protest as he may to the
contrary, is actually precluded from holding an explanatory view.
According to Wong, the theories Samuelson sanctions fail to fulfil
generally accepted requirements for explanatoriness. In particular, a
requirement that "the explanans /defined as 'the set of statements which
forms the explanation'_/ must have testable consequences in addition to
the explanadum /defined as 'the set of statements which describe what
is to be explained'7" (Wong, p. 317) is held to be violated by the
theories Samuelson approves. Wong has earlier presented Samuelson's
part in the Friedman Affair as developing from the proposition that the
3.6
minimal assumption set of a theory is logically equivalent to its com¬
plete consequence set. Now, Wong's claim is that, as theories on this
view are statements of logical equivalency, "the explanans (the axiom
set) is just a restatement of the explanandum (the consequence set)"
(p. 317) and the theories lack testable consequences beyond the explan¬
andum. But this argument is at best incomplete: it hinges on Wong
first switching to identifying the explanandum just as "the consequence
set" (instead of as the set of statements describing what is to be
explained); and then proceeding to interpret this in Samuelson's case
as the complete consequence set, for which the logical equivalency
claims are made. Yet by contrast, the "consequence set" with which
the explanandum in a theory fulfilling Wong's requirement for explana-
toriness is to be identified is only a subset of the theory's full logical
consequences. Before assenting, then, to Wong's criticism of
9
Samuelson - that all he has to offer is restatement, never explanation -
we would certainly need to know that for Samuelson the explanandum of
a theory, stating what, in his terms, is to be described in a superior
10
way, must indeed be that theory's complete consequence set. Since
Wong fails to assure us of this, it seems to remain possible that
Samuelson would in practice admit those theories that Wong calls
11
explanatory: Wong's quarrel with him here is merely verbal if what
distinguishes a better from a lesser kind of description for Samuelson
is that which distinguishes an explanation from a "mere" description
12, 13
for Wong. Paradoxically, oversimple labels may complicate
the issue.
3.7
In Friedman's case, Wong (p. 314) finds it "quite evident" that
his instrumentalist label applies. But does it really fit? That
Friedman is solely concerned with the immediate success of predic¬
tions has been a popular view; and it is a view of this sort that Wong
endorses when he labels Friedman instrumentalist, seeing him as
advancing principally the stark claim that a theory, being "merely an
instrument for prediction ... is tested only by the conformity of its
predictions with observable reality" (Wong, p. 314). Though the
view has been popular, however, it has also been, I think, a fallacy
that has contributed to the persistence of the Mystery: lack of agree¬
ment on the value of "The Methodology" can to some extent be
explained by the fact that this prevalent interpretation leaves totally
14
out of account the qualifying statements that Friedman makes. True,
he announces fairly near the outset (p. 8) that "the only relevant test
of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with
15
experience , which may sound categorical. But he is careful to
italicise "validity" here, surely because this first remark is to be
taken in conjunction with a second, namely (p. 9) that "the validity of
a hypothesis in this sense is not by itself a sufficient criterion for
choosing among alternative hypotheses", filled out by the later (p. 10)
"choice among alternative hypotheses equally consistent with the avail¬
able evidence must to some extent be arbitrary, though there is
general agreement that relevant considerations are suggested by the
criteria 'simplicity' and 'fruitfulness1, themselves notions that defy
completely objective specification". Wong's neglect of these qualify¬
ing remarks is particularly flagrant; for after asserting that Friedman
3.8
is an instrumentalist, he goes on to say (p. 315) that "if Friedman's
position is interpreted as instrumentalist, it can easily be seen that
testability (in Friedman's sense) is both a necessary and a sufficient
16
condition for the acceptability of a theory." Remembering
Friedman's emphasis on the insufficiency of the predictive test, might
one not reverse Wong's reasoning here and conclude that, if being an
instrumentalist is what Wong says it is, then Friedman is not an
17
instrumentalist after all?
Nor can the above remarks of Friedman easily be treated as an
isolated anomaly. For instance, he later suggests (p. 17) comparing
the promising but imperfect predictive performance of a theory with
the accuracy of an alternative one "which is equally acceptable on all
other grounds": that is, equally acceptable on grounds other than pre¬
dictive success, such as, presumably, "simplicity" and "fruitfulness".
19
Or again, it is an, admittedly pragmatic , part of his position in
"The Methodology" that (p. 17) if "there exists a theory that is known
to yield better predictions but only at a greater cost . . . the gains
from greater accuracy, which depend on the purpose in mind, must
then be balanced against the costs of achieving it"; for example (p. 18),
"in the particular case of falling bodies ... it does not always pay to
use the more /accurate but complex_/ general theory because the extra
accuracy it yields may not justify the extra cost of using it". Yet,
according to Wong, Friedman's concern for successful prediction is
"overriding" (p. 315) and his pursuit of it "single-minded" (p. 324).
Then Friedman is said to hold the crude view that "a theory must be
3.9
the most successful predictor before it can be given serious considera¬
tion": Wong accepts (p. 315) the claims that Friedman must deny "a
yet unfalsifiable theory from careful consideration" and that his method-
ology "rules out such careful consideration of fruitful alternative
20
theories" , where again Friedman's position includes subtleties that
Wong and others appear unaware of. For Friedman allows (p. 29) that
a hypothesis "gains indirect plausibility from the success for other
classes of phenomena of hypotheses that can ... be said to make /the
same/ assumption; /becausej at least, what is being done here is not
completely unprecedented or unsuccessful in all other uses". He
illustrates this with an example, remarking (p. 30) that "of course"
indirect evidence of this sort is not conclusive; but that, although "the
decisive test is whether the hypothesis works ... a judgment may be
required before any satisfactory test of this kind has been made, and,
perhaps, when it cannot be made in the near future, in which case the
judgment will have to be based on the inadequate evidence available" -
not a rapturous admission of the claims of "a yet unfalsifiable theory",
but their admission nonetheless.
However, Friedman's interest in prediction is already labelled
for Wong as instrumentalist and obsessional, as automatically subject
to the criticism (p. 324) that "the instrumentalist's particular obsession
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with predictions disregards the explanatory content of a theory .
Now it is true that some of Friedman's claims for prediction may
sound extravagant, taken in themselves; for instance, he does say
(p. 7) that arriving at "valid" (though also "meaningful") predictions
3. 10
22
is "the ultimate goal of a positive science" . But theories whose
predictive power is securely founded might also explain well, and vice
versa; and it is possible that Friedman, far from disregarding explan¬
atory content, rather reasons that prediction and explanation are
symmetrical and intends his claims to apply to both. Several state¬
ments offer support for this interpretation (for example (pl3), "for
/the predictivej test to be relevant, the deduced facts must be about
23
the class of phenomena the hypothesis is designed to explain"). Of
course, Wong might retort that Friedman's error comes in failing to
recognise the distinct features of explanation; that virtually identify¬
ing explanation with prediction is just as bad as ignoring it altogether.
But is it self-evident that this is a heinous crime? It has been at
least philosophically respectable to treat explanation and prediction as
two, temporally distinct, sides of a single coin since, in 1948,
24 25.
Hempel and Oppenheim argued for symmetry between them.
Or again, Wong (p. 315) seems to take Friedman's merely com¬
parative standard of predictive failure (a theory failing the test "if its
predictions are contradicted ('frequently' or more often than predic¬
tions from an alternative hypothesis)" (Friedman, p. 9, Wong's
italics)) as evidence that Friedman's interest always stops short, with
the instrumentalist's, at determining "the limits of [a theory's]
applicability", and never extends to concern with enlarging "our under¬
standing". But, as before, Friedman may be in better philosophical
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company here than Wong has recognised ; for Popper, a persistent
critic of "the obsurantism of instrumentalism" (Popper, 1963, p. 100),
yet draws on an idea of approximation to truth, or "verisimilitude",
whose "comparative use ... is its main point" (Popper, p. 234).
Popper writes (p. 235) that "ultimately, the idea of verisimilitude is
most important in cases where we know that we have to work with
theories which are at best approximations - that is to say, theories of
which we actually know that they cannot be true", adding "this is often
the case in the social sciences". And he judges that "in these cases
we can still speak of better or worse approximations to the truth (and
we therefore do not need to interpret these cases in an instrumentalist
sense)". But then, no more need Friedman.
It is not, then, so "evident" as Wong supposes that Friedman is
a die-hard instrumentalist: his views seem both more subtle and more
respectable than Wong's stereotyping label suggests. Nor, were Wong
now to acknowledge Friedman's moderate statements, could he readily
support the label by changing his plea to one that whether or not to
adopt this tag is simply a matter of taste, of choosing between alterna¬
tive interpretations either of which might be valid and which, as they
stand, appear equally plausible. For if Friedman is seen as Wong's
out-and-out instrumentalist, seeking to present predictive success as
the single, clear yardstick for judging theories, whatever can explain
his various deviations from the task? Taking this extreme and
unqualified position to be Friedman's, with "The Methodology" written
expressly to express it, involves construing his then errant statements
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there not (unproblematically) as genuine reservations, voiced on
purpose, about the rigid view, but rather as unwitting contraditions of
3.12
it; and what is there then to account for Friedman repeatedly lapsing
into them? Could all the passages out of accord with the stereotype
Wong would impose be merely a product of slovenly thought, the casual
, . . 28
outcome of carelessness? - surely this suggestion lacks appeal.
And until Wong can point to some more positive cause for these divergent
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statements, his interpretation must lack appeal too.
Thus, Wong's zeal for labelling has led him to caricature both
sides in the "Friedman-Samuelson dispute". In consequence, he
presents the dispute as having almost inevitably been a barren confronta¬
tion between rival philosophies, with a breakdown in true communica-
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tion between the advocates of each/ For instance, the "possible
Friedman defense against Samuelson's critique" that Wong advances
(pp. 315, 316) (and he advances only one) is a peremptory declaration
of rejection, rather than a reasoned reply: in Wong's view, "Friedman
would certainly reject the Theorem /of Samuelson, that 'it is a contra¬
diction to maintain that all consequences can be valid and the theory
and the assumptions not valid' (Wong, p. 315 )J, since he does not
accept Samuelson's view of the desired relationship between a theory
and its assumption and consequences as one of logical equivalence";
which, without the addition of any considerations which Friedman
might have put forward to show that the relationship can be different,
comes to little more than saying that Friedman would reject the
Theorem because he does not accept it. Moreover, given Wong's
wording of this Theorem, it seems by no means "certain" that
Friedman would in fact reject it: mightn't he first jib at the phrase
3. 13
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"all consequences", as lacking clear meaning as it stands ; but
then be willing to accept the Theorem, as true but of no practical sig¬
nificance, if the meaning of "all consequences" is specified as "the
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complete logical 'consequence1 set ? Wong also holds that simi¬
larly Friedman would reject the Corollary /that 'it is absurd to main¬
tain, in the case where only some of the consequences are valid, that
the theory and the assumptions are important though invalid. The
parts of the theory set and the assumption set corresponding to the
invalid part of the consequence set should be eliminated' (Wong, p. 316//
since for his instrumentalism it is irrelevant that the theory or its
assumption set is invalid since what matters is whether the theory
gives sufficiently accurate predictions for the purpose at hand." Now
in this context I should have said that there is a sense in which it
surely is relevant for Friedman that the assumption set is invalid, it
being for just such, often scorned, sets that he is anxious to claim a
role. Probably, however, Wong's meaning is that Friedman would
reject the Corollary because he does not share Samuelson's professed
concern with arriving at. valid assumption sets. But then the suggested
defence is a mere reiteration of the position that the Corollary has
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claimed to be "absurd". Dismissing Samuelson's objections out
of hand is apparently for Wong virtually all an instrumentalist needs
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and is able to do , to show "that there is not much substance to
„ 35Samuelson's critique from an instrumentalist point of view (p. 318) ;
and this leaves the coast conveniently clear for Wong to put forward
both his own objection to instrumentalism and also his "independent . . .
critique of Samuelson's critique" (p. 315). In a rather similar way,
3.14
though Wong accepts Klappholz and Agassi's account of what Friedman's
position is, he yet seems to present their criticisms of this stated
3 6
position as failures to sympathise with, rather than objections to, it ;
I
so that, manipulating his puppet-like Friedman once more into reply
by simple reassertion of various claims, he again restricts "freedom
of entry" into any significant discussion.
Despite his insistence of holding a monopoly of worthwhile inde¬
pendent argument, however, Wong's attempt to show that both sides in
tlie dispute have been misguided is vitiated, not only by his misfitting
labels, but also by a curious failure of nerve. For though he at least
aims a direct attack at descriptivism, when it comes to instrumentalism
he throws up the sponge. In defeatist vein, he writes (p. 323) that
"descriptivism was shown to be untenable in view of logical and
epistemological difficulties but instrumentalism cannot be defeated in
a similar fashion. In fact no refutation appears possible". This is
hardly the soundest basis from which to campaign for the adoption of
a preferred third view. It is also hard to reconcile with Wong's
earlier presentation of his case; so lenient a treatment of instrumental¬
ism seems partisan, when one tenet of instrumentalism conflicts with
the set of requirements for an explanatory theory that Wong brought
to bear against Samuelson. For one of these requirements (p. 317)
was that "the explanans must not be known to be false"; whilst Wong's
instrumentalists hold, in contrast, that "it is superfluous and
irrelevant to test assumptions as they are merely tools or instruments
which are judged by their ease or convenience in use" (p. 314) and
that "allegedly false statements in the theory are not problematic if
the theory can give sufficiently accurate predictions" (p. 315). Thus,
having assumptions known to be false is sufficient in itself to damn a
theory for Wong, but is insufficient to do so for his instrumentalists;
and, where Wong merely bemoans an instrumentalist "disregard" for
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existing explanatory content , we might expect him instead to reject
their position categorically, just as he does the descriptivists1, on the
grounds that theories it warrants can actually violate his required
"explanatory" standards.
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But perhaps Wong's uncharacteristic-reluctance to claim here a
clinching of the case against a rival doctrine stems from realisation
39
that he could face two problems in doing so. In the first place, in
his anxiety to dismiss Samuelson's challenge to Friedman, Wong has
taken a surprising line on the role accorded to false assumptions in
"The Methodology". Unlike some critics of the essay, he seems
aware of the ambiguity in Friedman's notorious passage, commending
hypotheses that are "descriptively false in /theirj assumptions"
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(Friedman, p. 14) , between the views that, on the one hand, a theory's
assumptions ought to state things which are not true of the assumptions'
subject-matter and that, on the other, they ought not to state everything
which is true of it; and his interpretation favours the second view; he
writes (p. 316) that Friedman's intention is to praise a theory not, as
Samuelson suggested, for "its shortcomings, i.e. its unrealism" but
instead for the virtue of "simplicity produced by an abstraction".
Such a reading, on the face of it, sits rather oddly with Wong's earlier
3.16
claim that Friedman's pursuit of predictive success is "single-minded",
All the same, he is surely right here not to follow those critics who
unquestioningly attribute to Friedman the former of the two views,
neglecting the latter; for to do this would, I think, be to misrepresent
further Friedman's case (in a way to be taken up in Chapter 4). Wong
here
is right, that is, to see Friedman's argument/as being first and fore-
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most for omission, for telling less than the whole truth. Telling
less than the whole truth does not, however, necessarily carry with it
adherence to telling nothing but the truth, a point that has been over¬
looked in parts of the literature: this has been yet another source of
misunderstanding. Not stating everything which_is true of a theory's
subject-matter surely does not exclude (though it may not enjoin) stat-
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ing something untrue of it too. But if this is so, then, in view both
of Friedman's denial that independent testing of a theory by tests of
its assumptions can be adequate, and of the fact that every one of his
examples has an untrue assumption which would indeed be outlawed
by Wong's entirely strict requirement on truth, (apart of course from
the fact that, if Friedman were one of the instrumentalists who fits
Wong's descriptions, he must presumably in any case share their
willingness to tolerate false assumptions), why does Wong fail to
invoke his truth requirement here to clinch a case that is hostile to
Friedman? It seems to me likely that he has rejected one frequent
misinterpretation here only to move to the other, that tends to err in
the opposite direction. I suspect that, his prohibition on falsehood
being violated by sins of commission rather than ones purely of
omission, he has fancied that it will necessarily be entertained in
3.17
company with any argument that omission there should be; so that, on
his interpretation, Friedman's argument would in fact rule out any
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scope for false assumptions. It may be partly because of such a
reading of this passage of an alleged instrumentalist, then - though
still strangely in view of the evidence elsewhere - that Wong hesitates
to reject instrumentalism on the grounds of infringement of his stipula¬
tion about truth.
In the second place, there is the problem for Wong that the laws of
logic, as Wong understands them, seem, taken in themselves, to
support his instrumentalists' attitude rather than his own doctrine that
"the explanans must not be known to be false". To some extent, Wong
may appreciate this: in arguing against his descriptivists' ideal of
logical equivalence between assumptions and consequences, he does
say (p. 317) that (presumably, for the standardly "incomplete" assump¬
tion and consequence sets) "the possibility remains that the theory, its
assumptions, and its consequences can have different degrees of realism
or empirical validity". But the amplification that follows stops
curiously short: he cites only the Modus Tollens rule, to show that
"of course it is wrong to say that the consequence set can be false and
the axiom set, true". This leaves it to the instrumentalists to invoke
Modus Ponens, making a seemingly parallel use of it to show that "of
course it is right to say that the axiom set can be false and the conse¬
quence set true" - an apparent vindication of their claim and rebuttal
of Wong's requirement. Perhaps Wong might then retort that to say
this is "right" so far as it goes but does not, in the context of theory
3.18
choice, go anything like far enough: that patterns of argument which
are valid from a narrow standpoint of formal logic will not necessarily
be acceptable from that of living language (even if invalid patterns are
unacceptable); and that, for a theory to succeed in explaining,unimpeach-
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able logical validity, though necessary, is by no means sufficient.
But if his rejection of the known false explanans (a rejection he
presents as an integral part of the "explanatory" view) is to be sustained,
then some such additional argument must be offered - an addition that
Wong gives no hint of having at hand, and that could of course, assuming
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parity of treatment with his descriptivists, be used to defeat instru-
mentalism after all. His acknowledged inability to floor the instru¬
mentalists appears, then, as something of an embarrassment: small
wonder perhaps if, seeking a way out of this tight corner, he resorts
to the desperate stratagem of abuse.
Reckoning that refutation of instrumentalism, and so of what he
A
looks on as "Friedman's instrumentalism", is impossible but want¬
ing nonetheless to discredit it, Wong styles it "fundamentally anti-
intellectual" (p. 323). But does this go much beyond telling us that
Wong disapproves of it himself, that he believes it to be somehow dis¬
tasteful? Exactly what are we to understand by "anti-intellectual"
here; and what is to persuade us that an "intellectual" position, in
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these terms, is always to be preferred? Perhaps one possibility
is that Wong intends his "anti-intellectual" charge as an oblique
reference to Popper's indictment of instrumentalism as, though
attractive, yet "obscurantist" (Popper, 1963, pp. 100 and 113); but
3. 19
if he does, why no direct reference, and what has stopped him from
presenting the point, as Popper appears to do, as backed by arguments
that are sufficient to defeat an instrumentalist position? (Could this
be because Wong has sensed that Popper's argument may not after all
48
have much force against what Friedman is saying? ) Wong giving
no clear guidance on what "anti-intellectual" is meant to convey, and
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no adequate support for his charge that the word applies, his rejec¬
tion of instrumentalism hardly seems likely to persuade any hitherto
unconverted.
Since Friedman himself presents very ingenious arguments,
there is something especially unsatisfactory in just branding them
"instrumentalist" and then brushing them aside as "anti-intellectual"
in favour of a, supposedly contrary, set of assertions. So cavalier
an approach cannot provide solid support for Wong's claim that "no
substantive issues were at stake in the Friedman-Samuelson dispute";
and it seems more likely to perpetuate the Methodology Mystery than
to yield a solution. As Wong confesses he cannot refute even a hard¬
line instrumentalism, let abne Friedman's more guarded views, his
method is not well calculated to deter extremists from adopting any
false assumption they may please; whilst Samuelson's supporters,
thinking they have only to dodge Wong's "descriptivist" tag to regain
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their status, might persevere, less prudently than their mentor,
in jettisoning every theory with any false assumption whatsoever and
rejecting Friedman's message lock, stock and barrel. It is in resting
on his labels that Wong goes wrong.
3.20
The question whether Friedman is right remains. Does he make
out his case? And why the mysterious difficulty in securing consensus
about this in the past? - Just what_is the case on"telling the truth" that




Footnotes to Chapter 3
1. His assessment runs counter to those of Agassi (1971) and of
Rosenberg (and to Leontief's; see Chapter 2, note 6).
Wong also holds (p. 312) thatthe debate has been "vague and
confusing" and so "of little apparent significance to the day-to¬
day work of the practicing economist"; whereas my impression
is that the undeniable confusion may have fostered some uncritical
implementation of the views associated with each side.
2. Here (and below), I take Wong to mean that no issue is "substantive"
in the popular English sense of "weighty" or "significant" (the
third meaning Webster's give: "enduring; solid; firm").
(Although Wong is to argue later, inter alia, that the positions of
Friedman ana Samuelson in this dispute derive from wider method¬
ological positions, I am sure that he does not mean "substantive"
in the (fairly standard English) sense of "independent" - a sense
listed as obsolete in Webster's - since his claim wouldn't then fit
into the context in which it occurs).
3. Moreover, Wong goes on to argue (p. 318) that "Samuelson's
presentation of the relationship between a theory and its assump¬
tions and consequences is wrong".
4. It is in a footnote (p. 318, n. 17) thatWong states that "the views
of Samuelson and Friedman are not mutually exclusive" (he next
3. ii
cites Boland's view that the debate between the two is a "family
dispute" between two "conventionalists"). But in general he
stresses contrast ("Friedman . .. does not accept Samuelson's
view of the desired relationship between a theory and its assump¬
tions and consequences" (p. 316); "instrumentalism ... goes
'beyond the facts' .. . descriptivism . . . designs a theory not to go
beyond the facts" (p. 324)) - the only feature that he brings out as
common to both views being their inferiority to his own preferred
one ("the choice, then, is not between instrumentalism. and des¬
criptivism but between them both and the view that a theory is
explanatory and informative" (p. 324); similarly (p. 312), "the
methodological choice is not one between the Friedman view and
the Samuelson view ..." etc. ). Without wanting to label either
Friedman or Samuelson as "conventionalist", I think the prospects
for showing that there is a considerable measure of agreement
between them would have been better (see page 3. 12 and note 50;
and also note 26); and I believe that some of Boland's reasons
(not given by Wong) for placing them in the same camp are important
ones (see Chapters 6 and 7).
Even if Wong were right in his apparent belief that the dispute
has not concerned the most important methodological issues, still
it would not follow (as he seems to suppose) that the issues that
are involved are unimportant (see notes 13 and 37).
5. Strictly, Wong's descriptivism is not an inmate of the Popper zoo
proper; though it may be that it is merely reclassified there - as
3. iii
observ&tionalism (Popper, 1963, p. 123). Wong seeks to distin¬
guish descriptivism (the view "that /theories7 are only descriptive")
from what is meant by the, Wong says, "usual" term, "descriptive"
( a term Popper often uses) - that is, from "the view . . . that
theories are descriptive" (Wong, p. 319, n. 19); but I suspect
this has led him into error. (See pages 3. 3 to 3.6; also notes 8
and 30).
Nagel (1961) does mention the term "descriptivism" but
avoids making much use of it - noting, as Wong fails to do, that
"describe" may have a wide range of meanings (see note 8). More¬
over, the position with which he associates the term is less rigidly
conceived, occupants of it, unlike Wong's descriptivists, differing
from instrumentalists only (p. 152) "over preferred modes of
speech" (see note 30).
6. Popper, whom Wong relies heavily on, qualifies a claim that "all
terms are theoretical to some degree" with the addition "though
some are more theoretical than others" (1963, p. 119) - leaving
room for Samuelson to argue for theories being grounded in state¬
ments involving the 'less1 theoretical ones.
7. Wong himself (p. 319) also presents Samuelson as claiming that
"explanations turn out to be just better descriptions " (see also
Wong, p. 317). But he cites this as one of the reasons a descript-
ivist has for "rejecting the view that theories are explanatory" -
even though his descriptivists hold that theories are descriptive.
(Of course, they also hold that theories are "only descriptive";
3. iv
but what need this exclude?) See below.
And by Popper. But, unlike Wong, Popper recognises that
rejections only of ultimate explanation as an aim are sometimes
expressed, confusingly, in the form of very strong claims for
description. However, it is instrumentalists that Popper is writ¬
ing of when he suggests that rejection of ultimate explanation by
essences may be what is intended when the formula "aim at
description rather than explanation" is used. (He writes (1963,
p. 104, n. 14) that the instrumentalists' meaning is that "theories
which do not describe in this sense /i.e. do not describe "the
ordinary empirical world "J do not explain either, but are nothing
but convenient instruments to help us in the description of ordinary
phenomena"). Nagel (19 61) also draws attention to the misunder¬
standings connected with strongly worded claims for description,
pointing out that the narrowness of the claim that sciences never
explain but merely describe depends critically on the meaning
given to "describe" (is it, for instance, allowed that we can
"describe" what may never take place? ) See also notes 5 and 30.
Can no restatement ever count as some sort of explanation?
Perhaps there may be confusion about what the restatement restates.
Wong's opposition between restatement and explanation seems most
likely to hold if it is sentences, rather than statements (in the
terms of Cartwright (1962) and Lemmon (1966)), that are being
restated, for here the scope for explaining in restating does seem
relatively slight. Taking each "type" sentence to be a specific
3.v
sequence of words, then the sentence can only be stated (uttered)
by means of that particular word-sequence (in a "token" sentence
of that "type"); and restating the sentence must mean repeating
it, word for word (in a second "token"). (Even here, though, I
am not sure that the repetition must be mere repetition; if changes
in intonation are taken into account (same words: different mean¬
ing?), mightn't even restatements of this kind offer some explana¬
tion?) But, by contrast, a statement can be stated (made)by
means of tokens of different "type" sentences; and hence it could
be restated in words that differed from those first used; may not
the second way of stating it be explanatory? ("We must petition
Mr. Jenkins"; "Mr. Jenkins?"; "We must petition the Home
Secretary"). Similarly, in Quine's terms (Quine, 1970 ), the
same "eternal" sentence can be expressed through different "non-
eternal" sentences, if there are relevant differences in their
in the
context of utterance - e.g., /exchange above, it being known on
the one hand, and not known on the other, that Mr. Jenkins is
the Home Secretary - and again this seems to give some scope
for explanation. (Furthermore, what is the case about X could
perhaps be restated - though this may not be "restatement" in
Wong's sense here - by means even of different statements
(different "eternal" sentences), "redescribing" X, which surely
might often then be counted as explanations).
10. The criticisms made of Samuelson's views through Wong's schema
of p. 319 seem to rely heavily on Wong's concentration on the
3. vi
lines running horizontally, to the neglect of moves in (p. 319)
"the northerly direction . .. /of/ increasing generality or univers¬
ality". Yet the schema might surely be held to embody a proced¬
ure Wong approves (even if he would not approve of the terms
Samuelson might describe it in): in Wong's terms, may we not
"explain" the consequences C of theory B, in the schema, by the
more general theory B+ ? - a theory which would then of course
have "testable consequences beyond the explanandum" (since C
is only a subset of C+, the complete logical consequence set of
theory B+).
11. Wong does not show (see the argument above and note 12 below)
that Samuelson is precluded from employing criteria for "better"
descriptive power that are akin to Wong's own (p. 317) for explana-
toriness. And whilst some statements on method may have a
clear enough meaning to be criticised in their own right, inde¬
pendently of how (or whether) their makers put them into practice,
Samuelson's claim that an explanation is "a better kind of descrip¬
tion" is surely not sufficiently specific to serve in itself as a firm
target for Wong's attack.
12. A later argument of Wong against Samuelson (Wong, p. 320)
might be mobilised here, to show violation of a second require¬
ment for explanatoriness, were it not that this argument too
appears incomplete. The claim would then be that if the descript-
ivist desire "to ground theories in observational statements" were
realised, the requirement that the explanans of an explanatory
3. vii
theory mustinelude at least one universal law would be infringed,
because "an unrestricted universal statement is not equivalent to
a finite conjunction of observational statements". However, an
answer would be needed to a natural retort of the descriptivist:
that a universal statement may nonetheless be equivalent to an
infinite conjunction of observational statements.
13. However, though I think this may just be a matter of emphasis,
Samuelson probably does dwell unduly on what would hold for
notional "logically complete" consequence sets (see note 32). I
also agree with Wong that a Quinean point may have some force
against Samuelson's objections to Friedman's case (see note 34).
(Why, however, doesn't Wong count these issues in the dispute as
"substantive" ones?)
14. The neglect of some of th e statements Friedman makes which
has characterised much of the debate is documented in greater
detail in Appendix A.
Unless an argument strong enough to justify passing over
these qualifications is provided first, setting them aside surely
seems unfair; but yet very few who agree with Wong's interpreta¬
tion here offer any argument in support of it, many1 not even appear¬
ing to recognise that the qualifications are there. Since the quali¬
fications are made, it seems to me that in fairness some mention
must be made of them (and that this would be so, even if there
were compelling reasons for subsequently setting them aside).
However in Chapters 4 and 5, where a deeper answer to the
3. viii
Mystery is sought, I ask why there should have been so many
Mystery-augmenting omissions of significant parts of Fridman's
case - and allow that they may not have been altogether unprovoked.
15. See also page 3.9 below.
16. Since Friedman does not, I think, use the term "testability" in
"The Methodology" (and Wong gives no reference here), it might
seem hard to know just what Wong understands by "testability (in
Friedman's sense)". But Wong surely must intend this as a
reference to Friedman's (p. 8) statement about testing the validity
of a hypothesis by comparing its predictions with experience
(having taken note of Friedman's (p. 9) phrase "the validity of a
hypothesis in this sense" without taking note of the rest of the
sentence it occurs in).
17. Unless there is a statement to the contrary, the term "instrument-
alism" is used below to mean "instrumentalism as defined by
Wong": for the most part, I assume for the sake of argument that
instrumentalism is what he says it is.
Perhaps instrumentalism need not be what Wong says it is;
and in that case it is conceivable that Friedman could legitimately
be described as instrumentalist. But then my objection would
run parallel with that to Wong's treatment of Samuelson: Friedman's
being an instrumentalist in some other sense would give no grounds
for attributing to him, and criticising him for, views peculiar to
the instrumentalism of Wong's particular definition. If Wong has
defined instrumentalism adequately, then Friedman isn't an
3. ix
instrumentalist; or again, if Friedman is an instrumentalist,
then Wong hasn't adequately defined instrumentalism. Either
way, Wong's criticisms of the position he defines needn't affect
Friedman.
In fact, Popper also defines instrumentaiism fairly narrowly
(and more narrowly than Nagel does), when he writes (1963, p. 101)
that "the instrumentalist view asserts that theories are nothing but
instruments". But he recognises, as Wong appears not to have
done here, that less narrow views will not fall under a narrow
definition. Thus, he allows that the claim that theories do serve
« ———
as instruments is consistent with non-instrumentalist positions,
pointing out that disagreement between instrumentalists and those
who held "the Galilean view . .. that /theoriesj are not only instru¬
ments but also - and mainly - descriptions of the world" would not
be settled by showing that "theories are instruments" since "both
were agreed on this point" (p. 101). He also says (p. 63) that "that
theories may be used in this way ... as practical instruments or
tools for such purposes as the prediction of impending events . ..
cannot be doubted". I doubt if Friedman need be labelled
"instrumentalist" on Popper's definition either. (See especially
note 19; but also notes 18 and 48, and pages 3.9 and 3.10).
Whereas I take this reference to "other grounds" as additional
evidence that Friedman is not concerned with immediate predictive
performance to the total exclusion of theother considerations often
canvassed here, some critics (typically citing out of context his
earlier (p. 8) remark about the validity of a hypothesis) have
seized on it as instead betokening inconsistency. (Might Wong
be doing so too? See below. ) Though loud in denouncing exclus¬
ive concern with predictive success, and in proclaiming the
importance of recognising the variousother factors, they yet
insist that Friedman's own reference to "other grounds" has to
be ruled out of court. But they appear to take it as a datum that
his concern with prediction is an exclusive one.
However, it might be argued that such "other" factors as
Friedman does admit are still seen by him as contributing in a
wider context to the ability to predict (to the ability to predict well
in areas of increasing scope in the future, perhaps given constraint
on time and resources to spend on predicting). The sketch he
gives of how the criteria of simplicity and fruitfulness apply tends
to bear out this suggestion; and, after all, he does write (p. 7) of
the development of theories yielding "valid and meaningful"
predictions as "the ultimate goal of a positive science". But
since exclusive concern with developing prediction in the wider
context would, on this view, include concern with simplcity and
fruitfulness (and might allow that immediate predictive success is
not the be-all and end-all), would it any longer be objectionable
to Friedman's critics, as leaving important factors out of account?
Perhaps the protest might now be made that a further consideration
is crucial - namely, a theory's explanatory power. But Friedman
apparently sees prediction as going hand-in-hand with explanation -
a view that some philosophers support. See below, page 3.9.
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Immediately after saying that Friedman's instrumentalism
is "quite evident", Wong does mention "apparent ambiguities and
inconsistencies in his essay" - now claiming that these "can best
be sorted out" (p. 314) by treating Friedman's view as instrument¬
alist. Is there an implicit reference to Friedman's recognition
of "other grounds" in this? (All thatWong adds is that "all
/Friedman's^ methodological prescriptions" are "subsidiary" to
the "overriding methodological maxim ... of successful prediction").
19. Several commentators have drawn attention to Friedman's prag¬
matic talk here of whether it will "pay to use" a theory, rather
than of whether there are grounds for believing the theory. (See
also Chapter 4, note 41 , on the ambiguity in Friedman's (p. 9)
phrase, "the hypothesis ... is accepted . . ."). But it is of
course usual to take practical considerations into account in some
contexts: Samuelson (in 1965), Nagel and Popper all also allow
that, in Popper's words (1963, p. 113), "for instrumental
purposes of practical application a theory may continue to be used
even after its refutation, within the limits of its applicability".
20. Wong's expression of claims made about Friedman's position in
Klappholz and Agassi's criticism of it (1959). Wong accepts the
claims; but does not, it appears, accept them as criticisms,
saying (p. 315) that "we can understand Friedman's position".
See page 3.14 , and note 48. See also Chapter 4, for some
support of Klappholz and Agassi's main, and more favourable,
thesis about "The Methodology". (Wong does mention
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their contention "that Friedman's position is essentially a critical
one" (Wong, p. 314), saying that their interpretation is "an
alternative" to his instrumentalist one; but is it? - and, if it were,
how could it be "evident" that Friedman is an instrumentalist?
See p. 3.11 above; note 18; and Chapter 4).
21. See note 37.
22. Does this contradict the admission of "other grounds" than
predictive success for accepting a theory? On simplicity and
fruitfulness as possible means to a predictive goal, see note 18.
23. Coddington believes that "the structural equivalence of explanation
and prediction can only be maintained by a rather drastic distorta-
tion of the customary concept of explanation" (1972, p. 4); and he
remarks that "it may be in half-conscious acknowledgement of
this distortion that Friedman always puts the word "explain" in
inverted commas. The point is that if the word "explain" is
being used in its customary sense, why is it necessary to put it in
inverted commas?" My example from page 13 of "The Method¬
ology" puts the lie to Coddington's strict "always" (as would other
examples: e.g. Friedman, pp. 12 and 28); but it would be quibbling
to make much of this, since these counter-examples seem to come
either soon after an occurrence of "explain" that_is in inverted
commas, or else in phrases in which "explain" was marked in
this way in a previous use. But I think there are several possible
reasons for this "encapsulation", apart from that Coddington
suggests. (Consider, for instance, Friedman's use of inverted
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commas with the term "assumptions", where he holds (p. 23)
that "the very concept of the "assumptions" of a theory is surrounded
with ambiguity" (admittedly, however, his own use of this term
too has been the subject of criticism; see Appendix A); or his
use of them with "realistic"). Although well aware that what we
count as explanatory, and what we can justify so counting, have
been matters of dispute, Coddington evidently, but I think rashly,
assumes here that there is just one clear sense of "explain" - the
"customary" one - and that there is nothing loose or potentially
misleading about this customary usage. (Later in his paper he
is, however, more hesitant. ) See below, and note 25.
24. If not before, Coddington notes that Marshall subscribed to the
symmetry view - though, according to Coddington, he did so on
grounds that Friedman could not admit.
25. It might be objected that none of this respectability can attach to
Friedman's position, because in "The Methodology" he fails to
draw the fairly standard distinction between secure prediction in
accordance with lawlike, potentially truly explanatory, regular¬
ities (the prediction for which any symmetry claims could best
be made) and prediction based merely on statistical ones. But
the mere lack of explicit reference to this distinction is not in
itself decisive evidence of failure to accept it. There is perhaps
indeed something rather bald in the particular observed or
supposed regularities that Friedman offers as theories, of market
behaviour in "The Methodology", of national income determination
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in his Quantity Theory writings; but, on the other hand, Friedman
would doubtless have plead that, if this is so, it is just a symptom
of economics still being at a primitive stage, compared with other
"positive" sciences. Though not claiming that Friedman's
position altogether coincides with the Hempel-Oppenheim one, I
would argue that his implicit suggestion of treating explanation
and prediction together is not, given Hempel-Oppenheim, patently
indefensible. See notes 18 and 48.
I am not arguing, then, that Friedman's approach to explana¬
tion is correct: to hold views that are respectable is not necess¬
arily to hold views that are right (see also note 26). But many
commentators have surely, like Wong, at the least been too swift
in announcing dismissal. Even Coddington, who advances beyond
many critics here in his recognition of the Hempel-Oppenheim
view, apparently assumes that Friedman's position must be a
shallow one. True, Coddington does (pp. 4, 5) invoke the well-
worn example of the daily rising sun in order to illustrate the
objection that, whereas an event can be predicted on the basis of
a generalisation that "may be seen merely as a de iacto regularity",
it can hardly be "explained by subsuming it under a de facto
regularity", explanation requiring in addition "some sort of causal
narrative" - an objection that does not seem to me to be wholly
convincing (do we in fact ever predict that the sun will rise merely
on the basis of a de facto regularity? Can we predict confidently
where only de facto regularities do seem to be involved (tossing a
coin; three heads in a row . ..)? Couldn't it be said that, in so
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far as primitive man (or Coddington's "small child") would be
confident in predicting the rising of the sun next day, they could
also be said, to that extent to be able to explain it? - having some,
albeit very elementary, grasp of the "underlying process"
(Coddington, p. 5) that is involved?) But it seems that Coddington
himself is not quite convinced by the objection either, for he goes
on to write; "it may be that, at the deepest level of analysis, the
distinction cannot be made between de facto regularities and causal
processes: what we regard as causal processes may simply be
de facto regularities of sufficient familiarity". However, he adds;
"But at the level of analysis appropriate to the present discussion,
the distinction seems sustainable, and, if any sense is to be made
of the concept of explanation, indispensable" (p. 7). But why
should a relatively superficial level of analysis be all that is
"appropriate" for "the present discussion"? - a discussion presented
as one that "has implications for the conflict between operation-
alism and realism", in which Coddington sees Friedman's view as
"compatible with operationalism and the predictive but not the
explanatory value of theories" (Friedman, of course, being held to
take "the predictive performance of a theory as the overriding
criterion of its acceptability")'. See also note 23. (Some other
points in Coddington's paper are given a more favourable reception
in Chapters 4 and 5).
26. Again, the views of well-known philosophers are of course not
sacrosanct (see note 25). In this case, the authority of Popper is
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challenged by that of Kuhn. Kuhn takes a very different view of
the significance of counter-instances, writing (1962, p. 80) "there
are, I think, only two alternatives: either no scientific theory
ever confronts a counter-instance, or all such theories confront
counter-instances at all times".
As before (note 25), my general claim is only that Friedman's
position is less parochial both in scope and in appeal than Wong
appears to suppose. But any support for Friedman's views that
is implicit in the writings of Popper is especially significant in
this context, because Wong professes hostility to Friedman's posi-
#
tion but draws heavily on Popper in developing his own.
i
([n claiming that some of Friedman's individual views have
some respectability, I do not mean to suggest that his views as a
whole must accord with a single, broad tradition in philosophy
which is the respectable one. "Respectability" in this sense need
not, for instance, coincide with "conventionalism" in Boland's
(see note 4) (see, however, note 30 too).)
27, The moderate interpretation does run into problems with some of
the examples Friedman gives, which it cannot readily accommo¬
date; but it will be argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that the extreme
interpretation would meet with similar problems too. (See also
note 29).
28. The idea that Friedman_is careless in "The Methodology" has
appealed to some critics; but usually only as a possible explana¬
tion of some single statement, which alone is recognised as
"errant". (See note 18).
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29. One possibility that he might perhaps have drawn attention to is
that "The Methodology" may not have been written expressly to
express Friedman's methodological view but instead to support a
particular group of economic theories. Were this so, then what
will still appear as aberrations when Friedman is taken to be an
instrumentalist (in Wong's narrow sense) need not after all be con¬
strued as unwitting ones but can be conceived as instead being
deliberate. Sensing that even his, let us suppose, extreme instru¬
mentalist views would not be strong enough to support his favoured
economic theories, Friedman might have intermixed them in the
essay with moderating statements, perhaps to confuse the scent
and perhaps (to mix metaphors) to sugar the pill that non-
instrumentalists too would be being asked to swallow. Such an
interpretation (a far cry from the account Wong actually offers)
would approach quite nearly the interpretation of "The Methodology"
to be given in Chapters 4 and 5. But in these circumstances, such
extreme views on method as Friedman might privately hold surely
could not be attributed to him confidently without evidence that is
independent of "The Methodology", where reservations are made;
and it would not be reasonable, I think, to attack him as Wong's
extreme instrumentalist on the basis of this essay alone. See
note 27; and Chapters 4 and 5.
30. Wong writes of Friedman criticising, as it were inevitably, "from
an instrumentalist point of view" (p. 318)- and this makes me
wonder whether he may have the Kuhnian account of incommensur-
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able paradigms in mind here. Kuhn writes (p. 93): "When para¬
digms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice,
their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own para¬
digm to argue in that paradigm's defense. The resulting circular¬
ity does not, of course, make the arguments wrong or even
ineffectual ... Yet, whatever its force, the status of the circular
argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically
or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into
the circle". But of course by no means all unresolved disputes
are debates about paradigm choice; and this one doesn't seem to
me to be; couldn't it be said that, whatever philosophical differences
they profess, still both Friedman and Samuelson are practitioners
of, and apologists for, the same (very broad) tradition in economics,
practitioners that is of, albeit now perhaps near crisis, "normal
science" in this field? (See notes 4, 26, 49 and 50; and Chapter 6).
Nor is it clear that any differences there may be between Friedman
and Samuelson here must stem from those differences in political
persuasion or "fundamental differences in basic values" about
which "men can ultimately only fight" (Friedman, p. 5) (if indeed
such differences there be) (see the end of Chapter 4, and Chapter 6).
Thus, even if there are disputes in which some sort of "stalemate"
situation is inevitable, it remains to be shown that this is one of
them. (See also note 35.)
Wong surely is a prisoner of the narrowness of his labels
here. For, supposing that Friedman and Samuelson were respect¬
ively instrumentalist and descriptivist in some sense, there is still
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some support in the literature for the ideas that instrumentalist
and descriptivist positions may not always be fundamentally
opposed and that, where they are, some issues may tell decisively
between them. Popper holds thatinstrumentalism, on his main
definition (which seems to be fairly close to Wong's) is opposed to
the Galilean view that "theories are . .. descriptions of the world";
though, in contrast with what I suspect would be Wong's view
("suspect", since the Galilean view is not the same as Wong's
"descriptivism"), he argues that the struggle between the viev/s so
defined is one in which "there is much at stake" (1963, p. 101) and
in which there are clear grounds, which presumably could be painted
out to the instrumentalist, for taking a stand "with Galileo against
instrumentalism" (p. 117). On the other hand, he also allows that
it would be in keeping with an instrumentalist line of argument to
arrive at a position (one he has "not so far encountered in the
literature" (p. 109)) according to which the dispositional words
used in theories may be counted as giving descriptions, but descrip¬
tions that "have nevertheless a purely instrumental function"
(p. 110). And the argument leading to this position is one which,
Popper says, "is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to criticize;
for our whole question - whether science is descriptive or instru¬
mental - is here exposed as a pseudo-problem" (p. 109). Then
Nagel (who characterises instrumentalist and descriptivist views
as considerably more permissive than on Wong's account) points
out that those who differ over whether theories can meaningfully
be said to be true or false "frequently disagree neither on matters
3. xx
falling into the province of experimental inquiry nor on points of
formal logic nor on the facts of scientific procedure" (1961., p. 141).
On Nagel's account, the opposition between the two positions would
be more apparent than real, with each able to meet "the prima facie
difficulties it faces"; whereas Wong seems to suggest that the
opposition between the positions as he sees them is real and inevit¬
able, but that each position is wrong. (Nagel does say that, with
the positions he is dealing with often divided by "in part, loyalties
to different intellectual traditions, in part inarbitrable preferences
concerning the appropriate way of accommodating our language
to the generally admitted facts", controversy "can be prolonged
indefinitely". But he adds "the obvious moral" that, when the
positions are stated circumspectly, "the question as to which of
them is the 'correct position' has only terminological interest"
(1961, p. 141)). See also notes 4, 5, 8, 17 and 48.
31. For the Theorem seems to ask us to consider a theory quite in
general, in speaking of "all consequences"; and Friedman holds
that if we do consider a theory without reference to any particular
"use to which the /theory] is to be put" (Friedman, p. 26), then
it becomes unclear what is to count as a consequence, the very
distinction between assumptions and consequences becoming blurred.
See also note 32.
32. Probably Samuelson would not be alone in taking the phrase to
mean this. Of course such a reading does involve stretching the
meaning of the term "consequences" to include even so-called
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"assumptions", in so far as the latter are also implied by the
theory; but the term can bear this technical sense. (Wong's point
about differences over the forms of theories desired for practical
purposes would then only be relevant at a later stage - the discussion
of the importance of the, then valid, Theorem about necessary
theoretical relationships).
Alternatively, Friedman might reject the Theorem as inco¬
herent. Or he might argue that, when the term "consequences"
does have a clear reference (i.e. in his terms, when the use to
which the theory is to be put is known), "all consequences" comes
to the same as just the consequences specific to (relevant in) that
use, and that then, on his account of the uses of theories, the
Theorem is false. (Here Samuelson might dispute whether these
uses are desirable - a question that could still, however, be discuss¬
able). But this final possibility, which could conceivably be what
Wong has in mind, involves, as I think Friedman would agree, a
somewhat esoteric reading of the Theorem, with this time perhaps
drastic confinement to the meaning of the word "all".
I wonder whether Wong may have here confused a claim that the
assumption set's truth value is irrelevant to the acceptability of a
theory with an, as it were higher order, view that any objections
that might be raised (any arguments to the effect that truth of
assumptions is relevant after all) are likewise irrelevant to the
acceptability of the claim. (See also note 39. )
Virtually, if not quite all, Wong does suggest that the way in which
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Samuelson has misinterpreted one point might be brought out in the
defence (but see page 3.15). But a further objection that Wong per¬
mits his instrumentalist defender to make - that even if "the part .. .
of the assumption set corresponding to the invalid part of the conse¬
quence set" could be eliminated, still "it may be required for the
generation of the valid predictions" (p. 316) - surely comes to little
more than reassertion unless we are told more about what is meant
by "required". If it means merely "useful" or "convenient", then
doesn't the objection need expansion if it is to have any weight?
Any circumstances that Wong's instrumentalists might appeal to
here, however, as ones in which the retention of this part of the
assumption set could indeed be convenient (see, e.g. , Friedman,
pp. 17 and 18), will surely introduce factors that would qualify to
some extent the "single-mindedness" of their pursuit of immediate
predictive success. On the other hand, the difficulty of identifying
this "corresponding part" of the ' assumption set having been waived
here, surely this part of the set, which presumably harbours its own
invalidity, cannot be necessary for the generation of valid predictions?
(See the end of Chapter 4).
Why doesn't Wong permit his instrumentalists to raise here
themselves the difficulty he is later to raise independently (p. 318)
- the Quinean point that it may not always be possible to single out
one assumption in an assumption set as the "guilty party"? (a
point that does, I think, have some force against the Corollary;
though, on possibilities for sometimes detecting the "culprit", see
Popper, 1963, p. 112). This is a difficulty which, it seems to me,
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the instrumentalists are in a better position to highlight than is
Wong; for, since he is to stipulate that the explanans of a theory
"must not be known to be false", mayn't he be putting himself
into the embarrassing position of having to jettison whole sets of
assumptions because it is known they are somewhere false (though
perhaps in the slightest way) but it isn't known where? See note
13 and page 3.14.
35. Dispute over "The Methodology" has indeed sometimes reduced to
a similarly sterile series of claim and counter-claim, without
fruitful exchanges (whence in part the Mystery? see page 3.9,
and Chapters 2 and 4); but surely it need not have done (see note
30). And encouraging the series to continue further does not seem
to me to be a forward step: Wong's "Friedman-type defense"
(p. 316) carries the suggestion that no more powerful or productive
answer to the charges (and in particular none of the elements in
Wong's own "independent" critique) are likely to be available to
Friedman.
Of course, reasserting those specific parts of Friedman's
case that critics have overlooked in making their criticisms would
be an important part of any answer to them; but, though Samuelson
may indeed have been guilty of some neglect, the reassertive
answer to him that Wong suggests is surely not one of the approp¬
riate character. It seems to me (though not, I think, to Wong:
see note 4) that in the "Friedman-Samuelson dispute" there is
scope for reaching a far better understanding between disputants
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than there has so far been (on which points, if any, are genuinely
ones on which these disputants must agree to differ) and indeed
scope for a fair measure of agreement too (see also note 50).
36. See note 20. Although Wong does appear to present Klapphclz
and Agassi's critical claims as ones that are true of instrumental-
ism without necessarily being sufficient to denigrate it, there is
some confusion about Wong's own attitude here. (I suspect that,
when he does eventually find fault with instrumentalism, he may
be doing so on much the same grounds. See note 48).
37. Wong does, of course, spurn instrumentalism as "anti-intellectual"
(see page 3. 18). But the basis on which he actually makes this
rejection seems, as I shall argue below, extraordinarily weak.
Here, on the question of explanatory power, instrumentalist theories
do, according to him, comply with a key requirement of going
"beyond pure description" (p. 324); and instrumentalism appears
to blot its copy-book in his eyes only by not noticing that they have
done so (the "disregard" he laments). However, his instrumental¬
ists could in principle accept theories which have known false
assumptions, on all fours with theories which haven't; whereas
holders of Wong's explanatory view could not; and so it is puzzling
that Wong does not claim to have defeated instrumentalism in a
very "similar fashion" to that used to "defeat" descriptivism.
(Could it be that theories with known false assumptions are not,
after all, to be rejected by Wong, since he too could be willing to
use them for some practical purposes? (See note 19). Even if
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he were willing to do so (and he does not canvass this possibility
himself), he is still, in contrast with his instrumentalists, committed
to regarding such theories as in principle having a different status
from ones whose assumptions may be true).
If known false assumptions are necessarily inferior ones on
Wong's explanatory view of theories, but are not necessarily
inferior according to his instrumentalists, shouldn't Wong see this
as a "substantive issue" in the dispute ?
38. In his, not always adequately supported, attacks on Samuelson's
position, Wong is outspoken; among many examples are "we have
now shown that there is not much substance to Samuelson's critique
from an instrumentalist point of view" (p. 318); "it was shown that
Samuelson's presentation of the relationship between a theory and
its assumptions and consequences is wrong" (p. 318); "now a
refutation of Samuelson's descriptivist methodology will be given"
(p. 320). It seems improbable, then, that Wong holds back from
claiming Friedman vanquished too merely from diffidence; as
witness also the confidence of his introduction ("What then is the
»
excuse to write yet another paper on methodology? The alternative
s
to bad methodological discussion is not no methodological discussion"
(p. 312)); and the terms in which he goes on to disparage the position
he cannot defeat (see below).
39. Or perhaps from confusing Popper's statement that "instruments,
even theories in so far as they are instruments, cannot be refuted"
(Popper, 1963, p. 113) with the meta-claim that the instrumentalist
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view cannot be refuted either (see also notes 33 and 49; note 30 too)
40. The sentence Wong quotes (about "'assumptions' that are wildly
inaccurate descriptive representations of reality ..." and etc.)
comes from this passage; the different page reference he gives
is an error.
41. Admittedly, though, Friedman's way of putting the argument could
be misleading: see Chapter 4. (On the particular phrase,
"descriptively false", see also note 42 and Appendix B. )
42. Indeed, in Chapter 4 a good deal will be made of the idea that what
is literally a falsehood could perhaps actually fulfil the role of
summarising detailed truth (in which circumstances it might be
misleading to think of omitting detail and including falsehood as
entirely separate processes; see Appendix B).
43. It could, I suppose, be the case instead that Wong has recognised
that a third interpretation, not so common in the literature, is
possible (see note 42) but has actually then been so swayed by
Friedman's argument for that third position that now he is chary
of parading too prominently his previous conviction that known
false assumptions should be excluded. But I don't think this is
likely.
44. It is tempting to remark that, had Wong himself articulated this
reply (anticipating the objection to his account), he might then
have become more receptive to Friedman's remark that the validity
of a theory (in "Friedman's sense") was not a sufficient criterion
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on which to choose between theories.
Without some such additional argument, Wong would seem
to have to withdraw his stipulation about truth and concede that, on
this, the instrumentalists have been right. With such an argument,
must he concede that Samuelson is right? Wong denies that the
choice must be one between Samuelson and the instrumentalists;
but, on the other hand, surely he must choose between rejecting
known false assumptions and not rejecting them? Perhaps he
could still argue, however, that Samuelson is right about what the
outcome of the latter choice should be, but is right for the wrong
reasons. (See note 4; but also note 50).
45. Wong may fancy thatit will not do to criticise his instrumentalists
for failing to live up to standards that they themselves would
repudiate: if the sole interest his instrumentalists have (and ack¬
nowledge as worthy) is prediction, is it reasonable to criticise
them for not serving the cause of explanation? But Wong's descript-
ivists were similarly interested in description rather than explana¬
tion; and they were taken to task for this. (See notes 30 and 37).
46. See note 17.
47. Wong does tell us that he takes the epithet to express "the spirit
of Samuelson's F-Twist caricature". But since, according to
Wong, Samuelson's F-Twist account is not only internally unsatis¬
factory but is also, apparently in almost every particular, a "mis¬
interpretation of Friedman's methodology" (p. 316), I do not see
just what "spirit" Wong can think is left.
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For the adjective "intellectual", the concise Oxford Diction¬
ary (more or less echoed by Webster) gives: "of, appealing to,
requiring the exercise of intellect". Now surely forming any
general doctrine about scientific method, instrumentalism not
excepted, will require "the exercise of intellect"; as will putting
even Wong's crude version of instrumentalism into practice (for
instance, which predictions are to count will be a matter of judg¬
ment for Wong's instrumentalists, for they do not deal (even then,
mechanically?) with a theory's "complete" consequence set). Then
Wong is committed to claiming that his brand of instrumentaiism
does at least "appeal to the intellect" of Friedman; whilst Popper,
to whom Wong refers us for discussion of instrumentalism,
presents it as having "appealed to the intellect" of Bohr, Bridgman,
Duhem, Eddington, Hertz, Kirchhoff, Mach, Poincare, Schlick,
Ryle and Wittgenstein (Popper, 1963, p. 99, n. 5, etc.). (Nagel
has the instrumentalism of his definition as appealing also to the
intellects of Peirce, Ramsay, Dewey, Watson and Toulmin).
Aren't any of these "intellects" to count?
Given his reliance on Popper, it indeed seems fairly likely that
Wong's intention here (though see note 49) is to echo Popper's
indictment of instrumentalism as being, despite what he sees as
attractions, "as obscurantist a philosophy as essentialism" (1963,
p. 113). Popper does attempt to justify his charge. Taking the
instrumentalists' attitude to be "one of complacency at the success
of applications", he argues that their interpretation will "be unable
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to account for real tests, which are attempted refutations, and
will not get beyond the assertion that different theories have differ¬
ent ranges of application. But then it cannot possibly account for
scientific progress" (1963, p. 113). He contrasts the prediction
of events of a kind which is known (e.g. the prediction of eclipses)
with the prediction of "new kinds of events" (discoveries) (p. 117),
saying that instrumentalisrn can only account for the former, and
that it goes against the scientific spirit of discovery - the attempt
to explain the known by the unknown and thus to extend the realm
of the known. According to Popper, instrument--
alisrn is out of keeping with the Greek tradition of rational criticism
in accordance with which scientists have created myths or con¬
jectures, theories "which are in striking contrast to the everyday
world of common experience, yet able to explain some aspects of
this world of common experience" (p. 102).
These criticisms of instrumentalism do not command universal
assent; and Nagel in particular has questioned their applicability.
But if Wong is taking them to be powerful (and so as unquestionably
decisive against those he would call instrumentalists in natural
science?), surely they still would not justify spurning Friedman's
arguments on methodology as "anti-intellectual", because
(a) we need to be told more about what constitutes a "real
test" and a "discovery" in the social sciences, where Popper
himself says that theories "are at best approximations" (see
page 3. 10);
(b) in his gestures towards a fuller view of scientific method,
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Friedman doesn't seem unduly complacent about the past "success
of applications" (e.g. "any theory is necessarily provisional and
subject to change with the advance of knowledge" (p. 41); "the
tentative state of knowledge that alone makes scientific activity
meaningful" (p. 34); (but see also (d));
(c) he does seem to hint at a criterion of progress, when
(pp. 33 and 34) he speaks of the increasing ability of science to
reveal more "fundamental" and "simple" structures (see also
Chapter 4); and he himself points out that he has not described
the process of scientific discovery (recognising that "the construc¬
tion of hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, intuition,
invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar
material" (p. 43) - Grecian, this?);
(d) although the specific hypotheses he discusses can indeed
scarcely be looked to for successful predictions of new kinds of
events, so that there may appe ar to be, and perhaps even be, some
complacency here (see Chapters 4 and 5), still he is after all
arguing against those who would thoughtlessly discard such
hypotheses altogether, out of hand; and in so far as his claim is
only that theories known to be imperfect can still be used to advan¬
tage, the more so in the absence of worthy rivals, Popper would
agree with him (see note 19).
Even if the "anti-intellectual" charge does have meaning,
then, as an oblique reference to Popper's charge of "obscurantism",
it is a charge against Friedman that need not stick. (Would such
a charge against Friedman differ much from the criticisms
3. xxxi
Klappholz and Agassi make, either? See note 36).
. His next sentence is: "instrumentalism provides a self-justification
for its methods and its methodological choices. " Does this add
anything? - I am not sure what the statement means. If it is
about the circularity involved in defending an alleged paradigm,
then it isn't clear that the statement is true (see note 30: mightn't
the relevant paradigm, within which criticism must take place,
be the, only identical if instrumentalism_is completely justified,
one set by scientific method itself?); and, if it were true, surely
any rival methodology would be in the very same boat. Or is the
statement again intended to echo Popper's attack (on the grounds
of complacency (see note 48), and the grounds that "the instru¬
mentalist view may be used ad hoc for rescuing a . . . theory which
is threatened by contradictions" (Popper, 1963, p. 113))? - if so,
there seems to be some confusion between justification (of practice,
by a doctrine on method) and self-justification (of one of these, by
itself). Wong does offer quotations from Johnson (1971, p. 13)
in illustration of the "self-justification" statement, but their
relationship to it is not clear. The specific plaint Johnson makes
against the methodology of positive economics (that it necessarily
repudiates interest in explanation) is not, I think, enough to back
Wong's position against Friedman here (see page 3.9; note 37;
and also Chapter 4).
For, notwithstanding his criticism of Friedman in 1963 (which I
am tempted to describe as an S-Twist), Samuelson himself has
3. xxxii
elsewhere shown, both before and since, surprising tolerance
of assumptions that seem to fit the Friedman mould. Loud echoes
of "The Methodology" are present in Sainuelson (1962) (an article
itself to become notorious) where, having claimed some value for
truly "heroic abstraction", he writes (p. 194): "What I propose
to do here is to show that a new concept, the "Surrogate Production
Function", can provide some rationalisation for the validity of the
simple J.B. Clark parables which pretend there is a single thing
called "capital" that can be put into a single production function
and along with labour will produce total output (of a homogeneous
good or of some desired market-basket of goods) ... I shall use
the new tools of the Surrogate Production Function (/note : J one
might call this the As If Production Function) and Surrogate Capital
to show how we can sometimes predict exactly how certain quite
complicated heterogeneous capital models will behave by treating
them as if they had come from a simple generating production
function (even when we know that they did not really come from
such a function)." Then in 1965, after giving explicit recognition
to the value of theories that are simple or that link well with other
accepted theories, Samuelson goes on to admit that there could be
a situation where one should accept a theory some of whose conse¬
quences have been refuted (a situation in which the discrepancies
are agreed to be unimportant; and in which no alternative theory
that would share only the valid consequences of the theory in
question is available). Most recently comes the Nobel Prize
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lecture of 1970 (A.E.R., 1972) (based in part on an earlier paper
in Lerner(ed., 1965)). Here Samuelson speaks with approval
of Mach and of "more economical" descriptions of nature. And
he uses examples from physics - examples with a familiar sound:
"As I shall discuss in connection with the role of maximum principles
in natural science, the plumb-line trajectory of a falling apple and
the elliptical orbit of a wandering planet may be capable of being
described by the optimising solution for a specifiable programming
problem. But no one will be tempted to fall into a reverse version
of the Pathetic Fallacy and attribute to the apple or the planet
freedom of choice and consciously deliberative minimising. None¬
theless, to say 'Galileo's ball rolls down the inclined plane as if
to minimise the integral of action or to minimise Hamilton's
integral' does prove to be useful to the observing physicists, eager
to formulate predictable uniformities of nature" (1972, p. 250).
This passage might surely almost have been Friedman's own. But
no mention is made of him.
4. 1
Chapter 4
THE WHITE, THE CREY AND THE BLACK
It can generally go without saying that reaching a fair judgment
on what a man says requires first a knowledge of what he does say.
Yet much of the hottest debate in the Friedman Affair has concerned
propositions thatit is arguable Friedman is not committed to; whilst
some objections raised, as though for the first time, are ones he had
anticipated and tried to meet in 19 53.
It would be possible, though tedious, to document in detail this
1
history of neglect of Friedman's statements, with the scorning of
debate by Friedman and some of his followers that has been associated
with it; but behind the history would still lie the question why there
should have been so much neglect. Its persistence and extent point to
more than simple slackness. One influential factor may well have been
the convenience of the bastard versions of "The Methodology" for
"justifying work thatproduced apparently surprising results without
feeling obliged to explain just why they occurred" (Johnson, 1971, p. 13);
but by no means all contributors to this methodological debate have had
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private empirical axes to grind. The key to the misunderstandings
seems to me to lie rather in the fact that many critics of Friedman's
essay, feeling sure it is somewhere at fault, have sought the error in
the wrong place.
For though "The Methodology" is written with such easy elegance,
the very smoothness masks a tension between two themes. I want to
4.2
suggest that recurrent misreadings of the essay have resulted from
attempts to criticise it as a study in the large of methodology, promised
in the title, without taking into account the rather special nature of
5
Friedman's brand of the positive economics billed there too. Friedman's
underlying aim in "The Methodology" is not after all, I think, to give a
general account of correct scientific method, merely illustrating the
story from his own field of interest: his concern is with establishing a
particular theory of the firm (and other economic theory of similar
6 7
origin), rather than with methodology as such. The nature of the
economic theory Friedman champions then explains why so much of his
essay concentrates on exposing the naivety of those who reject "unreal-
8
istic , and indeed false, assumptions out of hand; and his emphasis on
this need not be taken to show that he sees in falsehood an end to be
pursued for its own sake and even to be given pride of place in his whole
methodological system. But if the aim of "The Methodology" is indeed
of so specific a character, then some familiar types of objection to the
argument are conspicuously incomplete; and those who have made them,
however correct in their basic conviction that some move in the essay
would prove to be objectionable, have been much too hasty in claiming
already to have uncovered the move that is.
On the interpretation that I am suggesting, Friedman would lay
special stress on just those principles of method that might then seem
to underwrite the specific case that he has at heart. Thus, the theme
that standard scientific practice rightly involves being selective and
telling less than the whole truth would be specially highlighted where it
4.3
verges on licensing untruth too, largely because falsehoods enter into
the case Friedman is concerned with. But, in terms of the lie-telling
analogy, if Friedman is arguing for "telling fibs" only in certain situa¬
tions, then those criticisms are indecisive that assume he advocates this
"evil" universally, never recognising the value of what is good. Some
critics take his remarks about lying out of context and there condemn
them, conflating pleas in defence of this lie or that with exhortations to
fib all the time; whilst others take him to task for failing to extol truth-
telling, neglecting the fact that he may be concerned with those special
circumstances in which, his whole point is, the literal truth need not be
told. What both groups leave out of account is the question whether
Friedman's lies are white. Whether you call them white or not, yet
others might say, they are still lies; and the damage done to the practice
of being honest by allowing exceptions to the truth-telling rule will far
outweigh any direct good achieved by particular lies. From this point
of view, even allegedly "white" lies will come out on balance as black.
But this attack too is weakened by failure to refer in detail to Friedman's
particular cases; for if the situations in which he advocates "lying" are
truly distinctive, so that permitted exceptions to the rule are well
defined, then the rule may retain its force; it will not be easy for every¬
one to claim that his case is a "special" one too.
At this point, the critics might very well protest that Friedman's
aim appears to be less narrow than I have suggested, his case on truth
requirements for assumptions being presented at the outset as a general
one. But, in the first place, some magnification, by means of tone, of
the general scope of an essay designed in the main to further a specific
cause that is a controversial one might give testimony to skill in
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persuasion, rather than to the nature of the writer's prime objective;
and, in the second, do the explicit generalities there are in "The
Methodology" really favour falsehood in general? Certainly, Friedman
writes (p. 14) that "truly important and significant hypotheses will be
found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate representations
of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more
unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense)". But just what is this
sense? He continues by saying that an "unrealistic" or "descriptively
false" hypothesis "abstracts the common and crucial elements from the
mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena
to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone . . .
it take account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant
circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for
the phenomena to be explained". This seems to admit the possibility,
as some commentators (Wong amongst them) have allowed, that assump¬
tions might qualify as "descriptively false" for Friedman just through
failing to catalogue the truth exhaustively, without actually being false
as well; and, more importantly, it seems also to show that, where the
"descriptively false" does involve untruth, the case Friedman emphasises
(and Wong seems to neglect) - still he is not saying, as some critics take
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him to be, that any old falsehood will do. Of course, to use the single
phrase "descriptively false" to cover both these situations is to blur
this distinction between truth and falsehood; but Friedman's point here
may be that there is a rationale for sometimes doing so - a rationale
which constitutes the justification for accepting some assumptions
that are false. For his highly effective argument that we do not
explicitly include in an assumption set every single known truth about
the phenomena concerned does draw attention to our "revealed prefer¬
ence" for simplicity; and simplicity, given full rein, can perhaps ride
roughshod over truth. Some well-established processes of simplifica¬
tion and abstraction can lead to statements that, though summarising
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much of the truth, might not themselves be held literally true. Hence
Friedman could make the claim that, just as any attempt to mirror the
truth in its entirety would add valueless clumsy complication to an
assumption set, so also does a requirement that assumptions must be
true - because it excludes, without even giving them fair trial first, a
whole realm of "respectable" abstractions and approximations. Seen
in this light, his thesis would be that stating the relevant truth about
some phenomenon simply, for a particular explanatory or predictive
purpose, is sometimes (he might say, fairly often in our present state
14
of knowledge ) best achieved by means of literal falsehoods; and he
15
would be promoting fibbing only as an efficient means to a good end.
But any false assumptions admitted accordingly ought to be "sufficiently
good approximations for the purpose in hand" (Friedman, p. 15),
approximations, that is, of the truth; whilst the predictive test of such
sufficiency appears, on this basis, not as a test that will be adequate
taken in total isolation, but rather as a control on a process of simpli-
16
fication that has (apparent) reality as its starting-point. Such a just¬
ification for waiving the truth requirement, then, is only an aspect of
4.6
the wider case for framing simple theories that "abstract essential
17
features of complex reality" (Friedman, p. 7) ; and, as such, it can
justify only a very special group of lies - those whose "whiteness" con¬
sists in their epitomising truth.
However, as Friedman himself acknowledges, but his devotees
often forget, "criticisms may miss the target, yet there may be a target
for criticism" (Friedman, p. 41). I believe that there is such a target
in "The Methodology", and that the failure of so many critics to hit it
decisively may be more than a mere coincidence. Friedman's explicit
claims on methodology are open to a moderate interpretation on which
. 18 ,his attackers have made next to no impression : even on the question
of "fibbing", he can be seen as arguing for treating "lies" as white only
if they contribute to simplicity, by abstracting away cnly from trivial details
19 20
of reality, whilst yet yielding valid predictions. ' But, if my view
of Friedman's main aim as yet more specific is correct, these muted
methodological precepts, even if accepted, could not bring him success
in themselves. To establish his favoured theory of the firm, he would
still need to show, firstly, that his criteria for whiteness are precise
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enough to distinguish black from white effectively , and secondly, that
they are actually fulfilled by the falsehoods in his theory. Friedman's
main efforts, however, go to routing old enemies instead. He makes
much of the fact, rashly overlooked in some past arguments for abandon¬
ing altogether the theory of the firm based on the assumptions that
22
Friedman recommends , that to exhibit the falsity of a theory's assump-
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tions is not ipso facto to dismiss its conclusions ; but he keeps
studiously quiet about the general possibilities for fair dismissal. At
24
the same time, with what seems like masterly cunning , he seeks to
shift the burden of proof over his theory of the firm onto his opponents,
putting on them the unexpected onus of showing that the excluded facts
they champion have not only indeed been omitted or denied, but are also
important and relevant, so that including them will add more than just,
howsoever true, clutter. These moves are so skilful that commentators,
fussing over them, might, perhaps forgivably, forget to consider whether
the proof could be supplied. But in the last analysis, the crucial
question for the theory is whether the excluded facts do matter, rather
than whether their promoters, spotting at length Friedman's failure to
show that they don't, will recover sufficiently to show that they do.
Then what I am taking to be the, very specific, issue is undoubted¬
ly further obscured in "The Methodology" by the whiff there may be of
methodological principles that are not moderate, of arguments for false¬
hood that depend on no appeal to special cases - a whiff all the more
perplexing since it does not originate in substantial commitments to the
extreme, in the text. Friedman's discreet silence about the drawbacks
of using false assumptions may be part of his strategy against the
inveterate champions of "realistic" ones; and it is, I have argued,
compatible with a moderate methodology that allows the virtue of keeping
contact with truth. But nonetheless, to stress a possible role for false
assumptions without making even passing reference to their limitations
too may be to court, for whatever strategic ends, appearing misguided
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and extreme. It is understandable that thwarted critics do not feel
4.8
quite reassured when the seemingly extreme simply evaporates under
their pressure, to become measured moderation instead. Similarly,
Friedman's lack of explicitness about the rationale for adopting false
assumptions is mysterious, especially as his stated position might be
thought to stem from belief in a fallacious argument: the argument that,
since the truth of a statement (about the subject-matter of a theory) is
insufficient to justify its inclusion in the assumption set, mere parity of
treatment demands that the falsity of another statement should not be
sufficient to justify exclusion. This is fallacious because the insuffic¬
iency of truth as a lone criterion for assumption choice does not imply
its irrelevance (assumptions' truth might, after all, still be necessary),
and consequently treating truth as irrelevant is not required for consist¬
ency; and one wonders why Friedman does not, to reduce any risk of
such an argument being rashly attributed to him, give more detailed
guidance on the basis for his position - a position supported by the far
more appealing argument that, when assumptions are serving to simplify
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the welter of minor details of (apparent) reality , their literal truth
may not be necessary after all. Moreover, as the text stands, even the
latter argument might be thought to lend itself to an extreme use; for
though Friedman's false assumptions do have to be "sufficiently good
approximations" of the truth, he adds (p. 15) that we can find out
"whether they are . .. only by seeing whether the theory works, which
means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions". Here Wong's
view that predictive performance is a sufficient test of a theory for
Friedman might well appear to rear its head once more, with ability to
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work being Friedman's sole criterion for the whiteness of lies
Yet Friedman, having earlier stated clearly that predictive success is
at most a necessary requirement, could have avoided any confusion at
this point by stressing that he is speaking, in effect, of the predictive
test as a control (for its being, for him, the only possible test of whether
approximations are "sufficiently good" need not mean it is a test of what
is an approximation too - this not being a question of truth alone, and so
not decidable by direct "tests" of truth): he could, that is, have emphasised
the fact that all the candidates for testing should already be simplifica-
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tions of the truth, drawn in some conventional way. Finally, one
might wonder on grounds of style too how far Friedman's essay is truly
intended to strike a moderate chord. At times, his tone appears
temperate enough, and his manner ingenuous, as he leads us on by
soothingly steady steps of reasoning; but at others, the prose becomes
polemic and provocative as, to opponents of the beloved business theory,
he expresses defiance that may border on contempt. Yet if his general
methodology really is so moderate, and his point against opponents of
the theory is so clear (beingthe point that, having disregarded matters
of logical fact, they rely on an argument that is indisputably incomplete),
why devote such impressive effort, to persuasion on the one hand and
to denunciation on the other? These disparities between the potentially
moderate substance of Friedman's general methodological statements
and his melodramatic manner of making them have doubtless encouraged
misunderstandings and fostered the Methodology Mystery.
But I believe that these riddles can be solved; and solved in such
a way that any mere whiff of the extreme in Friedman's essay need not
be taken to countermand the moderate view of much of his argument
4. 10
about methodology there. On the interpretation I am suggesting, a
plausible account can, I think, be given of why overtones that are
extreme might yet be welcome in "The Methodology" ~ an account that
allows for the difficulties Friedman meets in the essay in his attempt
to realise a very specific aim, and that explains too why so many critics
have suspected something was amiss without actually being able to
detect it. Thus, it seems to me that some of the examples Friedman
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canvasses can in practice only be defended on the basis of views more
extreme than he ever officially avows in his preaching - views that,
though vulnerable, cannot readily be pinned on him, Wong-fashion, as
general claims in "The Methodology", especially since these views do
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not cover all the examples either. J And it seems to me too that,
whether deliberately or unconsciously he alone can say, he also sets up
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a hue-and-cry in the best tradition of diversionary tactics. Here are
his pursuers, seeking to censure his challenging yet guarded remarks
about the requirements for assumptions and the general significance of
"predictions" (but always taking it for granted that particular conclusions
come up to the mark); or intent on faulting his insistent but blameless
argument that a theory with false assumptions may yet have true con¬
clusions; or trying to track down a fanatical general case for falsehood
that always seems to prove a will-o'-the-wisp: all of them thinking they
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are hot on the scent of his methodology as such. And all the time he
is leading them away from a cool consideration of the facts in his central
economics case.
Friedman is, in fact, far from forthcoming about the marked
if.11
differences between his specific examples, and about the various
ways in which their assumptions, to qualify as. white, are held to
compensate for the limitations inherent in being false. For what¬
ever their value in terms of simplicity, and despite their compat¬
ibility with true conclusions, it remains the case that false
assumptions are not ideal: if they are preferred, this is only
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as a "second best". For instance, unlike true ones, they carry
no general guarantee that, barring mistakes in reasoning from
them, their conclusions will be true: they may have conclusions
35"
that are true but won't necessarily do so. Friedman's point
that conclusions drawn from false assumptions can be true is
important against naive insistence on eschewing false assumptions
whatever the price; but he neglects to say that perfect reason¬
ing from false assumptions can only be expected to lead unerr¬
ingly to true conclusions in conditions that are highly restrict¬
ive. Assumptions that are false, it will be suggested below,
can only be used reliably to predict what is already expected
on other grounds to be true - when all the glory must by rights
belong elsewhere. And it is in where the glory truly does belong,
in the location of these independent grounds for confidence, that
the divergencies between Friedman's various examples really
become apparent. In what follows, I shall depart from "The
Methodology" by dividing the class of false assumptions, perhaps
36
somewhat crudely , into three groups.
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The falsity of "as if" assumptions that, in particular uses,
come into the first group (assumptions-A) stems from their
elimination from the theoretical picture of relatively minor
factors (thus permitting concentration on the crucial ones)
that are at work in actuality. Friedman evidently believes
(I think, mistakenly) that most, if not all, the false-
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hoods he is concerned with come into this category. Thus he writes
(p. 40) that "a meaningful scientific hypothesis or theory typically
asserts that certain forces are, and other forces are not, important
in understanding a particular class of phenomena. It is frequently con¬
venient to present such a hypothesis by stating that the phenomena it
is desired to predict behave in the world of observation as if they
occurred in a hypothetical and highly simplified world containing only
the forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important". Now it might
be natural to feel confident that assumptions-A, despite their falsity,
imply certain conclusions that will be consistently borne out at least
approximately by the evidence, because assumptions-A have the merit
of paying some court to the true grounds for any such success. There
can be confidence in their predictive performance because, though false,
they yet epitomise the truth, by isolating key operative causal factors
that are working to effect broadly the implied result. Similarly,
assumptions-A can have explanatory significance, since they express
in stylised fashion the actual mechanisms at work. The explanatory
and predictive value of assumptions-A, then, depends on their special
relationship with the truth: they are derived by certain well-entrenched
methods of abstraction from the real underlying conditions, so that the
nature of their departure from the solid foundation of reality is known;
and it is this link with a firm foundation that allows us to use them with
some freedom. At the same time, some warning signals are also built
into assumptions-A: knowing what is assumed away in the expectation
of its influence being small is some preparation for recognising a change
4.13
to circumstances where its influence may be greater, for it is already
a realisation that the influence is there. Of course, it may only be
possible to tell whether influences assumed to be negligible are really
t
too small to m^4er by putting theories so assuming to the test - as
Friedman, playing one of his trump cards, adroitly argues. But he
does not point out that, by considering the relation between the assump¬
tions and the truth, it should be possible, in the context of assumptions-A,
to gain an idea, in advance, of what the influences are that are being
+ + a 38tested.
The situation is different with assump'tions-B, a group that Friedman
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also admits in practice, though perhaps only faute de mieux.
Assumptions-B, though false, nonetheless do imply conclusions that
prove persistently to be true (or very nearly true); but, in contrast
with assumptions-A, they have nothing to do with the fact of their con¬
clusions1 truth. Assumptions-B, then, have true (or nearly true) con¬
clusions, but lack the special relationship with the truth that characterises
assumptions-A. And so their success may appear miraculous since,
unlike assumptions-A, they give no hint of the actual mechanisms on
which it relies. Yet assumptions-B depend on a methodological conjur¬
ing trick by Friedman, rather than on any miracle. Whereas
assumptions-A are related in certain well-entrenched ways to statements
of what actually is the case, so that what they assume is a close
approximation to or abstraction from the real causally operative state
of affairs, assumptions-B by contrast do not correspond by the recognised
abstractive routes to anything in nature, instead relating to statements
4. 14
of actual causal conditions in the spurious fashion of sharing the same
implications. That assumptions-B have true implications is a theoret¬
ical windfall, possible because of the operation of causal mechanisms
that they make no acknowledgement of: they are parasitic performers
40
that, in contrast with assumptions-A, masquerade as if they were not.
Theories built on assumptions-B, then, only pretend to truly independent
predictive power and merely create an illusion of offering any explana¬
tion themselves. Moreover, such theories harbour dangers, since bad
break-downs in the underlying causally effective conditions need have
no bearing on assumptions-B themselves, though jeopardising their
conclusions' truth. On the other hand, so long as their implications
do happen to be true, assumptions-B could conceivably have a role,
perhaps pending the accurate statement of preferable ones, or perhaps
merely as embroidery on descriptions of events, embellishing accounts
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of the already known.
Might Friedman here dispute the basis for distinguishing at all
between assumptions A and B, arguing (as many commentators would
have him do) that both groups are equally acceptable since they score
success with their conclusions, and that the greater descriptive
inaccuracy of the assumptions-B themselves is merely an unimportant
matter of degree? And indeed, _is the distinction adequately based?
Friedman's "crucial element" (p. 14) and "important force" (p. 40)
passages suggest he there has only assumptions-A in mind; and I do
not think his argument precludes him from seeing the two groups as
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distinct. And surely the distinction between groups A and B is one
4.15
that can in principle be made. Admittedly, the term "well-entrenched
that is used in drawing the distinction is. though familiar in another
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philosophical context, conspicuously vague here ; but vagueness in
marking the distinction may be a sign that methods of simplification
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will need to be investigated in greater detail before there can be any
more exactness, rather than that there is nothing to try to be more
exact about. It does seem to me that assumptions that, for instance.
postulate a theoretical limit to an existing series of observations
will form a group distinct from
assumptions-B - assumptions which, rather than just allowing the
effects of an operative and powerful force to be considered in isolation
from other forces in a hypothetical simulation model that is set up,
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serve instead to introduce a hypothetical motive force. If
assumptions-A can qualify as "white", surely assumptions-B can at
best be counted only as "grey".
However, in any case it is the distinction between both these group
of assumptions and a third that will be most critical in what is to follow
This third group is the group of those false assumptions (assumptions-C
which do not abstract by well-entrenched routes from the statements
of the actual causal conditions, as assumptions-A do, and which also
lack the background mechanism to bring about the truth of their implica
tions that assumptions-B rely on. Assumptions-C, then, are the
residual group - but a very important one. Their key distinguishing
mark is that, in particular uses, their falsity does carry with it denial
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of truth (and even of near truth) to their conclusions .; so that even
4. 16
attempts to use them in a decorative role will fail. Merely sufficient
assumptions that are false will fit into the C category, then, whenever
it is the case that no other assumption whose truth would be sufficient
for the truth, or near-truth, of the conclusion in question is true either;
and of course false "as if" assumptions whose truth is necessary for
the truth (or near truth) of a particular conclusion will always count as
assumptions-C, when they are used to "predict" it. And assumptions-C
are "black". Now this might have been a fruitful avenue for Friedman's
critics to follow; for if the truth of any of the assumptions in his
examples could be shown to be necessary for the truth (or near truth)
of the conclusions there being drawn, then the agreed falsity of that
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assumption would matter, against Friedman's claims. But critics
have not taken this path, and the Mystery muddles on - a measure of
the skill with which Friedman has obscured the issue here, if any of
his assumptions is indeed an assumption-C. Some may, of course,
have felt that here the issue really lay, but refrained from probing too
deeply because they shared Friedman's commitment to the value system
of which the economics at the heart of his essay is often held to be an
49
integral part; but I doubt if they are many. Friedman himself daims,
moreover, that in many cases positive science can be distinguished
"sharply" (p. 7) from normative science, and that his essay is "concerned
primarily with certain methodological problems that arise in construct¬
ing ... 'distinct positive science'" (p. 3); and so it would be in keeping
with "The Methodology" itself to judge it with Joan Robinson's view in
mind - the view (1973, p. 122) that "differences of opinion there will
always be where political issues are involved: these are differences of
4. 17
judgment and of moral values. They should not affect logical analysis
Which, then, of Friedman's "as if" assumptions fit into which of
the categories A, B and C? It is time to move on to another chapter.
4. i
Appendix IV
Footnotes to Chapter 4
1. The survey of the literature given in Appendix A provides further
details of this neglect, in a summary form.
2. How are Johnson's "results" related to what Friedman would be
willing to call "predictions"; and how does the "work" he refers
to compare with Friedman's "hypotheses"? Johnson holds (and
Wong expresses some agreement: see Chapter 3, note 49) that
"the demand for clarification of the mechanism by which the results
can be explained is contrary to the methodology of positive
economics"; but I do not think it is necessarily contrary to the
arguments presented in Friedman's "Methodology" (see Chapter 3,
note 25 and page 3.9). See below and Chapter 5, however, for a
significant qualification to be made about some of the specific
examples Friedman uses (on which, see also Chapter 3, note 27).
3. Friedman, I think has an axe of his own to grind - but not one that,
by following Johnson's version of positive economic methodology,
he could legitimately present as being ground. See below, and
Chapter 5.
4. Similarly, though some may have taken a stand on "The Methodology"
less because of its arguments than because of their own political
persuasion, still I don't think this factor is sufficient to account
for such widespread confusion. (See below).
4. ii
See note 33.
See Chapter. 6, note 12.
Some of the very many commentators have, of course, given
parts of the interpretation to be suggested in what follows, with¬
out linking whatever part they give to the other parts in the pattern
I shall suggest (see note 33). Those commentators who do in
some way specially highlight Friedman's particular concern with
economics here are in the minority; and even they rarely discuss
his economic example in much detail. Among them are Nagel
(1963), who notes that there is some tension between two themes;
and Samuelson who, in the 1960s, citing Rotwein (1959), says
that what he dubbs the "F-Twist" seems significant for economics,
rather than philosophy of science, being apparently designed to
help the perfect competition, laissez-faire model and, "incidentally'
the maximisation-of-profits hypothesis (how much difference does
it make that Friedman deals in "expected returns" rather than
"profits"? See Friedman, p. 21, n. 16; and chapter 5 below.)
Rosenberg (1972) does give a fairly searching analysis of Friedman'
specific business hypothesis; but I do not agree with
his conclusions (see Chapter 5 and Appendix A). See also note 8.
I am sure that Klappholz and Agassi are right to recognise the
significance in "The Methodology" of Friedman's desire to vindi¬
cate specific economic theories, writing, before going on to make
some criticisms of the essay (see Chapter 3), that "the central
thesis of Friedman's essay is that much criticism of economic
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theory has been methodologically wrong-headed and misses the
target, a thesis he easily establishes." However, I think that his
central aim of pleading for specific theory goes rather beyond just
rebutting its critics.
9. One might well tend to exaggerate the general value of one's case
(by means of suggestion) I think, if one really had a somewhat
personal goal at heart in arguing the case at all, even where the
case unembellished could probably suffice to bring off one's aim.
But I shall suggest below that there are additional reasons why
Friedman might slip into heightened language, though pursuing a
limited aim (I am not arguing, however, that Friedman can be seen
to be deliberately deceitful (see note 32), and Chapter 5).
10. "General" is a term that seems to have two, on the face of it widely
different, uses in the philosophy of science; and it seems to me
that some confusion between them may have entered into the literature
of the Friedman Affair. Is a "general claim" one that holds true
without qualification; or is it one that "covers" a very wide range
of phenomena (though perhaps not being literally true of every indi¬
vidual instance of them)? I think Boland probably intends "general"
in the former sense when he speaks of the simplicity/generality
trade-off (with, he says - in what may be an over-simple view; see
below note 14; also Chapter 3, n. 50 - Samuelson opting for gener¬
ality, Friedman for simplicity): a sense that may perhaps coincide
with what others have meant by "realistic". On the other hand,
in speaking of "general equilibrium theory", we seem to intend
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"general" in the, apparently rather different sense of "all-embracing".
But may such opposition as was suggested above between being
strictly true and having breadth of scope, between accuracy and
inclusiveness, be a false one? Mightn't a truly "general" claim
have both features? I think Friedman might answer these questions
in the affirmative. He speaks of "the extra accuracy" yielded by
a "more general theory" (p. 18); and of "stating assumptions so
as to bring out a relationship between superficially different
hypotheses" being "a step in the direction of a more general
hypothesis" (p. 29). And he explains that a theory counts as "more
'fruitful' the more precise the resulting prediction, the wider the
area within which the theory yields predictions, and the more lires
for further research it suggests" (p. 10) - evidently seeing these
factors as being in harmony with one another. See note 14; and
Appendix B.
11. See Chapter 3, pages 3.15 to 3.17.
12. On the meaning of "accept", see note Zfl.
13. See Appendix B.
14. There may be some suggestion in "The Methodology" that employing
these, so to speak, "abstractive falsehoods" may be a temporary
expedient, though perhaps a necessary one at this stage in the
development of economic theory. Are there systematic reasons
why true assumptions must forever be complicated? Friedman
gives no explicit answer; but, in his optimism about the progress
of science, he sometimes seems to suggest that the trade-off between
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simplicity and "realism" may not be permanent and inevitable:
that there are potential possibilities for arriving at assumptions
that are both simple and true, potentialities not yet realised perhaps
because economics is still an infant science. Thus, he criticises
(pp. 33 and 34) Alexander's view that "economic phenomena are
varied and complex, so any comprehensive theory of the business
cycle that can apply closely to reality must be very complex", say-
'economic
ing that "if a class of/phenomena appears varied and complex, it
is, we must suppose, because we have no adequate theory to explain
them." And he tells us that it is "a fundamental hypothesis of
science . . . that appearances are deceptive and that there is a way
of looking at or interpreting or organising the evidence that will
reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be mard-
festions of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure".
But if the "fundamental structure" of reality really is simple, then
perhaps we may sometime arrive at assumptions that are both simple
and true: "general" theories may then no longer be more costly
to use; and artificial devices of abstraction, having outlived their
usefulness, may wither away. (He also remarks (p. 26) that
assumptions may be singled out as crucial on the grounds, inter alia,
of "intuitive plausibility": assumptions may not everywhere have
to be true, but it's good if they're next door to it). See notes 10
and 16, and Appendix B.
Phelps-Brown (1972), following Morgenstern, supports the
view that economic science is at a relatively early stage in its
development, whilst Worswick (1972) to some extent dissents. (All
seern to share in the belief that some progressiis possible,
but also believe, unlike Friedman one suspects, that recent
developments have not represented much of an advance. See
Chapter 6.) Coase shares in optimism that it may be'
possible to find some assumptions that are both "manage¬
able" and realistic (see Appendix B).
15- Might falsehoods have a necessary role? See Appendix B.
16. Here and below, I leave aside the question how we know
what"reality" is.
17. See also Chapter 9-
18. See Appendix A.
19. "Trivial", for a particular predictive (explanatory)
purpose.
20. On the question of how far this squares with his examples,
see below.
21. Might Friedman claim that no such distinction need be
made? See p.^.l/f.
i
22. Friedman's buspess "as if" hypothesis, though based on
the same assumptions as the traditional theory of the
firm, may be articulating them in a new way(see Chapter 5
and Appendix C); but sometimes "the theory" will be used
below to refer to both.
23. For some attempted criticisms of points of logic in
Friedman's case, see Appendix A.
2h. See note 32.
25. See pages ^.3 and i\.k»
k.vii
26. See note 19.
27. Perhaps the term "work" shares some of the possible
ambiguities of "predict".
28. The mere truth of their implications would not be sufficient
to make assumptions, "simplifications of the truth" in the
sense intended here. On the vagueness of "conventional",
see page ih.15.
29« Some critics seem to have missed the point that not all
the examples he canvasses sire ones he recommends us
actually to adopt.
30. Thus, rather as Hahn (1973s P«8) writes of Debreu,"odd
though itis that so clear a writer...should be misread,
it can be explained by a genuine problem".
31»See Chapter 3j note 29.
32. The diversions may not have been plotted ones: see page
5.13.
If they were, Joan Robinson's view of Marshall might
come to mind: "The more I learn about economics the more
I admire /his/ intellect and the less I like his
character.,.the thinner is the argument the thicker is
the tear gas"(l973s pp.259 and 262).
33. Of course, a number do take some of Friedman's examples
into account, as illustrations of his preaching. But
they rarely consider them all; or discuss the differences
between them; or criticise his translation of preaching
into practice. Though examples may have triggered off
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their chase 9then, they think their prey more general.
3k- On Friedman's standards, true assumptions are not necess¬
arily the ideal either, unless they are simple as well.
See note Ik and Appendix B..
35. See below, pp.if.15 to if.16.
36. The divisions are designed to echo differences between
Friedman's examples, and I think they will serve for
that purpose.
37. Even a falsehood that broadly epitomised truth would
be unsuccessful when used to predict (explain) the
very facts that made it false.
38. These "as if" assumptions are those that the moderate
case .for "abstractive" falsehoods would justify.
39. He presents hypotheses based on assumptions-B as acceptable
ones, but recognises that in fact preferable theories
will often be available.
ifO. This may have been what Xoopmans (1957, p.536) had in
mind when he wrote that "in each of Professor Friedman's
examples he knows more about the phenomenon in question
than he lets on in his suggested postulates".
kl» For some illustration of when assumptions-B might be
"accepted"(in the sense of being adopted and made use of),
see Appendix C.
(Friedman's use of the word "accept" may, incidentally,
tend to mislead. For often we can "accept" in the sense
above, when we cannot "accept", meaning "take to be true"
4.ix
or "believe".) (See Klappholz and Agassi (1959)).
^2. Kis common treatment of his diverse examples might seem to
preclude him from distinguishing these two groups. But see
note 39.
See note 28.
See Appendix B and Chapter 10, note 6.
if5. Some of Friedman's examples make it tempting to say that
the hypothetical motive forces introduced by assumptions-B
will be impossible ones. But the distinction drawn does
not require them to be.
1+6 • Introduction of examples involving the controversial
assumptions-B seems to have served to divert attention
from, this critical distinction.
1+7 > Since conclusions drawn from assumptions A or B need only
be very nearly true, the conclusions of all three groups
from assumptions-B
of assumption can be false; and so the distinction/here
must be one of degree.
^8. A point to be exploited in Chapter 7.
L+9* See Chapter 10, note 5.
50. But she goes on to claim that they very often do. See
Chapter 6, note 2h.
5. 1
Chapter 5
AN "AS IF" BUSINESS
The four key examples in Friedman's argument are presented in
Section III of "The Methodology". First comes "a simple physical
example, the law of falling bodies". Here Friedman suggests that "the
2
application of /the^formula [s = \ gt ] to a compact ball dropped from the
roof of a building is equivalent to saying that a ball so dropped behaves
as if it were falling in a vacuum" (p. 16). This example is, I think, the
strongest Friedman gives in support of his idea of admitting false, but
only "descriptively false", assumptions: we may treat what might con¬
veniently be called this "assumption of a vacuum" as a "white lie" - as
2
an assumption-A.
Next comes an example "designed to be an analogue of many hypotheses
in the social sciences" (p. 19), an example concerning the density of
leaves around a tree: Friedman suggests the hypothesis "that the
leaves are positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximise
the amount of sunlight it receives, given the position of its neighbors,
as if it knew the physical laws determining the amount of sunlight that
would be received in various positions and could move rapidly or
instantaneously from any one position to any other desired and
unoccupied position". And "a largely parallel example involving human
behaviour" follows. We are asked (p. 21) to "consider the problem of
predicting the shots made by an expert billiard player. It seems not
at all unreasonable that excellent predictions would be yielded by the
hypothesis that the billiard player made his shots as if he knew the
5. 2
complicated mathematical formulas that would give the optimum direc¬
tions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc.,
describing the location of the balls, could make lightning calculations
from the formulas, and could then make the balls travel in the direction
indicated by the formulas". Both these examples involve false assump¬
tions" that do not, it seems to me, pass muster as assumptions-A.
But since both hypotheses have true, or largely true, conclusions,
3
perhaps the "lies" might qualify as grey, i.e. as assumptions-B.
"it is only a short step from these examples", Friedman tells us
(p. 21), "to the economic hypothesis that under a wide range of circum¬
stances individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to
maximise expected returns . . . and had full knowledge of the data
needed to succeed in this attempt; as if, that is, they knew the relevant
cost and demand functions, calculated marginal cost and marginal
revenue from all actions open to them, and pushed each line of action
to the point at which the relevant marginal cost and marginal revenue
were equal." But is the step a short one? This chapter will, I think,
provide an answer.
The particular economic theory that I have argued Friedman seeks
to protect and promote could, summarising his expression of it above,
be expressed as the hypothesis that
(1) all businessmen behave as if they were seeking rationally
to maximise their expected returns and had full know¬
ledge of the data necessary for success (i.e. as if they
4
were "DRRMs" - deliberate rational returns-maximisers)
5.3
Now he maintains (1) despite accepting, albeit sometimes reluctantly,
evidence that
(2) no businessmen do deliberately seek to maximise returns
precisely; none does actually formulate and solve the
returns-maximising equations, or have the knowledge
5
necessary to do so.
Ke maintains (1), then, even though presumably accepting that
0
(3) no businessmen actually are DRRMs.
(1) to (3) form an unusual and at first sight disarming set. Friedman's
strategy in "The Methodology" appears to be to outflank critics of the
maximisation-of-returns theory, by stating that evidence supporting (2)
and so (3) is nonetheless consistent with the truth of (}). If this is so
then, he suggests, bring what evidence the critics will in favour of (3),
still they cannot dislodge his "as if" hypothesis thereby: all they will
r
show is that its "as if" clause is not fulfilled, a fact he already admits.
If we assume, for the sake of simplicity, something that is false, still
some of what follows from our assumption may be true, and this is
what Friedman relies on here. (1) claims that something follows about
businessmen's behaviour from assuming them to be DRRMs and asserts
the truth of what does; and what does follow must, for Friedman's
g
case to hold, be true (or very nearly so).
But can (1) indeed be maintained if (2) is true? Having accepted
that all DRRMs proceed by solving the returns-maximising equations,
how can Friedman agree that (2) is true, that no businessmen do solve
these equations, without being committed to saying that no businessmen
5.4
behave as if they're DRRMs either? At best, (1) can only be true if
9
"behave" is given a severely restricted sense. Now Friedman himself
does seem to interpret (1) as referring just to a restricted zone of
business behaviour: he apparently takes "behave" to mean "act in the
market", seeing it as denoting the end products of business decisions
and not the process of producing them. But if this is how (1) is to be
10
interpreted, surely, for clarity, he should have made this plainer.
Moreover, "behave" is not the only slippery, not to say treacherous,
term in his hypothesis. For if (3) is true and the supposition of the "as
if" clause in (1) can't be fulfilled, then the "as if" itself needs cautious
interpretation. Since Friedman accepts (2), whence (3), he can't very
well be using (1) to claim that, given the evidence of business actions
in the market, businessmen may actually be DRRMs: he can't, that
is, say "businessmen behave as if they're DRRMs" and then add, in good
faith, "so maybe they are". Yet one might all too easily be beguiled
by the "as if" into imagining by and by that businessmen's DRRM-ness
is being established after all^ - that somehow the truth of the whole
12
hypothesis is mysteriously transmitted to its every part.
The terms in (1) having thus been restricted, the issue now is, as
what sort of assumption is the statement in the "as if" clause serving?
Here Friedman 's presentation is confusing. Sometimes he gives the
impression that he takes the "assumption" of his hypothesis to be only
technically (descriptively) false, remaining faithful to the broad essen-
13
tials of the truth. For instance, whilst he accepts the evidence
supporting (2), gleaned by asking businessmen questions about their
5. 5
decision-making, at one point (p. 22) he also says businessmen do not
"actually and literally" solve the relevant system of simultaneous
equations; and he goes on to mention calculations not being gone through
(for example, by the billiard players) "explicitly" (my emphasis both
14 15
times ' ). This muted admission might suggest that he would claim
it as an assumption-A, believing that little parts his economics
16
hypothesis from the physical one about the behaviour of falling bodies.
And indeed, he does later present "ideal types" in economic theory as
if they are on a par with the ideal types of natural science, saying that
I
they "are designed to isolate the features that are crucial for a particular
problem" (p. 36), rather than being (p. 34) "strictly descriptive cate¬
gories intended to correspond directly and fully to entities in the real
17
world independently of the purpose for which the model is being used!
As against this, however, when Friedman quotes, without demur,
the judgement that "it would be utterly impractical under present condi¬
tions for the manager of a multi-process plant to attempt ... to work
out and equate marginal costs and marginal revenues for each productive
factor" (p. 32), he is surely giving tacit support to the view that the
18
decision-making of businessmen working in complex modern firms
is bound to be a far cry from that of the "ideal" DRRMs. What is
more, immediately after writing that businessmen do not solve the
equations "actually and literally" (where he does state too that "of
course" they don't), he continues; "any more than leaves or billiard
players explicitly go through complicated mathematical calculations or
falling bodies decide to create a vacuum" - which must surely be to
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say, by comparison at least with the leaves and these, now suddenly
supposed sentient, falling bodies, that they do not do anything remotely
19
like solving them. Here he is surely likening his DRRM assumption
to assumptions that are not, after all, assumptions-A, and treating the
leaf hypothesis as indeed "an analogue" of the economics one. Is,
then, the "lie" about businessmen really any better than grey? What
are the real "forces" that the DRRM assumption would be allowing us
to consider in isolation, were it an assumption-A? Can there, for
instance, be an all-pervading, non-fictitious force of conscious returns-
maximising rationality, which is merely masked, distorted or disturbed
by other forces (less "crucial" for business actions in the market) to
become the apparently much weaker "profit motive" of observed beha¬
viour? The very idea that human actions can usefully be thought of as
the mere resultants of sets of forces, let alone of these particular
20
forces, seems to me a dubious one. But if the DRRM assumption
were only an assumption-B, how important a role could it be playing
in the theory of the firm? As an assumption-B, it would add no informa¬
tion about the actual behaviour of firms to that included in an assertion
of its conclusions alone. - conclusions that would be true for reasons it
21
gave no hint of. If the DRRM assumption_is an assumption-B, then,
Friedman exaggerates its value with any impression he leaves that it is
22
but a "short step" away from his vacuum "assumption" too.
There is certainly something disturbing in Friedmanfs apparently
indiscriminate use of expert billiard players, leaves, falling bodies and
ordinary businessmen in his examples; and in the curious expressions
5. 7
that seem to result from this and perhaps too from the slippery nature
23
of "as if". For instance, in the leaf example comes the very odd
claim that "so far as we know, leaves do not 'deliberate' or consciously
'seek', have not been to school and learned the relevant laws of science
..." etc. (p. 20, my emphasis) - a strange juncture to choose for making
any gestures towards a Popperian view of the conjectural nature of know¬
ledge. Then again, there is the over-ready switch from the appealing
hypothesis that bodies generally fall as if in a vacuum to the absurd-
sounding one that they fall as if they first "decide to create" a vacuum
24
and then fall in it. Amidst these seeming confusions, one might very
well begin to wonder how far Friedman does bear in mind the differences
there are between his examples, and whether he is tending to treat the
25
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grey as white. But could we have been meant to wonder? The very
weirdness of his, very ingenious, examples that (in my terms) involve
assumptions-B has of course provoked fierce discussion of whether
having true implications makes a theory good enough, discussion long
prolonged since so much seems to hinge on the questions "good for
what? - and against what background?" And in the discussion, the
presence of true (or nearly true) conclusions not being a point at issue,
attention has been focussed on the significance of assumptions them¬
selves instead. Once one is released from the distractions of Friedman's
intriguing assumption-B examples, however, a new doubt about his
economics hypothesis might arise. For is the DRRM assumption even
an assumption-B? How certain is it that the DRRM hypothesis, (1),
is true (or almost true)? If (2) is true, it is remarkable if businessmen
can persistently pull off the maximising result; and one might well
5. 8
wonder now what process there can be that actually is at work, as the
counterpart of passive adaptation of leaf-growth to sunlight in that
2 6
•analogous" example, to bring about the outcome which is alleged.
Could it be that the DRRM assumption, deftly slipped in by Friedman
amongst his already perplexing examples,is in fact an assumption-C?
Does anything in "The Methodology" show that what follows about action
in the market from assuming businessmen to be DRRMs is true (or very
27
nearly so)?
Friedman first attempts to argue indirectly for the truth of the
conclusion about business behaviour, an approach it is hard to square
28
with the methodological principles he is so often held to profess.
He appeals to a parallel with his hypothesis about the billiard players
and to the process of "natural selection". Confidence in the billiards
hypothesis, claims Friedman earlier (p. 21), "is not based on the belief
that billiard players, even expert ones, can or do go through the process
described; it derives rather from the belief that, unless in some way
or other they were capable of reaching essentially the same result, they
would not in fact be expert billiard players". Now, he claims (p. 22)
\
that similar "evidence" supports the maximisation-of-returns hypothesis:
"unless the behavior of businessmen in some way or other approximated
behavior consistent with the maximization of returns, it seems unlikely
that they would remain in business for long". Consequently, "given
natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely on
the judgment that it summarises appropriately the conditions for survival".
Now appealing to the billiards hypothesis is a very subtle move; and
5.9
at first sight it might seem to be a powerful one. After all, the "as
if" billiards hypothesis looks open to the objections that are commonly
raised against the business one, but yet it seems broadly true; its
implications about the upshot of the process by which expert players
make their shots do seem to be ones that experience would, more or
29
less , bear out. And if the billiards expert is able to make his, often
perfect, shots without consciously going through complex mathematical
calculations, why shouldn't the businessman manage to maximise expect¬
ed returns (or at least come close to maximising them), the questionn-
evidence gp
aire/notwithstanding? However, surely Friedman overplays the
analogy here, setting standards for survival in business that, unlike
those set for expertise in billiards, are ones that can't be realised.
There can be confidence in the billiards hypothesis despite Friedman's
vagueness about the method by which expert billiard players actually
play so well (despite, that is, his telling us only that they must be
capable of reaching superb results "by some means or other" (p. 21))
because it is easy to conceive what the nature of this method might be;
and this makes the case of the expert billiard player crucially different
from that of the businessman. Whereas the expert at billiards may be
able to size up his shots with the aid of just one of his senses (sight),
gaugeing the angles and distances by eye to within the margin of accuracy
required by the game (and conceivably eventually even doing this without
needing much recourse to conscious thought at all - passing beyond a
phase of concentration to that of habitually fine play), the businessman
by contrast has no comparable means of assessing a business situation
5. 10
directly (no single sense seems suited for registering key factors; and
conscious calculating thought is surely always bound to be involved,
partly because allowance has somehow to be made for the dynamism
of the system if maxima are to be achieved, partly because all the
factors relevant to the business situation don't ordinarily fall within the
businessman's immediate narrow field of sense perception at any one
time - except perhaps in the form of ciphers, which by their very nature
seem even more likely than factors directly present to call for conscious
31
interpretation). And again, whereas the billiards expert has been
able to gain his expertise at the game by practice, since he faces broadly
similar situations again and again (level table, round ball, straight cue),
by comparison the businessman, whether expert or only common-or-
garden, has to respond to a state of flux in which comparatively little
need be remaining constant, and so would have very much less chance
of achieving the maximising outcome as a result of the process of "learn-
32
ing by doing",
Here Friedman would protest that speculation about what decision¬
making processes are available to businessmen misses the point he is
making. For, he would say, it is the play of impersonal market forces
33
that sets the standard for survival in business so high ; and we can
know that this standard must be being reached in businesses that survive,
however much in the dark we may be about how it is. "Let the apparent
immediate determinant of business behavior be anything at all", he
writes, "habitual reaction, random chance, or whatnot. Whenever this
determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational and
5. 11
informed maximization of returns, the business will prosper and
acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the
business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only
34
by the addition of resources from outside" (p. 22) . Now since many
businesses do survive, it isn't possible to maintain both Friedman's
argument (that (1) summarises the conditions for survival, the process
of natural selection dooming any deviant decision-makers to extinction)
and the argument I am suggesting (that no real-world businessman
, 35
could attain the maximising standard being laid down). But is
Friedman's argument correct? Are the conditions of market behaviour
#
summarised in (1) really required for survival? Surely not. A com¬
parison between the conditions presented as necessary for business
survival, in "The Methodology" on the one hand and in Alchian's 1950
article on evolution in economics (an article which Friedman claims
sympathy with) on the other, reveals striking differences; and Alchian's
natural selection argument is surely much the more successful. He
was seeking an alternative approach to market behaviour to that relying
on the insubstantial notion of maximum profits, a notion he held to be
meaningless in conditions of uncertainty; and he argued that, in general,
surviving firms must make positive profits over a period, stressing that
only in the special (and hypothetical) conditions of perfect competition
36
would it be true that maximum profits are required for survival.
Friedman distorts this argument. Surely achieving the maximum (or
even a near maximum) of expected returns is not the sine qua non of
persistence in business; and surely Friedman's business hypothesis
37
"summarizes . . . the conditions for survival" inappropriately. The
5. 12
perfect competition of the jungle may permit only the fittest to survive;
but the human institutions of the market seem able to countenance at
3 8
least all the fit.
Still, if Friedman's business hypothesis has successfully been put
to direct predictive test, mustn't my objections to the indirect backing
he tries to give it have been at any rate over-strong? In outlining his
direct evidence, Friedman begins bravely: "an even more important
body of evidence for the maximization-of-returns hypothesis", he
writes, "is experience from countless applications of the hypothesis to
specific problems and the repeated failure of its implications to be con¬
tradicted" (p. 22). But what follows appears uncomfortably like
evasion. He cites specifically none of the instances in which the
hypothesis has (on his claim) been satisfactorily applied; and remarks
instead that "this evidence is extremely hard to document .. . the evidence
for a hypothesis always consists of its repeated failure to be contradicted
. . . and by its very nature is difficult to document at all comprehensively.
It tends to become part of the tradition and folklore of a science revealed
in the tenacity with which hypotheses are held rather than in any text¬
book list of instances in which the hypothesis has failed to be contradicted."
Now whilst Friedman might perhaps legitimately appeal to the difficulty,
with a universal statement, of ever completing documentation of favour¬
able instances, this is surely quite different from his apparent difficulty
in even beginning it. In this context, when he himself has set such
storeon the failure of others to offer direct evidence (see, for instance,
Friedman, pp. 15 and 31) and when his own indirect arguments seem
5. 13
to be ones that fail, these remarks must surely appear as an admission
39
of weakness. It is hard to avoid suspecting that behind Friedman's
omission of specific citation of any direct evidence here may lie the
fact that there simply isn't any. (Indeed, in this case one wonders
whether there could be any. Friedman seems to admit that businessmen
do not explicitly calculate the relevant maxima because, amongst other
reasons, it would be impossible for them to do so. But then why should
the watching economist be in any better position to measure fleeting
marginal quantities and to gain direct evidence that maxima have actually
40
been achieved? )
Yet Friedman himself seems to take his "as if" hypothesis about
business behaviour to be true, or very nearly so. I fancy that he may
do so as a question of faith, rather than of observation, though, it is
clear that he thinks of the returns-maximising outcome as virtually
inevitable, with natural laws operating unfailingly, if mysteriously, to
bring it about, whatever businessmen may say or feel. And/seems to
be a matter of belief with him that particular states of conscious know¬
ledge have no more relevance to business actions than they do to the
behaviour of leaves or inanimate falling bodies. He seems to believe
that, just as natural laws may fill up the gap left by those fictitiously
false assumptions that demand consciousness on the part of leaves or
falling stones, so, in the absence of living DRRMs, we must look to
natural laws rather than to any different form of deliberate human action
as the determinant of business behaviour. This fatalistic attitude to
the businessman's destiny is evident again in the quip (p. 31) that testing
5.14
the maximisation-of-returns theory by "the answers given by businessmen
to questions about factors affecting their decisions [is] a procedure for
testing economic theories that is about on a par v/ith testing theories of
longevity by asking octogenarians how they account for their long life."
Here another analogy is overplayed: we may reasonably take businessmen's
achievements as being at least in part the result of deliberative decisions
which they could surely sometimes in fair measure account for; whereas
there is generally reason to doubt whether octogenarians can have had
much conscious influence over the age that they have reached, and so we
lack the special grounds which we have in the sphere of business action
41
for asking them to explain how it came about. It does not follow from
there being natural laws in the purely physical world that there will be
an "invisible hand" in the business one, guiding men's affairs irresistibly
to a pre-ordained destination and making futile any human attempt to
42
steer a different course.
Without Friedman's faith in some such irresistible power of the
market-place to serve as a deus ex machina for his "as if" theory of the
firm, is this a theory we can reasonably accept? Could his DRRM
assumption lead even the vicarious life of an assumption-B? I do not
43
think so. For picture the businessman beloved of the questionnaire
accounts. He professes an aim quite other than that of maximising
44
returns. He fails to answer correctly questions designed to test his
grasp of the significance of the marginal measures, and his knowledge
of their magnitude in particular cases. He cannot be detected going
through the appropriate problem-solving, information-seeking motions;
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and denies doing so. Now we are asked to believe that, not just once
but time after time, he nonetheless charges the price that maximises
his expected returns, when it comes to the point. Unless the man is
systematically setting out to deceive us, isn't this implausible? Can
his true aim always be frustrated, and his deficient knowledge always
be made good, by just such a bungling in his execution of his plans as
will exactly compensate for their originally divergent direction? Can
he be a returns-maximiser quite in spite of himself? Surely the story
is far-fetched.
I suggest, then, that the constellation of truth values that Friedman
so ingeniously argues for in the rest of his "Methodology" (false assump¬
tion; true, or very nearly true, conclusion) doesn't and couldn't exist
in his central economics case. Then any followers of Friedman who
happily swallow the story that businessmen do behave in the market
more or less as the DRRM assumption would imply might indeed,
vaguely conscious of some necessary linkage here, feel this "as if"
assumption must have turned up trumps after all and somehow shown
4 5
itself in all essentials true. Then too, small wonder that critics
have felt that all was not well with "The Methodology".
If I am right, then, for the purpose of vindicating his "as if"
business theory, all Friedman's argument (on whichever interpretation)
proves in the end to be beside the point - for all its effect against naive
criticisms of theory of the firm and its success as a diversionary tactic.
Using his "grey lies" both as a decoy and as a seeming bridge, he has
put up a spirited defence of "white lies", only to tell one that is black.
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And whilst opponents of "The Methodology" (justly sensing it to be some¬
where at fault) have futilely tried to insist on white lies being treated as
black, Friedman's supporters (with equal justice, feeling him often to
be in the right) have sought, with no greater success, to pass off the
black lie as white.
Thus "The Methodology", having created an impression of paradox,
has itself been fundamental in the Mystery of its worth. And while the
Mystery has deepened, with the vital clues so well disguised in
Friedman's broader theses, the maximisation-of-returns hypothesis
has been able to persist, perhaps as the prime example of a theory that,
though "unsuccessful", yet proves "slow and difficult" to weed out: the
theory among theories of those that, in Friedman's (p. 11) words, "are
seldom downed for good and are always cropping up again".
5.1
Appendix V
Footnotes to Chapter 5
1. A phrase that Friedman does not welcome (p»18) but that
is surely harmless here.
2. That is, as an assumption A in a wide range of particular
uses.
3» On the background mechanism which assures success for the
billiards hypothesis, see pages. 5.9 to 5.10.
Friedman speaks of firms and businessmen interchangeably
and seems to intend his claim about behaviour to apply
to all firms.
5. Again, his acceptance that "of course, businessmen do
not actually" do these things (p.22) seems to be
intended as a claim about all businessmen. On his
acceptance of the evidence, see pages 5»zf and 5»5 (and
notes).
>
6. On how far the "actually" here may be significant, see below,
7. See Appendix C.
8. If we take it that what does follow about business
behaviour (in any sense of "behave"(see below)) from,
assuming businessmen to be DRRMs is not a question of
dispute, then (1) stands or falls on the truth of its
conclusion. On the use that Friedman might make of (1),
given his acceptance of (3)* see parallels in Appendix C.
9. The leaf and billiard player analogies give the clue to what
the sense Friedman intends might be. Neither the leaves.
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nor the players calculate; but for the former "their
density is the same as if they did"(p.20), whilst the latter
are "capable of reaching essentially the same result" as
the calculated one. This suggests that Friedman may take
"behave" in (1) to mean "act in the event", rather than
"behave in all respects".
10. With no restriction■on the meaning of "behave" made
explicit, (1) might very well be understood as the
hypothesis that businessmen behave in all respects as if
they're DRRMs. But, even for the non-behaviourist, it
is hard to imagine businessmen behaving in every respect
as DXRMs v/.ithout also actually being DRRMs too. If
Friedman's claim that (1) has survived attempted refutations
is accepted, one may then be misled into supposing it
been
must somehow have/shown that the questionnaire evidence
was false.
11. See Appendix C.
12. It is suggested below that the transmission mechanism
here is not itself imaginary but that its being in
operation is.
13. The essentials, provided literal description of business¬
men's decision procedures is not our question of concern
(see Chapter k, note 37)•
lif. On the relative scope of billiard players and businessmen
for making "implicit" calculations, see pages 5.9 and 5-10.
15« On the scope for leaves calculating "implicitly", see below.
16. Rosenberg (1972, p.27) claims that Friedman does not admit
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the questionnaire evidence as supporting (2) and (3) at
all, and that indeed he excludes the possibility of such
evidence being relevant to"microeconomic general statements".
But I think this claim rests on a misunderstanding of what
Friedman means by"the associated hypothesis" in the (p.22)
passage of"The Methodology" that Rosenberg cites. (See
also Appendix A).
17- See page 12, and Friedman's (p.'t-O) passage quoted there.
18. Perhaps he would not extend the view to cover every modern
firm, however.
19. On the billiard players' case, see'pages 3-8 to 5.10.
20. Little agrees (1950, introduction):"In psychology...the
physical analogy has proved barren. It is not useful to
think of the mind as consisting of molecules - feelings
and volitions - tugging this way and that, with a
resultant force which realises itself in action."
21. But could these conclusions be true for independent
reasons? See below.
22. Doesn't the step seem a long one, between neglecting air
pressure so as to concentrate on gravity, ana neglecting
irrational behaviour so as to concentrate on rationality?
See note 20.and note 33•
23- See Appendix C.
2if. The new assumption stated is surely not an assumption-A,
for all the fact that the "as if" clause still makes mention
of a vacuum.
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25. I think that such a policy of making us wonder might
perhaps be a subconscious one (see page 5*13)•
26. Friedman himself introduces the hypothesis of passive
adaptation in the case of the leaves, suggesting it to
be a preferable hypothesis (see Chapter note 39).
As Koopmans has pointed out, if we knew there to be
a comparable process backing up Friedman's business
hypothesis, there would be a preferable business
hypothesis too.
27. If what follows is neither true, nor nearly true, the
assumption is an assuraption-C (sed pages h»15 and /f.16)..
28. This indirect argument for the conclusion's truth seems
consistent with the moderate methodology described in
I
Chapter but would suggest, I think, use of an
assumption other than the DRRM one. See note 26.
29. In the sense that they will typically make shots that
are "perfect", within the margin of accuracy set by the
game. The pockets being wider than the balls are broad
and getting a ball into a pocket often being the best
shot, the ball that is struck need not travel precisely
along a single central line for the ideal upshot to
result. There will be, as it were, a "beam" of equally
good possible paths to the broad goal. (Does Friedman
take the "optimal direction" to be a line, just as the
perfectly competitive "path" has to be strictly narrow?
See note 30, and page 5*11)•
30. With soine of Friedman's non-economic hypotheses, coming
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close to the precise result implied can seem a realistic
possibility although achieving it precisely is not. But
for his economics case there prove to be special diff¬
iculties in connection with approximating the perfect
result. See note and Chapter 7> especially page ?.9.
31► The suggestion, then, that businessmen somehow simply
"sense" or "feel" what each new set of maximising
requirements is seems to be a non-starter. See note 32, too.
32. To put it another way: if, at each game, the billiard table
had a different slant and its surface a different config¬
uration of hollows and humps,, if the balls were differently
shaped and the cues differently bent, he who, with the aid
just of his "practised eye'J always managed to score would
be not merely an expert player but also an immortal one.
Not that the businessman lives in a realm of total
chaos. Though too little will remain constant for the
development by practice of'fine tuning" skills, still
enough may be remaining in a similar zone to give some
broadly stable base for decision-making. But a policy of
making discrete changes (taking fewer, larger steps)
might now be "second best" (Achilles stepping over the
tortoise? Morgenstern (1973, p.1171) has similarly
suggested relating the tatonnement process to Zeno's
40 and note
paradox.) See note/41; and Chapter 7.
33. Couldn't it be these impersonal forces of the market that
the DRRM assumption allows us to consider in isolation?
(See above and note 22). Some abstract assumptions might
approximately fulfil this role, I think (see notes 26 and
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£f2), but not the DRRM one; for the impersonal force it
might be held to isolate is not one of actual markets.
See page 3«H on Alchian.
See note 4.
35. What counts as "behaviour consistent with rational and
informed maximization of returns" (my emphasis)? As I
have taken it in stating Friedman's argument, the market
behaviour that DRRMing does imply (but would not in fact
be responsible for); and Friedman's argument can then be
attacked on the grounds that such behaviour is not, as
he claims, necessary for survival. But the phrase may
be another slippery one; for it might instead suggest
behaviour that some would think of as tending in the same
direction as DRRM behaviour (e.g. pursuit of positive returns,
rather than maximum ones). If the latter were what Friedman
meant, his view 01 the survival process might not be
wrong after all - but his hypothesis (1) could no longer
be presented as summarising the survival conditions. See
below, on Alchian.
36. For the perfectly competitive situation is what Latsis
(1972) calls a "straightjacket" (or"single exit") one:
"the 'nature' of perfect competition is unusually strict
in allowing a choice of either following a single strategy
or going under"(p.210). (However, in these circumstances,
as Latsis has pointed out, it cannot really be said that
decision-makers freely choose to maximise profits, in
preference to making, for instance, merely positive ones:
"to say that a seller under perfect competition chooses a
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course of action to maximise profits is analogous to
saying that a member of the audience is maximising if he
runs out of the single exit available to him in a burning
cinema," Thus the "maximising" policy is also a "bankruptcy
avoidance"one.)
But out of the perfectly competitive situation, on the
Alchian argument, "Realised positive profits, not maximum
profits, are the mark of success and viability. ...This is
the criterion by which the economic system selects
survivors: those who realise positive profits are the
survivors; those who suffer losses disappear."
#
Alchian's argument seems to have been widely mis¬
represented, and confused with the, surely false, claim
that only maximisers survive. Not only Friedman but also
Penrose (1952 and 1953) dn her hostile replies to Alchian's
paper, give his case this gloss. Yet Alchian himself
particularly emphasises that "the pertinent requirement -
positive profits through relative efficiency - is weaker
than "maximised profits", with which, unfortunately, it.
has been confused."(p.213) writes' that "positive
profits accrue to those who are better than their actual
competitors, even if the participants are ignorant,
intelligent, skilful, etc. The crucial element is one's
aggregate position relative to actual competitors, not
some hypothetically perfect competitors. As in a race,
the award goes to the relatively fastest, even if all the
competitors loaf. Even in a world of stupid men there
would still be profits. Also, the greater the uncertain¬
ties of the world, the greater is the possibility that
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profits woud go to venturesome and lucky rather than to
logical, careful, fact-gathering individuals."
It is because of Alchian's paper that Friedman avoids
the term "maximum profits" and speaks instead of "expected
returns", as a footnote in "The Methodology" explains
(p.21, n.16). But Friedman ends his note rather lightly
with the comment that "the issues alluded to . . . are not
basic to the methodological issues being discussed, and
so are largely by-passed in the discussion that follows",
going on to maintain the idea of maximising these returns.
It may be that the issues aren't fundamental to broader
questions of scientific method (though see note ^2), but
it is surely false that they are not fundamental for the
application of Friedman's methodological precepts to this
particular economics case, discussion of which is Yihat
follows. (See note 1+0).
3?. Perhaps he himself senses that he has done so; for, in
saying merely that "it seems unlikely" that businessmen
?.rho fail to approximate conditions summarised in (1)
would survive, and in recognising the possibility of,
as it were artificially, prolonging existence by"the
addition of resources, from outside", he already
weakens any claim of his hypothesis to be fulfilled.
38. And the mixed economy even accommodates "lame ducks".
39. But not an explicit one. Yet what argument could
Friedman now bring to bear if the theorists of imperfect
competition felt tenacious too?
kO. Does the fact that Friedman treats of "expected returns"
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rather than profits mean the relevant maxima are obser-
vables? And, more generally, could Friedman seek to
salvage his hypothesis with the claim that due attention
hasn't been paid to his concern only with expected returns
(interpreted by Friedman as expected receipts and/or the
expected utilities associated with theui (p.21, footnote
16))? Perhaps if the hypothesis is meant merely as the
claim that businessmen do the best they can to get such
returns as they want, it might be true. But if it were,
it would be trivial, and would seem to be consistent with
the theories Friedman rejects. (See note 36).
41. Rosenberg (1972, p.28) criticises this analogy in similar
terms, as does Coddington.
Is the difference between the cases a matter of
degree? Perhaps so. On the one hand, the octogenarian
may at least have deliberately avoided activities which
would (certainly?) have shortened his life (e.g. smoking).
And though the businessman, on the other, may give an
account of acts that contributed to a. final achievement,
his influence on events will be incomplete (in his
environment of uncertainty and change). (See note 32).
42. Where the destination is defined as a highly specific one.
However, the broader Alchian evolutionary approach may
have something to offer.
43* Can it be said that truth of the DRRM assumption is
necessary for achievement of the maximising result?
Surely, businessmen would reach the same result if they
actually sought to minimise returns but persistently
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made an arithmetical error (I am grateful to Kit Fine
for this point). And this suggests a variety of other
sufficient assumptions, albeit impossible ones, might be
imagined here too(see Chapter 8, notes 10 and 12).
However, the DRRM assumption would be an assumption-C,
even if only sufficient for its conclusion, if no other
sufficient assumption were in fact true - and surely none
is. (On the possible "survival" assumption required to
yield the maximising result, sec note 36.) The DRRM
assumption is necessary, then, in the perhaps rather
special sense that, given the fact, that all other
sufficient assumptions are false, only if it were true
could its conclusion be too.
44. I take it that, except in the perfectly competitive
situation, an aim of satisficing, for instance, is quite
distinct from a maximising one. See note 36, but also
note 40.
45. See notes to page 5.4, and note 43.
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Chapter 6
TAKES STOCK AND LOOKS AHEAD TO A DILEMMA
"When she was good, she was very, very good;
But when she was bad, she was horrid,"
Traditional nursery rhyme
The last two chapters have presented what I believe to be the
solution to the Methodology Mystery, the answer to the question v/hy
consensus on the value of Friedman's case has been so especially slow
to develop. That so many commentators have in various ways mis¬
represented his case forms part of the solution but turns out to be even
more significant as a clue pointing towards the rest. For finding that
1
much of what Friedman explicitly says about method proves respect¬
ably run-of-the-mill leads one to ask what can have caused hosts of
critics to think it instead either the product of only a narrow school of
thought that they see as plainly inferior; or else more radically un¬
informed, and revolutionary but outrageously wrong. Would most
logicians agree with Friedman that the falsity of a theory's assumptions
doesn't necessarily carry with it the falsity of its conclusions? - Surely
2
the answer is, yes. Do most philosophers of science support
Friedman's view that theories can often be used to advantage although
3
there is known to be evidence that tells against them? - Yes again.
But critics of "The Methodology", perhaps misled to some extent by
a certain grandiloquence not altogether suited to an essay of limited
scope, and by views that are incautiously worded when they run the
risk of being read in isolation, do not take these points to be ones in
Friedman's favour; for they see all his claims not only as much stronger
than these, but also as strong enough to prohibit him from holding a mod¬
erate view on any other matters of method. Many might here insist that
Friedman is_outrageously wrong in saying that a false assumption is
always better than a true one - as indeed he would be, if he did say this.
But it is by no means clear that he does: what he says is at the very
least compatible with recognition that true assumptions may have value
as well as limitations, and false ones limitations as well as value. Argu¬
ing for "telling fibs" only in restricted situations, Friedman would surely
want to claim "whiteness" for his lies. That, might return the critics,
is just an attempt to whitewash; and an attempt that furthermore won't
wash, for what, after all, does this "whiteness" amount to? - surely, for
Friedman, just to the yielding of valid predictions; and then isn't he
as wrong as ever, still tolerating grossly false assumptions and now
showing himself as obsessed with the goal of prediction to boot? But
"prediction" can reasonably be used in a sense wider than that in which
4
the critics have generally understood it; and Friedman's argument,
it seems to me, is driving at the idea that "whiteness" can be claimed
for some false assumptions on the grounds, not solely that their implica¬
tions happen to be true (or very nearly so) but also that they epitomise
5
truth in some more direct way. He deftly suggests that attempts to
epitomise truth are necessary and that they can result in statements
that themselves fail of literal truth; and this is the mainstay of his
particular point that truth should not always be viewed as a strict
6.3
6
requirement for statements that are to serve as assumptions. Yet
it is a mainstay that is often overlooked; and here the oversight may
be fostered, I think, not just by Friedman's manner of phrasing his
case in "The Methodology", but also by the critical fact that not all the
types of false assumption he introduces in his examples can be said to
epitomise truth in the way his argument would seem to require.
It is at this point that Friedman's opponents seem originally to
have gone astray; for they appear to have taken it for granted that
Friedman's examples and his arguments would be in step. Then,
rightly believing that an error was there to be detected, they have
fruitlessly sought it, and have rashly proclaimed it, in his preaching
on method, instead of scrutinising and explosing his translation of this
7
into practice. Yet how far Friedman's argument will, even if valid,
give backing for the examples he then proceeds to introduce is an aspect
of "The Methodology" that the critics should perhaps have been alert to
from the first; for Friedman's chief aim in his essay is surely to buttress
just one assumption: the essay is surely designed to uphold a particular
theory of the firm. It is in the pursuit of this aim that I think Friedman's
error comes; for, pursuing it, he trades too far on the facts, firstly,
that one false assumption he discusses (that of the theory he borrows
g
from physics) enjoys a special relationship with the truth, and secondly,
that in all his non-economic hypotheses, truth of their assumptions
happens to be unnecessary for the truth (or at least, the near-truth) of
their conclusions - taking a licence that enables him to slip his central
economics example seemingly smoothly into the flow of argument in
6.4
"The Methodology", even though the truth-values in this example, I
simplifying
suggest, don't accord with the pattern ^assumption that is false: con¬
clusion that is true; or, if not true, very nearly so) that Friedman has
so ingeniously been championing. This seems to me to be the key to
the solution of the Methodology Mystery. For, if I am right, Friedman's
telling of the black lie is so subtle and his integration of it into the able
defence of white lies so apparently complete, that its peculiar colour
has then simply not been suspected by either side in the dispute it has
9
confused.
Thus, solving the Mystery proved to be a much longer task than,
at the outset, I had expected it to be - but also, a far more exciting one.
The initially queer-sounding claim that, in judging a theory's assump¬
tions, one may not always be wise to insist on their honesty, is one that
10
turns out to be too reasonable to be summarily dismissed. Yet, for
all that, it fails to prop up the tottering economic theory that Friedman
tries to champion, whose success does seem to depend on its assump¬
tions "telling nothing but the truth". Both these findings, it will be
argued below, have importance for the issue which is the subject of the
following chapters - a central issue (some would say, the central issue)
in economic theory.
The issue is, that of the value of general equilibrium (GE) theory
(and of the derivative "neoclassical" - sometimes called "neo-
neoclassical""''^ - theories, Friedman's hypothesis about business
12
behaviour among them) : a theory whose assumptions are widely
acknowledged to be far removed from many aspects of reality; but one
that, nonetheless, still forms the basis of most undergraduate textbooks,
is at the core of many degree courses in economics, and is sometimes
proffered as a frame of reference for assessing government economic
policy. Speculation about the future of the discipline still so much
13
dominated by this theory is, however, rife and is fast establishing
itself as a favourite theme - generally a gloomy one - for Presidential
Addresses to Associations of economists (establishing itself in what
Nelson and Winter describe as "a remarkable surge of authoritative
14
grumbling" (1974, p. 890) ). By 1971, Leontief was quoting the words
of a recent president of the Econometric Society: "the achievements of
economic theory in the last two decades are both impressive and in
many ways beautiful. But it cannot be denied that there is something
scandalous in the spectacle of so many people refining the analysis of
economic states which they give no reason to suppose will ever, or have
ever, come about ... It is an unsatisfactory and slightly dishonest state
of affairs". Thai Leontief added himself: "But shouldn't this harsh
judgment be suspended in the face of the impressive volume of econo¬
metric work? The answer is decidedly no" (1971, p. 2). He was
followed in 1972 by Phelps-Brown, who noted (1972, p. 1) "the small-
ness of the contribution that the most conspicuous developments of
economics in the last quarter of a century have made to the solution of
the most pressing problems of the times"; himself hotly pursued by
15
Worswick, whose contention (1972, p. 74) was that "one cannot avoid
some uneasiness. The standards are high, the intellectual battalions
are powerful, but . .. the performance of economics seems curiously
disappointing". MacDougall, feeling in 1974 that the time had come
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"to redress the balance", starts his Address with the ingenious point
that "self-criticism ... is by no means an unhealthy development";
but even he goes on to say: "i happen to agree with many of the criti-
16
cisms that have been made" (1974, p. 773).
17
In this doom-laden atmosphere, many economists are now willing
18
to acknowledge that GE theory, in its traditional form, does not offer
in itself a comprehensive explanation of the economic world. Some,
however, are still reluctant to jettison the theory altogether, cherishing
19
the hope that it can be reformed and so defended. At the same time,
a considerable, probably growing group of economists clearly deem
GE theory more deeply unsatisfactory than this, holding that its
deficiencies are far past repair and that it should be replaced by a
20
radically different theory. Towards the end of his book, "Anti-
Equilibrium", Kornai distinguishes two currents of this kind in the
recent response to GE theory, calling the one "reformist" and the
other "revolutionary". But the prospect he sees for reform is bleak;
"each of the reformers", he writes, "makes a small dent in the founda¬
tions of the GE model /hoping/ that the impact of his attack will destroy
a dilapidated wing of the building, but /supposing/ that the other parts
will remain intact. However, if all attacks on the foundation were
made simultaneously, the entire building would collapse." A similarly
21
sceptical view of what the reformers are achieving is held by Kaldor :
taking up the metaphor, he writes (1972, p. 1239) that "the process of
removing the 'scaffolding1, as the saying goes, - in other words of
relaxing the unreal basic assumptions - has not yet started. Indeed,
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the scaffolding gets thicker and more impenetrable with every success¬
ive reformulation of the theory, with growing uncertainty as to whether
there is a solid building underneath." And the total collapse of such
a building as there has been supposed to be is the subject of such eager
expectation with many revolutionaries that, unwilling merely to wait
for reforming zeal to prove self-defeating by undermining the central
structure with its all-round alterations, and impatient of the building
showing itself to be chimerical or, if real, yet crumbling of its own
accord, they are urging direct action to bring it down; Kaldor seems
to be among them, for (1972, p. 1240) he has advocated "a major act of
demolition" of the conceptual framework of the theory, holding that
without it "it is impossible to make any real progress".
Yet the collapse, whether accidentally developed from within or
22
deliberately engineered from without, has not yet come ; and
23
reformists remain unconvinced that it need come ever. Because I
believe that the theory does collapse, I would like to try to convince
them. At the same time, I agree with Hahn that Ellman's view - that
the teaching of GE theory is "a pernicious practice which does substantial
harm" and that so far as possible it should be "remove/dJ from the
syllabus" (1972, p. 1481) - is "unattractively illiberal" (Hahn, 1973,
24
p. 5) . The liberal Mill would certainly have thought so too; for he
wrote that those who "refuse a hearing to an opinion because they are sure
that it is false . . . assume that their certainty is the same thing as
absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
,.25
infallibility. If GE theory does collapse, then it seems to me, on
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the one hand, that it would not be pernicious to teach what the theory
is and what its weaknesses are, and on the other, that reformists them¬
selves, once convinced, might often be in favour of the present strangle¬
hold the theory has in some quarters being relaxed, to allow fresh
theories in. Would present defenders of GE theory ever be convinced
that the theory must collapse? Some would argue that most would not:
that their vested interest in both the theory and the value-system it is
26
associated with would prove to be too strong. But even if only a few
were persuaded, should not revolutionaries think this worthwhile? - if
not because they agree that, if revolution is to be, far better that it be
peacefully brought about, then because the ruin of the theory they look
forward to will surely be seen much more certainly and swiftly (and
will be cleared up a great deal more tidily too) if but a handful of erst¬
while reformers could be enlisted to work on the side of more radical
27
change. In any case, I am more hopeful that defenders could be con-
28
vinced - if, that is, the arguments brought against GE theory really
29
are "convincing" ones.
Now I think that, if the reformists are to be convinced, two (from
this point of view , complementary) lines of argument must be shown
to have force against GE theory; and so my attempt at convincing falls
into two parts. The first (given in Chapter 7, and building on the
discovery that the falsity of Friedman's assumption does matter for
his business hypothesis) argues that damage to the whole structure of
this particular theory follows automatically on the slightest damage to
any part of its foundations (damage there is acknowledged to be); whilst
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the second (described in Chapter 8, and asking what limits can be set
on how far the process of abstraction may legitimately go, given
Friedman's point that invoking the criterion of literally "telling the
truth" may not do) attempts to show that the theory is unsatisfactory even
if presented (as it recently has been) as merely an abstract design whose
value does not depend on its ever being implemented, whether perfectly
or not.
Together, these two lines of argument do persuade me that GE
theory does indeed collapse. At the same time, it must be admitted
that, both for the details of the theory itself and for some points in the
arguments against it, I have had to draw on what might be characterised
as only hearsay evidence (for example, verbal statements of mathematical
proofs, where the proofs seem to have been accepted in the literature,
30
have simply been accepted on trust) . This introduces an element of
doubt; but one that I have tried to keep within bounds by going for
evidence, wherever possible, to the practitioners of GE theory themselves:
a key argument against the theory in Chapter 7, for example, rests on
a mathematical proof worked out jointly by the author of a standard
British textbook on traditional neoclassical economics and by an economist
well-known for developing theorems in, for instance, the neoclassical
31
theory of international trade. This strategy of seeking information
32
from the "adversaries" is one by which I hope to have minimised the
risk of attributing to GE theory, and faulting it on, features that its
defenders deny it has - a danger two major economists have recently
exposed themselves to, on the testimony of a third; Hahn judges that
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Joan Robinson's view of the neoclassical tradition "is very much like
that of a medieval citizen of Lincoln of the Jews. Like him she
attributes quite absurd beliefs and takes it for granted that these reflect
wickedness" (1972, p. 205); and it is Hahn too who holds that, in attack¬
ing equilibrium theory, Kaldor has been "tilting at the windmill of some
old fashioned textbook" (1973, p. 32). With some thought for the
safety of my skin, a good deal of my hearsay evidence has been drawn
from Hahn himself.
But because the evidence_is in a sense hearsay, and sometimes
circumstantial too, it could be that it misleads. Yet if it does, the
arguments are still, I think, important ones. For it seems to me that
if superior evidence were indeed to show that these arguments do not
after all bear jointly against GE theory, then this theory may well be
33
one that cannot be faulted categorically. And I think that, as
Chapter 9 will suggest, many attacks on the theory, along with attempts
to promote rival ones, can be seen to have been weakened by their fail¬
ure to take both lines of argument into account.
The arguments of the succeeding chapters, then, will, I suggest,
break through both the possible lines of defence of GE theory. And its
defenders will be placed on the prima facie horns of a dilemma. For,
if I am right, any defence of the theory will only be able to escape
Chapter 7's argument against it at the price of falling a victim to
Chapter 8's; and vice versa.
This dilemma facing the would-be defenders might perhaps be more
colourfully put in the terms of a traditional nursery rhyme. For
6. 11
Chapter 7 will suggest that when the theory is bad, it is "horrid". And
the burden of Chapter 8 is to be that if the theory were good, it would
be a deal too good - too good to be true, and so good that it is, literally,
quite out of this world.
\
Appendix VI
Footnotes to Chapter 6
1. For in "The Methodology", he may not be offering a full
account of scientific method. See page if.2.
2. For objections brought against Friedman on points of logic,
see Appendix A.
3. See Chapter 3, especially note 19 and page 3.10.
if. See page 3«10»
5. See pages if.11 to if.l5»
6. Should not, at least in our present state of knowledge.
See Chapter if, note lif. See also Appendix B.
7. See Chapter if, notes 7 and 31.
8. In its standard use. See the end of Chapter if, ana
Chapter 5*
9. The appearance of integration is aided by Friedman's
acceptance of "grey" lies in practice too. Friedman ma;/
well believe that the economic lie is better than black:
see page 5-13«
10. Are there "instrumentalist" overtones in speaking of the
"best policy"? Are false assumptions only to serve as a
convenience; or may they be a necessity? (See Appendix B;
and Chapter if). Does the policy aid the eventual achieve¬
ment of theories that can be "accepted",in the sense of being
believed? When Friedman is given the benefit of any
doubt on these scores, his claim has at least prima facie
plausibility; but even v/hen such benefit is allowed, his claim
for his central business hypothesis fail. See Chapter if,
especially page 4.10.
11. Neo-neoclassical is the terra Joan Robinson uses, followed
by some of the Cambridge school, for post-Keynesian
economics in the traditional equilibrium mould.
Neoclassical then refers, for them, to Marshall and Figou
et al, leaving the terra classical for the group that includes
Ricardo and Marx. But I follow perhaps the
more usual usage in distinguishing only two groups.
12. See Chapter 7. Friedman's articulation of this hypothesis
is novel; but see Chapter 5. On the dangers of making
precise claims about details of the central theory itself,
see below, and Chapter 7> note 7.
1'3. Those who have recently been critical of the present state
of the discipline as a whole have clearly had traditional
equilibrium theory very much in mind.
1^.. Nelson and Winter add an Address by Hahr. to their list.
13. V/orswick confirms the congruence of these assessments,
saying (1972, p.73) that while preparing his own lecture
he was "twice overtaken by presidential conveyances
/Leontief's and Phelps-Brown's/ moving very fast in the
general
same/direction".
16. KacDougall's move, in acknowledging the criticisms but
claiming they are a sign of a "flourishing subject that
can take such self-criticism in its stride" is remin¬
iscent of Kahn's (1973j P«12) who, having acknowledged a
serious difficulty for Arrow-Debreu equilibrium theory
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goes on to claim:"it is one of the great virtues of the way
good economic theorising proceeds that it allows us to
pinpoint difficulties precisely and to be precise about
the difficulties". Both their claims may be true and may
give the impression that the account has been squared; but
of course neither in itself can provide a rebuttal of the
criticisms made. (For more on the difficulty prompting
Halm's remark, and his subsequent attempt to meet it, see
Chapters 7 and 8). See also p.5.12.
17. In 1971? Leontief wrote:"The feeling of dissatisfaction with
the present state of our discipline which prompts me to
speak out so bluntly seems, alas, to be shared by
relatively few"(p.3). But a number of others have spoken
out since then.
18. On the form of equilibrium theory recently suggested by
Hahn, see Chapter 7, note 8.
19. There may be some who will cherish the theory, come what may.
But see Chapter 9.
20. Do they favour a theory whose fundamental assumptions
are different, or a theory of a radically different kind -
or might these possibilities reduce to one? See Chapter 9.
The proliferation of attempted modifications of the
theory on the one hand and the growing dissatisfaction with
it on the other have led a number of commentators to suggest
traditional theory has reached a point of crisis. Kelson
and Winter say (p.890) that "perhaps faj crisis is building
now"; whilst several recent commentators have presented
the situation in Kuhnian terms. And the Lakatosian concept
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of a "protective belt" might well be applied.
21. Challenged by Hahn: see Chapter 7 (especially page 7.6 and
note 16).
22. Kaldor's proffered demolition job would have been stronger,
I think, had he taken into account Friedman's case on
"abstractive" falsehood (see Chapter 2 and Appendix B).
Joan Robinson's criticisms of the theory have gone a long-
way towards undermining it, I think, but are sometimes so
epigrammatically expressed that it is hard to be sure. See
Chapter 9.
23. In adopting the labels "reformist" and "revolutionary" in
much of what follows, I may be inviting the charge that I
too indulge in "facile pigeon-holing" (see Chapter 1). But
I hope to rebut such a charge with the defence that the
terms are being used just for convenience in exposition:
it is the claims of individuals rather than stereotyped
positions that will be criticised below.
2ij-. I largely agree too with Hahn's criticisms (1973» p.5)
of the larger view that "we have no criteria of true and
false" in social science because "social science...must be
'political'". See Chapter k> note 50, and Chapter 10.
25. Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 2. See Chapter 10, note 5»
26. See the end of Chapter 1+ and the start of Chapter 9»
27. Perhaps some are already being enlisted. See below.
28. At the end of the Reswitching debate, for instance,
Samuelson acknowledged that here he and other defenders of
neoclassical theory had been in error. "If all this
causes headaches for those nostalgic for the old-time
parables of neoclassical writing," he wrote in conclusion,
"we must remind ourselves that scholars are not born to live
an easy existence. We must respect, and appraise, the facts
of life" (1966, p.582) ► But see note 29; and Ferguson's
position, in Chapter 9*
29. Joan Robinson writes (1973} p.120) that"in the so-called
reswitching debate...the neo-neoclassics had to admit
that Sraffa was. right. But:
He who is convinced against his will
Is of the same opinion still."'
I would say that if he is of the same opinion, then he
hasn't yet been convinced; whilst if the opinion now
held is a rather different, modified one, it needs to be
shown why, if at all, the new position must fail too.
See note 28.
30. See particularly Chapter 7. And see below, on what
might be salvaged if the hearsay evidence has misled.
31. Some of his work in international trade theory in turn
serves as part of the evidence in Chapter 8.
32. See the note on Mill in Chapter 2 (note 10).
33». Even if the theory couldn't be demonstrated to be
faulty, there might still be reasons for preferring
an alternative one. But such reasons would be less likely





"I'm afraid you've got a bad egg, Mr. Jones1."
"Oh no, my Lord, I assure you'. Parts of it are excellent'."
Punch, 1895.
Taxed with a wealth of evidence presented as showing that the
assumptions of GE theory disagree with aspects of reality, defenders
of that theory will rarely now try to insist that these assumptions are
actually true. But they may well insist instead that the theory's con¬
clusions are borne out - if not always, yet sometimes; and if not
precisely, then still more or less. Claiming this virtue in the theory,
they would then lightly dismiss the non-fulfilment of its assumptions as
a thing of little moment, not unsurprising in an abstract theory. Thus,
in effect, recognising that the theory has (in their eyes, unavoidably)
its "bad" parts, they would defend it by saying how "good" it is in
others. Now there are theories for which defence along these lines
2
might well sometimes succeed. Rather similarly (to resort to an
analogy), the judgement that parts of them are good may save some
things to eat from going straight to the rubbish-bin - bananas, for
instance, which might be bad at one end yet reasonably good at the other.
Or trifles, or gateaux, with their various layers. Or crab: more
clearly still, since the very best of crabs are bad to eat in parts. But
with eggs it is different. If an egg is bad in parts, then we take it as
bad right through (and we scrap it, hoping the next is good). This
chapter will suggest that, as with the badness of eggs, so also with that
7.2
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of GE theory. For whereas defenders of this theory, believing its
conclusions to be true or nearly true, may still tend to speak with pride
of the practical value of those parts that are deduced, I think it can be
shown that their boast of empirical worth must be wry indeed; the
boast that the theory is "good in parts" - like the curate's egg.
The empirical claims of the would-be defenders of GE theory have,
of course, a familiar ring. Such defenders would be following Friedman
in admitting with such equanimity that their theory's assumptions are
not literally true. Some might even say these assumptions were not
meant to be understood as anything more than approximations in the
first place; and many might very well draw on Friedman's persuasive
point that falsehood may be acceptable as an incidental effect of another
process in theory-construction - of the necessary one of abstracting from
the detail of complex reality. The theorist, they would claim, is bound
to simplify and abstract, the success story of natural science illustrating
how worthwhile his enterprise can be. But since no theory can hope to
"tell the whole truth", theories must, the argument goes, be aimed at
summarising or epitomising it; and if they are, then theorists may need
to use assumptions which are not restricted to telling "nothing but the
truth" either. In this way, the defenders, taking advantage of Friedman's
ingenious case, might appear to shift any burden of proof onto those
critics who used to denounce their theory for its neglect, or denial, of
sundry matters of fact, challenging the critics now somehow to show
that facts excluded from GE theory (and perhaps included in its competi-
4
tors) are so important that they must be deemed essential ones. The
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course of the Methodology Mystery illustrates, I think, how far
"revolutionary" spokesmen have underestimated the subtlety and sig¬
nificance of this possible line of defence - a point pursued further in
Chapter 9. However, the Mystery's solution has also highlighted the
fact that there is a possible loophole in such a defence; it emerged in
Chapter 4 that to show that falsity of assumptions does not always
matter is not to demonstrate that it does not matter ever; and the
excluded facts could, after all, in some way be essential ones. Chapter
5 has suggested that, for Friedman's business theory, matter the falsity
does, there transmitting itself directly to the conclusions; so that, so
far as assessing that particular theory on empirical grounds is con-
is
cerned, Friedman's point about abstraction/h distraction. Now, I
am suggesting that the whole of general equilibrium theory is a theory in
just the same boat - that the falsity of its assumptions too is sufficient
5
to undermine any bid for factual strength in its conclusions.
Could the conclusions drawn in GE theory be true even though the
assumptions of that theory are false? Surely the answer is, no. It
is economists from within the field of GE theory who have in recent
years been working on tightening the statement of the conditions under
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which it could be held to apply, conditions some of which are held to
be, as I understand it, necessary for the truth of the theory's conclu-
7
sions. These economists allow that the conditions they are now able
to state with such precision are extremely stringent ones: thus, for
example, Hahn, in his recent inaugural lecture (1973, p. 27) notes
that "tradition ... is forced ... to say that the economy is out of
equilibrium if a housewife finds on a rare instance that the shop has
sold out of butter". They also themselves acknowledge that these
conditions are not (and are hardly likely to be) fulfilled in the real
world. Again, Hahn, in seeking to defend the "modern orthodoxy"
attacked in a recent book by Joan Robinson, commits himself to the
claim that (1972, p. 206) "'orthodox' economics is laying bare the
exacting and implausible assumptions required for the neoclassical
tradition". In the same review, he speaks (p. 205) of the "extreme
vulnerability of the theory of a decentralised economy to matters of
time and uncertainty", and says that "Debreu showed how that theory
would require a large number of contingent futures markets and found
that he could not then account for money. His work is the rod against
which all claims for a competitive economy must be measured" (my
emphasis). The same broad idea - that work in the neoclassical
tradition is establishing that non-fulfilment of certain conditions is
sufficient for the falsity of the conclusions of GE theory - appears in
Hahn and Arrow's book, "General Competitive Analysis" (1971). In
the preface, they pose the question "whether this enquiry into a [GE_/
economy, apparently so abstracted from the world, is worthwhile" and
argue in answer that it is worth showing "just how the features of the
world regarded as essential in any description of it also make it
impossible to substantiate the claims . . . made on behalf of the 'invisible
hand' ... In attempting to answer the question 'Could it be true?',
we learn a good deal about why it may not be true" (p. vii). The
inaugural lecture (which in large measure abandons the traditional GE
8
model) perhaps goes furthest of all. Hahn writes (p. 14) that "the
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Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is very useful when for instance one comes
to argue with someone who maintains that we need not worry about
exhaustible resources because they will always have prices which
ensure their 'proper1 use ... a quick: way of disposing of the claim is
to note that an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium must be an assumption he
is making for the economy and then to show why the economy cannot
be in this state" (again, my emphasis). Hahn still thinks the theory
may have a role, for he continues, "this negative role of Arrow-Debreu
9
equilibrium I consider almost to be sufficient justification for it."
Since theories in the neoclassical mould, but typically much less
precise than Arrow-Debreu, enter so v/idely into the textbooks, then,
in so far as propositions implied by such theories are or might be
thought to be meaningful, I agree with Hahn (against Coddington's
recent criticisms of this passage of the lecture) that the fact the Arrow-
Debreu formalisation can play this negative role is significant. And
Hahn does draw the moral I am arguing for when he adds that "for
descriptive purposes of course this negative role is hardly a recommenda¬
tion. "
Strangely, few opponents of GE economics have made much of the
fact that some of its assumptions are acknowledged to be both necessary
for the truth of propositions deduced and false. Kaldor, however, is
an exception. Noting (p. 1238) the revised statements of the theory's
assumptions "forced on its practitioners by the ever more precise
cognition of the needs of logical consistency", he first makes the
claim (already met in Chapter 6) that work on relaxing them has not
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yet begun. But he is also aware of the value of knowing that proposi¬
tions associated with equilibrium theory have been "shown to be valid
only on assumptions that are .. . directly contrary to experience"; for
he goes on to say (p. 1240) that "the pure theorist has successfully
(though perhaps inadvertently) demonstrated that the main implications
of this theory cannot possibly hold in reality", adding that "/however,
hej has not yet managed to pass his message down the line to the text¬
book writer and to the classroom".
Is GE theory then in ruins, but for the negative role Hahn makes
out for it - of giving an object lesson in structural weakness? Not
quite. As Hahn was quick to point out (1973, p. 8), to put the case as
Kaldor does is to neglect "the large literature on the 'removal of the
scaffolding'". Putting the same point differently, though the fact that
the necessary assumptions are false does mean conclusions drawn from
them cannot be true, this does not tell us that the conclusions may not
closely approach the truth; and the possibility of them doing so apparently
remaining, possibilities for developing or "reforming" GE theory might
seem to remain too: mightn't slightly more realistic assumptions be
stated that could imply the true state of affairs?
Again, I believe it to have been established that the answer has to
be no - established this time in "The General Theory of the Second
Best". As I understand it, this important paper of Lipsey and Lancaster
(1956-7) can be seen, in this context, as showing that even if the assump¬
tions of GE theory were very close approximations to the truth, still
this closeness could not be relied on to be "good enough"; against
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"reformist" claims, non-fulfilment of even just one of the assumptions
(or replacement of just one of the necessary assumptions by a signifi¬
cantly modified assumption, however closely related to the one dis¬
placed) means that no general claim can be made to the effect that the
facts (or the modified conclusions that could be drawn) come near to
the traditional implications. This general result is surely both
11 12
immensely significant for GE theory and initially surprising ; and
it seems worth quoting the Lipsey and Lancaster conclusions in some
detail.
Because they were specially concerned with welfare applications
of their theorem (the status of traditional welfare economics being,in
the late 1950's, in question in very much the same way as that of the
whole of GE theory is today), Lipsey and Lancaster's conclusions are
for the most part cast in terms of the fulfilment of the Paretian
optimum conditions. They describe their general theorem for a second
best optimum, then, (pp. 11 and 12) as showing that "given that one of
the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum
situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian
conditions". Furthermore, it shows that "in general, nothing can be
said about the direction or magnitude of the secondary departures from
the optimum conditions made necessary by the original non-fulfillment
of one condition". Then, "there is no a priori way to judge as between
various situations in which none of the Paretian conditions are fulfilled.
In particular, it is not true that a situation in which all departures
from the optimum conditions are of the same direction and magnitude
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is necessarily superior to one in which the deviations vary in direction
and magnitude." And again, "there is no a priori way to judge as
between various situations in which some of the Paretian optimum con¬
ditions are fulfilled while others are not. Specifically, it is not true
that a situation in which more, but not all, of the optimum conditions
are fulfilled is necessarily, or even likely to be, superior to a situation
in which fewer are fulfilled" - a negative corollary expressed more
colourfully by Mishan (1959) when he writes of it having been shown that
"if one or more of the optimum conditions could not ... be met in one
or more sectors of the economy, one did not make the best of a bad job
by proceeding blithely to fulfil the remaining conditions."
But the general theory of the second best is concerned, as Lipsey
and Lancaster themselves explicitly state, "not just with welfare theory"
but rather with "all maximization problems". This fact is implicit too
in Mishan's account of their theory: he speaks (p. 202) of the situation
they treat of as one in which "some particular institutional or policy con¬
straint prevented the realisation of all the conditions necessary for a
true summit position" (my emphasis), and states that their conclusion
"is proved elegantly by the simple mathematics of maximising a function
of n variables subject to the usual constraints - such as the production
function - plus an "artificial" constraint in the form of an inequality of
one of the conventional marginal conditions". Amidst the special
interest in welfare theory in the 1950's, the non-welfare applications
of Lipsey and Lancaster's theorem caused relatively little stir; and
13
they seem to have been passed over since. But their significance
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now seems clear: the general theory of the second best is surely
sufficiently general to apply to descriptive aspects of GE theory too.
Amongst the non-welfare applications of second best theory that
Lipsey and Lancaster mention, one is of special interest here in view
of the case Friedman puts in defence of approximation procedures.
he considers
They refer to an article of Smithies in whict/the case of a multi-input
firm seeking to maximise profits where a boundary constraint prevents
one factor being employed in the amount profit-maximisation would call
14
for. "Smithies then shows", write Lipsey and Lancaster (p. 16),
"that given the constraint, marginal cost does not equal marginal
productivity for this input, profits will be maximised only by departing
from the condition marginal cost equals marginal productivity for all
other inputs. Furthermore, there is no a priori reason for thinking
that the nature of the inequality will be the same for all factors. Profit
maximisation may require that some factors be employed only to a
point where marginal productivity exceeds marginal cost while other
factors are used up to a point where marginal productivity falls below
marginal cost". In this situation, behaviour that appears to approxi¬
mate maximising behaviour as nearly as possible (equating marginal
costs and revenues for all the, perhaps very many, other inputs
involved) would lead to perverse results.
Thus, the theory of the second best shows that "it requires only
that in one sector the conventional . . . conditions be abandoned as
impracticable for the conventional . . . conditions to be irrelevant in
the remaining sectors" (Mishan, p. 203); and it demonstrates too "the
7. 10
extraordinary difficulty of making a priori judgments about the types
of policy likely to be required in situations where the Paretian optimum
/the maximum/ is unattainable, and the second best must be aimed at"
(Lipsey and Lancaster, p. 28). There seems to be a further moral,
then, for the situation described above in which Hahn's single housewife
cannot buy her butter, over and above the moral that this situation has
15
to be counted, in the traditional theory, a disequilibrium one. For
even if, let us suppose, 49,999,999 other housewives are obtaining all
the goods (including butter) that they desire, and the 50-millionth house¬
wife too buys everything but butter that she wants, we do not seem able
to say, what would intuitively seem appealing, that this economy of
50 million people approximates an economy in equilibrium - or that it
is more nearly in equilibrium than it would be if, the butter shortage
being as before, some other housewife could not track down her
margarine. When the GE assumptions are not fulfilled (and they never
are), then even if they were to come near to fulfilment little of
16
empirical weight seems capable of salvage from traditional theory :
sadly for "reformists", the particular nature of their theory itself
precludes the easy claim that, though all is not "ideal", still things
may in general rub along pretty much as if they were. This all-or-
nothing state of affairs is apparently shared,as Kornai has pointed out,
by the closed axiomatic system of (some of) modern physics; he
quotes Heisenberg's statement that modern physical theory "cannot
be corrected at all since, as a result of its system of axioms, it has
become really a mathematical crystal, some rigid thing which may be
.. 17
correct or incorrect, but without an intermediate case .
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For GE theory, that might seem to be that. The stakes having
been set at all-or-nothing, and hence the result on empirical evidence
being nil, is there anything more to be said? I think there is. For I
doubt if all defenders of GE theory would take the argument given above
as, in itself, finally decisive against traditional theory. There is one
last line of defence behind which they might hope to retreat, and traces
of which can already be detected in the literature. Though acknowledg¬
ing that the GE assumptions are false and even admitting irregularities
in the idea of a merely "approximate" general equilibrium, might not
equilibrium addicts still cherish their theory as at least representing
a logical possibility that, though seemingly irrelevant now, may not
always be so - as a design whose significance may be independent of
its being implemented? May they not say that it is not just assumptions
but conclusions too which can have a value though far abstracted from
reality?
Chapter 8 will investigate this suggestion, asking: "if Economic




Footnotes to Chapter 7
1. For another claim which some defenders of the theory seem to
make - that its value in no way depends on any part of it being
fairly faithful to reality - see below, and Chapter 8.
2. Such a defence would seem to help support, for instance, Friedman's
example drawn from physics (a theory employing the "assumption"
of a vacuum).
3. Does it follow that GE theory should be "scrapped" too? See
below and Chapter 8; but also Chapter 6.
4. Chapter 9 will discuss in what ways some rival theories may be
offering an advance in "realism".
5. See note 3.
6. Sraffa's paper of 1926, showing that the perfectly competitive
situation is incompatible with an assumption of only partial and
static equilibrium, perhaps marked a climacteric in the develop¬
ment of neoclassical theory.
7. I must confess that I would be chary of specifying here precisely
which of these conditions are necessary (for precisely which
articulation of the theory) - the more so when both Kaldor and
Joan Robinson have been so roundly taken to task for getting the
theory wrong (see Chapter 6). But I think it is sufficient here to
take the theory at the valuation of a major practitioner of it, Hahn
7. ii
- who also did the scolding.
8. Hahn writes, for instance, that although he thinks it "useful to
have a concept of equilibrium states", he does "not believe the
Arrow-Debreu notion to be the appropriate one" (p. 9). He does
sketch the lines on which he thinks an alternative and preferable
concept might be developed, but notes himself that this still leaves
him "very much at the beginning of what could be called a theory"
(p. 38), adding that more needs to be done "before even a tentative
judgement on what has been proposed is possible". It would indeed
probably be early days to venture any pronouncement on equilibrium
theory in the new, and on the face of it very different, sense of
equilibrium that Hahn is suggesting; but whereas Hahn has "some
confidence in the main features of the story" (p. 38), I am left
wondering how far one central feature, a concept suggested as
being one of "learning" (see especially pp. 18 to 21) can legitimately
so be described. (See Chapters 6 and 8).
9. Can the deduced propositions legitimately be counted meaningful
ones? See Chapter 8.
Although Coddington's paper (1975, to be published shortly
in a shortened version) drew my attention to the significance of
this passage, it seems to me to give an entirely mistaken account
of the point Hahn is making.
10. Taking a "significantly" modified assumption to be one that is
changed in any way, provided only that the change is not a merely
formal one.
7. iii
Lipsey and Lancaster's paper did provoke an immediate discussion
in the same journal, over the strength of the conclusions they were
claiming; but their case has subsequently been accepted in the
literature. It is given an important place, for instance, in
Mishan's authoritative survey of welfare economics (1959), where
the initial dispute is taken into account (and Mishan saw no need to
qualify the place given to the paper when his survey was republished
in 1965).
Lipsey and Lancaster remark at the opening of their paper that,
although the main principles of the theory they go on to state in a
general form "have undoubtedly gained wide acceptance . . . the
principles often seem to be forgotten in the context of specific
problems and, when they are rediscovered and stated in the form
pertinent to some problem, this seems to evoke expressions of
surprise and doubt rather than of immediate agreement and satis¬
faction at the discovery of yet another application of the already
accepted generalizationd'(p. 11).
Boland's (1970) paper is unusual in suggesting that the Lipsey and
Lancaster paper has importance for the literature on methodology
in economics; but he too only speaks of their theory as applying in
the welfare context.
More specifically, the boundaries that Smithies suggests there may
be to the production function "take the form of irreducible minimum
amounts of certain inputs, it being possible to employ more but not
less than these minimum amounts" (Lipsey and Lancaster, p. 15);
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and the situation envisaged is one in which profit maximisation
calls for "the employment of an amount of one factor less than the
minimum technically possible amount". Situations that are at
least so constrained seem fairly likely to arise.
15. The situation need not be counted a disequilibrium one on the new
theory of equilibrium that Hahn has sketched; but see note 8.
16. What, then, is the position of the literature allegedly on the
"removal of the scaffolding"? At first sight, some of this might
seem to provide counter-examples to the theory of the second
best.
But consider a case Hahn discusses, that in which there
are increasing returns in the economy. This seems to be an area
which
in/Hahn would believe that some of the scaffolding can go. What
he is actually able to say seems, however, to illustrate the second
best theorem. On the one hand, he writes (1973, p. 12) that
"when there are increasing returns it may not be possible to show
that there are any logically possible economic states which qualify
as . . . an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium". On the other, he goes on
to say that "an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium may exist when there
are increasing returns". In other words, in the increasing
returns case, we cannot in general say whether such an equilibrium
exists or not: we are in, it seems, a second best situation. Hahn
then elaborates, considering cases where "we have particular
information about the relationships characterising the economy",
or later, specifically, where "in a precise sense increasing
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returns to scale are small relatively to the scale of the economy"
(p. 13) - cases in which firm conclusions can be drawn. But this
is still, I think, consistent with second best theory, which allows
that specific, though by no means necessarily simple, conclusions
may be reached piecemeal where the requisite detailed information
is available. The position seems to remain a negative one.
Given increasing returns, it will not be possible to say a priori
whether an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists, a fact that can be
known only when "precise" detailed information is known too; and
equilibrium theory of the traditional form seems to have lost any
claim to be "general". (And of course, those specific cases in
which the necessary conditions for an equilibrium to exist can be
known, may very well be ones that are no more realised than is the
unattained "first best" case. )
17. I wonder if Heisenberg is thinking of Einsteinian theory, as
expressed in a system of interdependent equations?
It would be interesting to explore the question how far there
are general reasons for theories being "all-or-nothing" ones.
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Chapter 8
REALLY REFERRING IN ECONOMIC THEORY
or
THE CHESHIRE CAT'S GRIN
"Military officers destitute of military knowledge;
naval officers with no idea of a ship; civil
officers without a notion of affairs . .. all totally
unfit for their several callings, all lying horribly
in pretending to belong to them. "
Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities
"The Cat . . . vanished quite slowly, beginning
with the end of the tail, and ending with the
grin, which remained some time after the rest of
it had gone."
Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
In 1964, answering Machlup, Samuelson wrote of his own factor-
price equalisation analysis: "When one looks at the real world, one
finds it obvious that the hypotheses of the syllogism are far from valid;
and also, the consequences are far from valid. This is indeed a matter
for regret and full disclosure of inaccuracy should be made. Neverthe¬
less ... a strong polar case like this . . . can often shed useful light on
factual reality" (1964, p. 737). Rather than arguing, then, that in
some way this particular part of neoclassical theory "approximates"
reality, he instead admits that not only its assumptions but its conclu¬
sions too are "far from valid"; pleading, however, that though they
are not valid, it's well worth considering how things would look if they
were. More recently, Koopmans (1974) has taken a similar line. He
too is sanguine about the value of equilibrium theory in its strict form,
8.2
writing: "Does the model of competitive equilibrium in its simplest
form represent one pure and special case, one valuable foothold for a
steep climb? My answer: yes"; and adding, by way of explanation,
"I do not hesitate about my 'yes' .. . because of the value to economic
theory of a fully worked out special case". But for all Koopman's own
lack of hesitation, shouldn't we pause to consider what it is that this so
"special" case can be a special case of?
For one begins to wonder whether there may not be in the offing a
general defence to the effect that the very fact of the non-realisation in
the past, present or foreseeable future of the assumptions and conclu¬
sions of GE theory somehow adds significantly to its purity as an ideal.
To the now familiar claim that the theorist must simplify and abstract
there is now added the view that the more he abstracts, the better.
Lancaster, introducing a surely extremely abstract model of inter¬
national traded writes (1957 (1969), p. 50) that, though the theory has
been attacked for its "unrealism", it is "indeed, strengthened by the very
properties which have been subject to so much criticism", being "the
simple model of international trade when things are reduced to most
elemental terms". Then he adds that these terms are "not necessarily
the most elementary terms", perhaps suggesting implicitly an aspect
of this defence that is made explicit in Hahn (1973) - that it is because
the highly abstract can be difficult to comprehend, rather than for any
better reason,that it so often becomes the target for attack. "Here is
what Russell has to say" says Hahn (1973, p. 3): "'Many people have
a passionate hatred of abstraction, chiefly, I think, because of its
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intellectual difficulty; but as they do not wish to give this reason they
invent all sorts of others that sound grand. They say that all reality
is concrete, and that in making abstractions we are leaving out the
essential. They say that all abstraction is falsification, and that as
soon as you have left out any aspect of something actual you have
exposed yourself to the risk of fallacy in arguing from its remaining
aspects alone. Those who argue in this way are in fact concerned with
matters quite other than those that concern science ... It is character¬
istic of the advance of science that less and less is found to be datum
and more and more is found to be inference'." "I happen to believe",
writes Hahn, "that what /Russell/ is here saying applies to our subject."
2
Yet, with Worswick, "one cannot avoid some unease" . If we
accept Friedman's point that one may legitimately abstract beyond the
point of literal truth, does this mean there are then no limits on how
far the process should go? For surely GE theory does seem to err
in the direction of over-abstraction, eventually reaching, one might
very well feel, vacuity.
Kornai (1971) has criticised GE theory for the "error of uniformiza-
tion": he writes that "the GE school makes the description of economic
systems entirely too dull; it over-schematizes and impoverishes it . . .
recognising only one type of consumer behaviour, one type of motive
force for the firm, and one type of information"; thus, "for the
economist of the GE school, 1 seems to be the magic number". And
a glance at neoclassical texts might suggest that Kornai is right. A
section of Lancaster's paper, for instance, is devoted to demonstrating
8.4
geometrically "the equivalence between a pair of countries engaged in
trade and a single economy, under certain assumptions ... a pair of
countries, with the properties which have been analysed in this paper,
is exactly equivalent to a single country whose endowment of labour
and capital is equal to the sum of the endowments of the two individual
countries" (1957 (1969), p. 63). But does Kornai go quite far enough?
Here is Hahn admitting that "traditional equilibrium theory does best
when the individual has no importance - he is of measure zero" (1973,
p. 33).
A number of critics of traditional GE theory have appealed to the
fact that it seems to abstract entirely from some particular factor,
whilst yet purporting to treat of it - with resulting confusion of terms.
Joan Robinson, for instance, has made this point frequently, about the
3
theory's treatment of capital : for the "neo-classics", she states,
"Capital consists of some homogenous physical stuff. Professor Meade
called it steel. I said, let us call it leets because we do not know what
it is" (1973, p. 126). Her question, "When is capital not capital?"
points the issue. Others have asked, in effect "When is a firm not a
firm?" Thus Archibald, in his introduction to a recent set of readings
in the theory of the firm, writes (1971, p. 10) that "in neoclassical
general-equilibrium theory, firms are completely described by their
production functions" and that "the formal theory of general equilibrium
is extremely difficult to handle without important simplifications,
particularly perfect competition. But in perfect competition firms
t
have so little to do, particularly in the absence of technical change and
8. 5
uncertainty, that there is nothing worthy of a separate title." Essentially
the same point is made by Latsis (1972, p. 210), when he says: "The
neoclassical approach may perhaps be fairly termed as envisaging entre¬
preneurs without entrepreneurial functions . . . decision makers without
decision procedures". And indeed Hahn too expresses some arguments
of a similar form; for instance (1973, p. 12), he admits; "it now seems
to me clear that there are logical difficulties in accounting for the exist¬
ence of agents called firms at all unless we allow there to be increasing
returns of some sort. But when there are increasing returns it may not
be possible to show that there are any logically possible economic states
which qualify as ... an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium".
Indeed, Hahn goes further and applies the argument-form more
generally: "we want . . . our equilibrium notion to be sequential in an
essential way . . . This .. . requires that information processes and
costs, transactions and transaction costs and also expectations and
uncertainty be explicitly and essentially included in the equilibrium
notion. This is what the Arrow-Debreu construction does not do"
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(1973, p. 16) . So does Joan Robinson: she claims (1973, p. 126) that
the neo-neoclassics made "output also consist of leets - they reduced
the whole argument to a 'one-commodity world1. The use of models
in economic theory is to eliminate inessential complications from the
analysis of some problem so as to concentrate on the main point; the
use of this model is just to eliminate the point." (Presumably the point
eliminated here needn't just be a point about capital; for who are these
men who can live by leets alone? If "we do not know what /they are]",
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shouldn't we write them backwards too, to be on the safe side, and keep
to a model about nem?) Or again, she writes (1973, p. 132) "it is not
legitimate to say: Let us first assume perfect competition and bring in
the complications later; for an economy in which text-book perfect
competition was possible would be different from our own in important
respects; we do not know what contradictions we may be letting ourselves
in for by assuming it. "
But it is Marx who seems first to have articulated an argument on
these lines against equilibrium theory; and his expression of it is
perhaps the most explicit on abstraction tob. In The Grundrisse, he puts
it thus: "Free competition has never yet been developed by the econo¬
mists, no matter how much they prattle about it. It has been understood
only negatively: i.e. as negation of monopolies, the guild system, legal
regularities etc. . .. But it also has to be something for itself, after
all, since a mere O is an empty negation, abstraction" (p. 413). He
goes on to say that "the reduction is not even formally scientific, to
the extent that everything is reduced to a real economic relation by
dropping the difference that development makes; rather, sometimes
one and sometimes another side is dropped in order to bring out now
one, now another side of the identity": for instance, after defining
wages and profit in such a way that they "are identical ... it is . . . an
error of language to call one payment wages, the other profit", (p. 250)
By now, it will have become clear what form my argument against
5
the final retreat of traditional equilibrium theorists is to take. For
it seems to me that the arguments above can be seen as sharing a
8.7
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common transcendental form; whilst the later quotations suggest that
an argument of such a form applies unfavourably not only to some
individual part of the GE system (when defenders could perhaps attempt
7
to plead that this part is not essential to the working of others) but to
the whole theory. I am suggesting,then, that the claim of some defenders*
that GE theory in its purest form represents an instructive possible
world, falls foul of a Transcendental Argument against the Too Abstract
(TATA).
The burden of the argument is that the supposed "special" or "polar"
case of GE-theory is too special to be a case at all - that the proposed
design for the GE edifice not only could never be implemented but also
even on paper does not truly take shape. For the GE assumptions are
so stringent that strict fulfilment of them surely implies non-fulfilment
of preconditions for various forms of human reasoning (a fact that may
go unnoticed because in the real world we become so accustomed to
taking these preconditions for granted). For instance, Joan Robinson
has suggested that the GE assumptions conflict with our real-world
concepts of time and space; but, if they do, can even our customary
laws of logic be relied on to hold in the truly GE world? Again, other
real-world considerations about the working of the human understanding
8 9
can be used, I think, to set broad limits on what can count for us as
comprehensible alternative worlds - limits which would be violated in
a strictly GE system. Just as the physical possibility of humanity
experiencing a different world depends on that world having character¬
istics that will support human life, so the rational possibility of our
8.8
comprehending an alternative world depends on that world having
features that permit us to grasp it ^ (and without which it can't
really be counted as an alternative world at all). Hollis (19 67-68) has
an example, designed to expose the difficulties in conceiving a Humean
world of unstructured sense perceptions, in which increasingly unpre¬
dictable change caused by a capricious gale leads eventually to a situa¬
tion lacking discriminable regularities and excluding any possibility of
referring to objects or predicating properties of them. By contrast,
in the GE world, it is the excess of regularity, the "error of uniform-
ization", that would defeat all attempts to discriminate, to refer and
i
to predicate: extreme uniformity would prevent us from picking the
now all too continuous things out from each other. And whereas
for Hollis1 s world, the descriptive categories of any possible public
language would be too few (generation and acceptance of new words
inevitably failing to keep pace with events), for the GE world they would
be too many: with all redundant terms eliminated, too few would be left
to form a language. In sum, the GE world is one in which there could
not be human agents, thinking and communicating; and if we seem able
to imagine any men rather than nem in it, this is only by means of
12
illegitimately importing features of reality. But since the categories
of our ordinary language lack application in a GE system, failing to
refer, and since that system nonetheless relies on these terms for its
expression, it is surely logically incoherent: even as a parable, the
theory doesn't make sense.
Not only, then, does discordant actuality defy explanation in
8.9
terms of GE harmonies, but also, in presenting its own never-never
land as having a distinct form at all, GE theory has in fact to depend
on terms wrested from the language of reality - terms that, like fish
drawn out of water, can't long persist alive. As the Cheshire Cat's
grin to the rest of the Cat, so empty names of worldly things have
lingered after the rest of the world has vanished.
Perhaps defenders of GE theory might here protest that the TATA
could only be held to have force against an overstrict statement of their
theory. They might say that they do not need critics to tell them that,
for instance, firms are not so alike as the strict statements of the
theory suppose them to be; and they might claim they have always been
willing to recognise that in applications of the theory there will be
differences to take into account. There are idealisations in the theory,
it is true (they might continue), but this does not mean the theory must
fail to refer; for when its assumptions are relaxed, be it only a little,
the theory may describe how things really are. But such a plea takes
the defenders back to the problems discussed in Chapter 7.
In this way, the TATA complements the case of Chapter 7, based
on the nature of the damage done when the GE assumptions are not
fulfilled, by drawing on the peculiarities of any situation in which they
were. If the arguments are valid, then on the one hand, the defenders
of GE theory cannot correctly claim that although its assumptions are
not fulfilled still its conclusions have general empirical worth; and,
on the other, they cannot legitimately appeal either to the idea that their
theory still has value in mapping out a merely possible world.
8. 10
Thus GE theory tells us neither what is nor what almost is nor
even what might conceivably come to be. Because of this, if theorists
now move on to the development of theories that do come down-to-earth,
they need not, I think, look back regretfully. Perhaps they will not,
and perhaps they need not, forget the paradise they dreamt of; but still
this paradise lost was never more than an illusion.
"They looking back, all th5 Eastern side beheld
Of Paradise, so late thir happie seat . ..
Some natural tears they drop'd, but wip'd them soon;
The World was all before them, where to choose
Thir place of rest, and Providence thir guide;
They hand in hand with wandring steps and slow,




Footnotes to Chapter 8
1. See also pp.8.3 to 8.4-
2. Based on Worswick (1972, p.74). (See page 6.5).
3. She extends the argument beyond capital too: see below.
4. And so, Hahn judges the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium concept
inappropriate, and sketches his alternative one. See
Chapter 7, note 8.
5. Not counting the appeal to faith. (See Chapter 9)•
6. Very roughly, they argue that neoclassical assumptions
contradict conditions that are necessary for our very
experience (and presupposed in our concepts) of economic
factors.
7. On the face of it, defenders of rival theories might
need to plead thus too; but see Chapter 9.
8. As Strawson (1959) and Eollis (1967-8) have used them.
9. See Appendix D.
10. Our being able to imagine a GE world,after a fashion,
would not be sufficient to make it a comprehensible one;
for equally, we seem able to imagine, after a fashion, the
incomprehensible. See below and note 12.
11. Defenders of GE theory might here suggest that this extreme
uniformity is shared by some abstract theories in natural
science, which we yet have accepted. But I wonder how far
uniformity there _is so extreme, and whether, where limits
are invoked, for instance, they apply just one at a time.
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(What, otherwise, does happen when an irresistible force
meets an immovable mass?) Also, the extreme assumptions of
natural science can, I suspect, more easily be relaxed*
Similarly, Hollis says (1967-8):"we can apparently imagine
a total chaos...we can think away every feature of an
ordered world in turn, but this does not mean we can under¬
stand a world without any features left. On the contrary,
if private consciousness provides a standpoint for
describing total chaos, it does so only in so far as
it gives us a private world with inductive stability, which
we then deny total chaos to resemble...total chaos remains




"What do you get by throwing stones at
your enemy's windows, while your own
children look out at the casement?"
Seeker, 1660
"Placing reliance upon neoclassical theory is a matter of
1
faith" one of its defenders has judged, when confronted with
a logical difficulty in that theory. Will the faith of all
defenders prove so strong? There is perhaps already some
religious air about the talk of "shedding light" and of
.2
"climbing steeply" (a ladder to Heaven?) ; but still it does
not seem to me that a general situation in which "criticism
3
can have no effect" has yet been reached (or necessarily
k
ever v/ill be) . And if the critical arguments of the past
two chapters are not mistaken, together they must surely
form a powerful pair.
It is in a combination of just such arguments, however,
that Hahn scents paradox. "I want to emphasise... the
paradoxical position of some of the critics", he writes
(1973, p.13):"They complain of the excessive generality of the
/equilibrium./ construction but at the same time believe that
the whole edifice must tumble if it ceases to be completely
general". But does any impression of paradox that there is
5
here truly stem from those critics? I have been arguing,
in effect, that it does not,but rather arises from the nature
of GE theory itself,whose very peculiarity it is to be in
precisely the anomolous situation being criticised. GE theory
is a theory which indeed cannot stand unless it's general, yet
9.2
if general, is too general to stand; but it need not be
paradoxical to point to this fact, for surely there may be
theories that escape this choice between the Devil and the Deep
Blue Sea.
So I join in both the "belief" and the "complaint" that
6
Hahn has held to be jointly a paradoxical pair - claiming}
against him,that the two are more effective working in harness.
It is rarely, however, that "revolutionary" spokesmen even
hint how these twin criticisms might mesh together, a failure
that surely weakens their apparent basis for espousing rival
theories.
Ellman, for instance, has suggested that GE theory is to
be criticised for a "lack of correspondence between the theory
7
and the economies we seek to analyse"(1972,p.l^80) But then,
how much better can "revolutionary" theories fare? Can labour,
for instance, really legitimately be treated as homogeneous,
even though capital cannot? Or again, take Eatwellis(197if)
recent exposition of Sraffa's alternative analysis.. Eatwell
is frank about the fact that the "composite commodity"
introduced "in which wages are expressed, is a rather extreme
abstraction." Then he continues "it is not, of course,
assumed that the worker actually consumes the standard commod¬
ity, merely that the wage may be expressed in those terms...
although an abstraction, the standard commodity represents
all the essential characteristics of the actual organisation
of production..." Doesn't this amount to saying that,
although there is in fact no such"standard commodity", still
we are justified in proceeding as if there were?
Moreover, consider Joan Robinson's case. It has not gone
9.3
, unnoticed with Hahn (1972, p.206) that she is willing to admit
"facts /that/ are stylized with a vengeance". She herself
acknowledges (1973j p.267) that in the simple Keynsian model,
where money prices are assumed away, Marshall's "little
question" of value ("Why does an egg cost more than a cup of
tea?") disappears. She is explicit too about the Ricardian
method of "taking strong cases", writing (1973> p.251) that
"this means: swing your variable over a wide range and look
at the two ends before you look at the middle". But then how
do Ricardo's "strong cases" differ from the GE theorists'
"special" or "polar" ones? The amplification she gives is
unhelpful here; for she continues: "there is an art in doing
this, it is not just a mechanical trick. What is a wide range
in relation to the question in hand? The trick anyone can
learn, but the power to recognise a wide range is a gift of
God." There follow examples (p.252); but these serve to point
the puzzle without offering guidance on how it is to be solved.
For instance, "for Marx the strong case (for accumulation) is
zero accumulation...you might think it rather a funny idea to
study accumulation in terms of a system that is not accumulating.
But if you think that, it just shows that you did not go to one
of the best schools, and I will not be so snobbish as to rub
it in." And again, "Keynes starts in a Marshallian short
period. It certainly does seem rather odd, at the first
glance, to assume zero accumulation when the very things you
are going to talk about - saving and investment - are two
aspects of accumulation. A number of smart Alecs have noticed
this anomaly and then spent a lot of time pointing out the
fundamental logical contradiction on which the General Theory
9.b
is based": here "Professor Kahn /made/ an endeavour to explain
what Keynes was doing"; but "this was in oral discussion, not
published". What are those who missed the oral discussion then
e
to make of the remark elsewhere (p.63) that "the Keyr^ian
revolution brought us down from the neoclassical cloud-cuckoo-
land, to here and now, facing the problems that we actually
face"?
At this point, one might begin to wonder whether those
rejecting GE theory as too abstract must, for consistency,
jettison the current rivals, too. It seems to me that perhaps
they need not, when their rejection is based on the twin
lines of argument given above. For whilst these arguments,
if correct, provide a strong case against GE theory, they
yet suggest how other abstract theories might be defended.
e
They bring a case that Marxist and Keyi^kian theories could be
proof against, if their advocates could show that the abstract
assumptions of their simple versions are ones that can be
relaxed.
e
Joan Robinson tells us that in the simple Key^kian model
"Marshall's cup of tea dissolved into thin air". Why exactly
does she think this mattered less than dissolving capital
into leets did? "You assume away the complications till you
have got the main problem worked out", she continues. And




Footnotes to Chapter 9
1. Ferguson (cited by Joan Robinson) responding to the
reswitching argument.
2. See pages: 8.1 and 8.2. See also p.5.13*
3. The conclusion Joan Robinson reached (1973, p.154) in
her criticism of Ferguson's book.
4. Perhaps this is a matter of faith with me. But for some
basis for the view, see pages 6.7 to 6.8, and especially
note 28.
3. I am aware of few critics who have articulated the
criticisms in this way (Joan Robinson is one; but see
Chapter 6, note 22). See below.
6. It might be wondered whether the combination of Chapters
7 and 8 above is paradoxical because, whereas the TATA
of the latter shows- the propositions of GS theory as
incoherent, the former relies on their coherence in
claiming them to be false. (See page 7.5). But again,
I think that any paradox stems from the position being
criticised.
7. He is comparing criticism of this "lack of correspondence"
with that of "the internal consistency of the theory
being realised", seeing the two as unrelated.
8. Here, Joan Robinson also says (1973, p.268):"The price level
comes into the argument, but it comes in as a complication,
not as the main point" - allowing for the reintroduction
9.ii
of complications. But neither the significance of being
able to bring the complications back nor the reasons
for differences in ability to do so between 6E and




AN END AND A BEGINNING
Breathless with excitement at the challenging issues that have
seemed to appear with each step along the way, J am very much aware
that reaching this first destination in a sense only shows how much
further one might eventually seek to go. A few problems may have
been solved, some more at least defined, and several others touched
on; but as many more are only beckoning from beyond the path.
Perhaps this is inevitable when the track has lain at first through a
maze of by-ways and later through almost uncharted territory. *
Perhaps too it is a hopeful sign for the newly-named Philosophy of
Economics; for the new areas do not seem to have proved barren, and,
with unknown regions yet to venture into too, it should be good to go on
2
exploring.
What might the explorer hope to find? Perhaps the answers to
two questions implicit in the route so far. Firstly, that of how far
3
the dismal science resembles others. (Are there any economic
4
laws; and if so, what are they like? Or is the economist rather
treating of experience that, as Neale has said of history, "never
repeats itself but . . . offers analogies"? ) Secondly, that of what
relationships there are between capitalism, liberalism and particular
economic theories. (When GE theory is an illusory monolith, but the
capitalist economy can be tinkered with, can the link between the two
5
be as close as has been supposed? )
10.2
6
Or ;perhaps he might linger to consolidate past gains. Or might
search for a bridge between the Is-Ought controversy and developments
7 8
in welfare economics. Or take up the cause of Cause in economics.
Or branch out in a dozen different ways.
Writing in 1939, the year after Harrod's Presidential Address,
D.H. Robertson was apologetic about touching "on the distasteful subject




Footnotes to Chapter 10
1. On a "chart" which has just been published, see Appendix D.
2. See Chapter 1.
3. MacDougall (1974» p.777) takes a common line when he claims
that "it is blindingly obvious that we shall never achieve
anything like the certainty of the natural sciences"; and
he includes in his reasons for saying so, that "we cannot
construct the same kind of controlledlaboratory exper¬
iments." But is it so blindingly obvious that economics
is doomed to an inferior position? Perhaps the dismal
science will always be a poor sister to the natural sciences.
On the other hand, it seems possible too that asking different
questions might bring a gain in the certainty of economic
knowledge (see note 4)} and that some decisive exper¬
iments might be devised.
I fancy that some constraints on economic behaviour might
usefully be thought of as economic laws. On the economics
side, it would be interesting to consider from this point of
view both the national income identities and relationships
of sectoral balances in the economy; whilst on the phil-
d
osophy side, this idea might link with the indiviualisa/'
holism debate (along with economic aggregation problems),
oral
a recent/paper by Hyle, work on circular arguments and on
the nature of necessity. See also note 8.
5. It has been implicit at some points in the thesis that
liberalism (for example, aft "thought and discussion",
10. ii
with Mill) is compatible with economic doctrines other
than neoclassical ones - a view that Friedman (1962) has
disputed. Here one might consider, inter alia, how the
arguments of Chapters 7 and 8 would relate to theories
cognate with the GE one in other disciplines (e.g.
theories of justice and formalised theories of democracy).
6. For instance, Chapter 1+ and Appendix B suggest that con¬
sidering accepted routes of approximation, summary and
abstraction in more detail might prove worthwhile. Also
it would be exciting to track down any parallels between
various all-or-nothing theories (Chapter 7). And work
on Lockean Abstract Ideas and on Bradley might complement
Chapter 8.
7. This may be one of the points at which developments in
economic theory might have value for philosophy.
8. It seems clear that the work of Lucas (1962) and of
Mackie (1969) on cause has very important implications




This appendix gives a brief summary of the principal
misunderstandings of"The Methodology" that have appeared in the
literature discussing it. It does not cover the wider
economic, literature, into which many, and sometimes cruder,
misunderstandings have found their way too.
Since only misunderstandings are reported, some papers
in the literature of the Friedman Affair get no mention at
all (e.g. Archibald's review-discussion (1959) of Koopman's
book (1957)5 with its two points of congruence with Chapter
5 above (pages 5.11 and 5.12)); and those that are mentioned
gain next to no acknowledgement of any fair criticisms they
also offer.
The areas of misunderstanding are listed separately,
though some have tended to go together. It has been held
that:
(a) Friedman believes theories must and can be judged
only by their predictions; and his methodology is at
fault because this rules out considerations which ought
to be taken into account too, and in particular ability to
explain.
Rosenberg (1972) is perhaps the worst offender here.
He has Friedman making the "sweeping" claim "that theory
is to be judged exclusively by its predictive power for the
class of phenomena which it is intended to explain" (p.17)
and later (p.19) that "the only measure of satisfaction is
predictive success". And he goes further; saying (p.17)
A.2
that the criteria of "explanatory power, simplicity, and
economy, synthesis of disparate phenomena, consistency with
other accepted theories, and the truth of ..... axioms...
cannot he dispensed with by mere assertion". Later (p.23)
he recognises Friedman's "other grounds" and costs-against-
accuracy remarks, but says on the first "what other grounds
of equal acceptability are there...if predictive success is the
only ground, as Friedman claims", and on the second that
"this criterion conflicts with the general criterion of
predictive success by importing economy and simplicity as
criteria for the acceptance of theorieb".
Coddington (1572, p.3) associates Friedman with the
view that "the characteristic of a theory which alone is
relevant in appraising it as a contribution to economic
knowledge is its predictive performance"; and although he
does mention the "symmetry" view of explanation and prediction,
he sees Friedman's account as "quite inconsistent with
explanation or prediction invoking 'causes'" (p.3, n.lA).
And he thinks that Friedman's position is "better described
as an extreme form of pragmatism or instrumentalism. ./"than/
labelled as positivist" (p.2). Bear and Orr (1967) see
Friedman as holding the instrumentalist view too (on Popper's
definition). They share the view that "The Methodology's"
methodology is contrary to pursuit of explanation: "A
scientist is concerned with how things happen, not only
with what happens, and the Friedman methodology makes it
impossible effectively to pursue that concern" (p.191).
Or, to go to Melitz (1965), "the 'as if' construal of
economic assumptions" leads to answering only "the question
•how possibly' rather than the question 'why'" (p.50).
And in 1959> Rotwein noted Friedman's treatment of
explanation and prediction as alike, but made no mention
of the support of some philosophers for this "symmetry"
view.
Needless perhaps to add that Klappholz and Agassi -
and Wong - misunderstand here too.
(b) Friedman has failed to realise that simple assumptions
are different from false ones; and believes that, for
assumptions, "any old falsehood willdo".
Thus, Rotwein takes the view that, when Friedman's
"descriptive falsity" passage is seen as an argument for
abstraction, it "conflicts with the procedure supported in
his main thesis because there 'descriptively false' has its
more direct and usual meaning: that is, we are told there that
in testing the validity of a 'theory'' it makes no difference
whether or to what extent its 'assumption' does falsify
reality"(p.565)• Rather similarly, Rosenberg.
Cyert and Grunberg (1963) write (p.308):"Friedman's
reference to abstract propositions as also 'unrealistic' in
the sense of the statement about the billiard players
confuses two quite different things: neglecting certain
attributes of reality and making observably false statements
about reality...an abstract proposition cannot refer to all
attributes of the elements of the particular class, but it
may not contain empirically untrue references." ("May not"
here meaning "is not allowed to"?)
Perhaps likewise, Bear and Orr, and Melitz.
A.J*
(Incidentally, Cyert and Grunberg also say (p.308,n.lJ*)
that "in his entire argument Friedman mentions only confirm¬
atory evidence which he describes as 'dramatic' and 'conclusive'",
objecting that "confirmatory evidence...merely indicates that
a hypothesis has so far not been disconfirmed". Compare
with Friedman, p.9 (as elsewhere in his argument): "The
hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted...
Factual evidence can never 'prove' a hypothesis; it can only
fail to disprove it, v/hich is what we generally mean when
we say, somewhat inexactly, that the hypothesis has been
'confirmed' by experience".)
(c) Friedman has confused "assumptions", meaning
"statement.of initial conditions", with "assumptions",
meaning "higher level hypotheses".
Barr (1971) writes that Friedman "talks about assumptions
(i.e. ideal conditions) of hypotheses and assumptions that
are hypotheses"(p.268). According to Barr, Friedman indicates
in the vacuum example that the assumption of the hypothesis
is that the buoyancy of air (and etc.) equal zero, whilst the
2
hypothesis is summarised in the formula s-^gt ; whereas in
contrast, in the economics case, "he refers to the assumption
as the'hypothesis: the assumption that firms seek rationally
to maximise their expected returns is labeled by Friedman as
the 'maximisation of returns hypothesis'". But surely Friedman
distinguishes between the actual maximisation of re burns and
deliberate maximising behaviour, with his "as if" hypothesis
only"hypothesising "the former.
A.5
Likewise, Rosenberg; perhaps Clarkson (1963); and,in
rather different terms, Melitz,and Cyert and Grunberg.
(d) Friedman holds that businessmen are DRRMs, billiard
players do solve the relevant equations,and etc.
Melitz misinterprets the "as if" construction (see
Appendix C). He writes. (p.50) that "if businessmen act only
as if trying to maximise profits, then evidently they do not
exactly try to maximise profits...As a result, no specific
conclusions about business's actions, however vague and
tentative, can be strictly derived from the statement. In.
basing any prediction on the assumption of profit maximis¬
ation, it nay safely be concluded that there is implicit
reliance on the declaration that...businessmen really and
truly try to maximise their profits...Broadly speaking, in
using the economic postulates to explain and predict, we
commit ourselves to what they say about the world, and
thus it would seem almost mandatory to interpret them
accordingly as straightforward declarations of fact".
Rosenberg holds, inter alia, that Friedman rejects the
questionnaire evidence against the hypothesis that
businessmen are DRRMs.
And Cyert and Grunberg give a remarkable account of the
billiards example. Taking the hypothesis to be that expert
billiard players make their shots by solving mathematical
problems, they claim that Friedman does not consider this
disconfirmed and consequently neither discards it, nor retains
it (because of its correct predictions in a limited zone)
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until a better hypothesis can be formulated. Rather, he
chooses the alternative of splitting the hypothesis into
two: "a hypothesis b^ (expert billiard players solve the
relevant mathematical problems before making a shot) and
b^ (expert billiard players have mathematical training to
solve the mathematical problems presented by the game).
Whereas b^ is now considered to be strictly disconfirraed,
b^ is considered to be true."(p.307)
(e) Friedman misunderstands elementary logic.
Clarkson believes that Friedman's case depends on talcing
success of predictions as, in itself, confirming the
propositions that imply them.
Rosenberg presents the twin of my argument that, where
truth of assumptions is necessary for their conclusions'
truth, falsity of the former will lead to falsity of the
latter. The point he makes is that, with the truth of an
assumption sufficient for the truth of its conclusion, to
establish the truth of the former is to establish the truth
of the latter. This does go against Friedman's claim that
independent tests of assumptions are not relevant, taken as
a general claim; but is not well-geared to Friedman's specific
concern with the status of tests of assumptions when these
(simplifying) assumptions are often false. Rosenberg also
makes the Samuelsonian point that "every theory implies its
own assumptions, so if these are tested and confirmed, the
theory must be confirmed to that extent." (p.18) It is true
that assumptions imply themselves, but Rosenberg neglects
Friedman's anticipation of this objection (which De Alessi(l97i)
has drawn attention to). Recognising some possibility of
interchange of assumptions and implications in different uses
of a theory, Friedman allows that in these circumstances a
hypothesis invoking false statements may be acceptable for
some purposes but not for others. False assumptions will
not have true implications when used to predict themselves -
but they can have other, less trivial, uses. (Criticism of
"The Methodology" on the.grounds of interchange possibilities
between assumptions and conclusions is related, I think, to
Leontief's point (1971) that the "give'ns" of today become the
unknowns of tomorrow; and to Rotwein's argument).
And Rotwein ends with "it is, difficult to argue consistently
in support of the unintelligible" (p.575); whilst Rosenberg
offers the conclusion that economists "would do well to




What does Friedman mean by his provocative claim in "The
Methodology" that "to be important ... a hypothesis must be descript¬
ively false in its assumptions" (p. 14)? Some commentators take
him to be claiming thathaving false assumptions is a (or even the)
prerequisite for the importance of a hypothesis; whilst others protest
that, on the contrary, the context makes it plain that the word "falsity"
in his claim is a misleading one, since he is not really talking of falsity
here but only of descriptive incompleteness (simplicity, abstraction).
But it is suggested in Chapters 3 and 4 above that neither of these
versions of the claim may represent Friedman's position adequately.
Certainly, the immediate context does show that he is discussing the
importance of abstracting from the mass of descriptive detail that
could in principle be given about phenomena (and other passages support
this interpretation: see, in particular, his remarks about a theory of
the wheat market that included details even of colours of the traders'
hair and eyes (p. 32)). And Friedman also says (p. 15) that he has
expressed his point "paradoxically". On the other hand, his examples
and parts of his argument elsewhere surely make it plain that he is
also especially concerned with stressing the role to be played by
assumptions that are false. Chapters 3 and 4 argued, then, that what
Friedman seems to be claiming is not only that just the key facts about
X (for a particular predictive (explanatory)purpose) should be included,
but also that stating just, as it were, the essence of the truth about X
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(for that purpose) may (in our present state of knowledge) itself involve
stating a falsehood.
The idea that broadly successful attempts to epitomise detail may
lead into falsehood (Friedman's idea, on my interpretation) has not
been very widely recognised, I think, in writings on economic method.
There seems to have been a fairly general presumption (though not all
hold this: see below) that a process of excluding unwanted details can
lead to statements as simple as could be wished without ever trespassing
into falsehood, and that taking some licence with strict truth has no
connection, at all with the ability to sum things up simply. (I wonder
how aware Kaldor is of the possibility that many, on the face of it
valuable, abstractions might be counted as literally false, when (1972,
p. 1240) he writes of "assumptions that are manifestly unreal - that is
to say, directly contrary to experience and not just 'abstract'." But
see below).
Yet the idea that I am taking to be Friedman's does perhaps
deserve some credence. An article by Barr (1971) on idealisations
in science seems to give some support for the idea (although Barr
believes, I think, that Friedman is abusing it). Barr makes it part
of his analysis of an ideal condition (holding ideal conditions to be
involved in many idealisations in the natural and social sciences) that
such a condition is "a formula in which occur state variables whose
existential closure is false" (p. 271). He also suggests that there
may be "no major semantic difference between (most) other universal
laws and laws in idealized theories" (p. 266), referring here both to a
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change of heart on the part of Hempel, who "at one time stated that
universal laws are true /and_7 now contends that they need hold only
approximately", and to the philosophers Scriven and Humphreys who
"contend that most laws that are formulated by scientists are only
approximated by most (if not all) empirical cases".
Consideration of some of the simplest methods of statistical summary
might also suggest that statements which are literally false may yet be
held to epitomise the truth. Take a group of (n) G-objects (where
n >2 ), each of which possesses a quality 0 to some measurable
degree but not all of which possess it to the same degree. Then, to
abstract or simplify:
AB. 1: we might employ the arithmetic mean of the 0 of the
group, saying that
(i) any G has (9 of . . .9 of G ) of 0
n
or again,
(ii) the representative G has ^(9 of . .. 9ofGn)of 0
n
But, except by a fluke, it will be false of each particular G that it has
just this degree of 0 ; so (i) will clearly be false. Further, "the
representative G" in (ii) will be a theoretical construct that has no
single direct counterpart in reality; and some logicians might perhaps
then want to claim that(ii) is false too, analysing it in such a way that
it makes an existential claim that is false (just as they might interpret
claims about the (merely hypothetical) G with perfect or infinite 9 as
false.
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AB. 2; to overcome this difficulty, we might take the median G
with respect to 0 , aiming to select one of the real objects as central.
Then, in summarising G's possession of 0 , we might claim that
(iii) the nr edian G (where G is ranked with respect to 0 ) has
x units of ©
(iii) will certainly be true where (n) happens to be an odd number. On
the other hand, it is open to an interpretation on which it would be false
if (n) is even; for by the usual conventions (the arithmetic mean of the
two most central observations being taken) the median G would then be
»
another entity merely theoretically invoked, and the problems of AB. 1
would be reintroduced.
AB. 3; or suppose that, as it happens, all but one of G have x units
of © . In this special case, it might seem natural to take the mode
as a summary measure, saying that
(iv) modal G's have x units of ©
or perhaps that
(v) in general, G's have x units of ©
(iv) will be true. But (v), which might be taken to mean only that
most G's possess just this degree of © , but might instead be held to
mean that all G's do, could again be false.
Thus both attempts, as it were, to extrapolate from reality (invoking
limits or idealisations) and ones simply to summarise it in various stan¬
dard ways do indeed seem sometimes to yield statements that could be
counted as false. (Must they be counted as false? -Mayn't there be
B. 5
a category of the "non-realistic", for which no existential claims are
made? But that they "could be" could be enough for Friedman's case).
When processes of abstraction are viewed in this light, Friedman may
be right to suggest that insistence on stating only what would be sure
to pass as strict truth may carry with it severe, and perhaps unnecessary,
restriction of methods of description.
However, where what might be counted as falsehoods can fulfil the
role of summari sing detailed truth satisfactorily (for a particular
purpose), there will of course be purposes for which they are not
satisfactory (see Chapters 7 and 9). Furthermore, there seems to be
a sense in which the truth that underlies them could be "recovered",
if at a cost. Is the cost then only one of convenience? And, even for
convenience, Friedman himself leads one to wonder how far, and how
inevitably, this must be lost, seeming to leave open the possibility that
eventually assumptions that are simple, powerful and true might be
developed (see Chapter 4, note 14). Boland has claimed that a
Popperian view suggests simplicity and "generality" could go together
(see Chapter 4, note 10). And in his 1937 paper on "The Nature of the
Firm", Coase seems similarly sanguine about simplicity in relation
to "realism"; quoting Joan Robinson's view that "the two questions to
be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable?
and: Do they correspond with the real world?", he goes on to remark
himself that "there may well be branches of theory where assumptions
may be both manageable and realistic." But Coase also notes Joan
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(a)"Rupert is walking as if he is drunk."
V/hat does (a) tell us? That if Rupert were drunk he would walk
thus and thus, and that he's walking that way now. Or, to
put this in schematic terms, that
(b)If K, then V/ ^-ly; and W j£-ly in fact.
It seems to me that, where (a) was uttered, both speaker and
when
hearer would often presuppose or take it for granted that /Rupert
is under the influence, this influences his way of walking,
and that they are agreed on what the influence on his way
of walking is. In these circumstances, to assert (a) might
.seem to be to convey simply the information that
(c;)Rupert is walking thus and thus,
i.e.. W jzf—ly
When (c) would be a full statement of what the utterer of (a)
intends to convey, I shall say that he is putting "as if" to
a D-use (a descriptive use). (A different example where an
"as if" seems inevitably to be used in a D-use: "Businessmen
behave as if they're steamrollers"). Making a D-use of
"as if" in (a), then, the speaker would be wanting to convey
merely the bare fact that
(d)Rupert is walking drunkenly
But there seem to be other possible D-uses of "as if" for v/hich
no ready replacement of the "as if" clause would be available -
where there is no other convenient, and perhaps no other
accurate, way of specifying the content of "thus and thus"
/
(some examples: "Now, children, we're all moving as if we're
pussy-cats after a mouse";"It accelerated as if it were a
Cortina saloon"). (This might have some importance for
questions raised in Appendix B).
However, whereas,when a D-use of "as if" in (a) is made,
the speaker's point is simply one about how Rupert is walking,
there could be other utterances of (a) in which, although the
connection between K and W ^-ly is not in doubt, another
matter, besides Rupert's manner of walking, is: namely,
whether Rupert is drunk. Then, since K is agreed to be a
sufficient condition for j^-ly, W jzR-ly might be treated as
evidence with a potential bearing on whether K (Rupertis
walking thus and thus; what is causing him so to walk? -
it could be his being drunk). Thus in (b), W fC-ly might
be treated as evidence whilst K specifies the conclusion to
which the evidence could be taken to point. When the utterer
of (a) intends his utterance to be construed in this way, I
shall say that he is putting "as if" to an E-use (an
evidential use). (An example, where the "as if" seems
inevitably to be used in an E-use: "He talks as if he knows
his job").
But E-users of "as if" in (a) might believe that
(El)Rupert is drunk (and his walking drunkenly is evidence
of this)
or (E2)Rupert is not drunk (and . though his walking drunkenly
might be interpreted as evidence that he is drunk, it isn't
actually evidence of this)
or (E3)Rupert may be drunk (and his walking drunkenly may be
C.3
evidence that he is)
or (EJf)Rupert is not drunk, but is merry (and his walking
drunkenly is evidence only that he is merry)
The moral of this tale is that, from the written words
"Rupert is walking as if he is drunk" alone, it will not be
possible to tell whether the writer is making a D,E1,E2,E3
orEif use of "as if"; and so to know, whether or not he means
to suggest that Rupert is drunk.
And if the writer has already said elsewhere: "of course
Rupert isn1t drunk" - or even "of course Rupert is only merry"
then at least we know - if only we notice in time - that his
9
use cannot be an El or E3 one. He is not suggesting that




On "Rational Economic Man"
This Appendix might perhaps have been called instead
"Stop Press"; for Hollis and Nell's book Rational Economic
Man (1975) appeared too late to feature in the text, yet is
news too important to be left out of account. Between the
structures of the argument in this thesis and in Rational
Economic Man (REM) there appear to be some striking parallels:
first impressions of the similarities and the differences
are reported below.
Whereas I have, for the most part,^been following Emmet
and Maclntyre's problem-oriented approach, Hollis and Nell
write (p.240): "our critique of neo-Classicism rests not on
our critique of Positivism, but on our alternative to it,
Rationalism". They"dispute not only the Positivist doctrines
behind orthodox methodology but also empiricism in general",
saying "it seems to us to be as true as ever that a scientific
method must reflect a philosophy of science, which must
reflect a theory of knowledge"(p.3)• But it seems to me
that the difference between the approaches may prove in
the main to be one of strategy: their theory of knowledge
is, I think, implicit in Chapter 8 above (which draws
substantially on an earlier paper of Hollis(1967-3)); and
the problems I tackle are also tackled in REM. The difference
in strategy is. very evident in the first part of each (where
their critique is of Positivism and mine of Friedman's case
for a particular hypothesis), but considerably less so in the
remainder; and below, attention is confined to the similarities
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and contrasts where explicit overlap is greater (Chapters 6
to 9 above with the latter half of REM).
The dilemma posed above in Chapter 6 in essence coincides,
I think, with that posed in REM, p.2^0: "either economic agents
and activities are conceived in such a way that the neo¬
classical assumptions are sufficient to entail the vision
of optimality...in which case the model cannot, in principle,
apply to a world in which our present laws of physics and
engineering hold: or economic agents and activities are
conceived in a manner consistent with regular reproducibility,
in which case the model can apply, but adulteration in the
product and exploitation in the factor market are both
conceivable, even likely, in equilibrium, optimality is a
farce, and the door is open wide in welcome to both Veblen
and Marx." Or again (REM, p.233):"If the /neo-Classical/
assumptions are made at all realistically, then they generate
...objections which suffice to show that neo-Classical
optimality cannot be guaranteed, indeed, could be achieved at
best by accident. If the assumptions are not realistic they
conflict with necessary properties of the bearers; and so
the model will not apply at all."
On one horn of the dilemma: Hollis and Nell's point
(REM, p.231) that when imperfections are recognised and the
requisite additions are then made to the neoclassical model,
"the basic model would...have changed beyond recognition"
corresponds to the "curate's egg" charge developed in
Chapter 7 above. However, they do not introduce the theory
of the second best.
D.3
Taking the other horn: both REM and the thesis argue that
neoclassicism founders because it "involves abstraction which,
ignores essential features"(REM,p.258) of the economy (the
former concentrating more than the latter specifically on the
essential features of production). But whereas I claim in
Chapter 8 that the neoclassical (GE) world is an impossible
one, Hollis and Nell make the apparently very different claim
that "neo-Classical theory is inapplicable, not false, and
impracticable, not impossible"(p.223). Yet the arguments on
which these respective claims are based seem, at first blush,
strikingly similar: is my conclusion over-strong, or might it
be that theirs could be strengthened?
Again at first blush, some expressions of the REM challenge
to neoclassical doctrine might seem strong enough to "tot up"
to a charge of impossibility after all. Examples are: "Neo-
Classicism finally falls foul of necessary but not purely
logical truths"(p.241); "neo-Classical theories, being
exclusively concerned with action variables, presuppose a
model of economic agency, with which they are incompatible"
(p.225): "we have argued not only that /neoclassical/
assumptions are not fulfilled, but also that they cannot be,
given the world we live in"(p.233); "we contend that there
cannot be one-commodity worlds"(p.248).
But Hollis and Nell only "press for a conviction on charges
of impracticability"(p.228), where "if a variable is so defined
that an economic agent, to whom it applied, could not last long
in the market (given the assumed social order) or support
himself materially (given the laws of nature), then the model
v.k
in question is irapracticable"(p.224). This suggests there might
be tv/o reasons for holding that the neoclassical "model", though
impracticable, might yet be possible: namely, that
(a)the relevant agents could exist in the market (even
though they couldn't last)
&/or(b)though such agents couldn't exist/last, given our present
world, it doesn't follow from this that they couldn't exist/last
under any conditions.
Hollis and Nell do not always seem to believe that (a) is true
(saying, for instance, that "given the laws of physics and
engineering and given the legal foundation of capitalism,
there cannot exist neo-Classical bearers"(p.225)). Again,
mightn't existence imply lasting? - or does lasting mean
lasting for longer than that? And it seems to me possible to
argue that the relevant agents couldn't exist in our world.
Y/hat about (b)? The argument in Chapter 8 above was that
there are limits on what can count for us as "possible
worlds", and that the neoclassical "world", with its
excessive uniformity, violates them (and thus that, not only
is none of the relevant agents able to exist, given our world;
but also that, given us, they couldn't exist in any worlds
counting for us as "possible"). Is this argument too weak
for the impossibility conclusion I draw, because even if
something isn't possible for us (possible for men, as against
nem), still it might be possible? But even if this suggestion
makes sense (and it may not do), mightn't it still be argued
that the neoclassical model presupposes that its "world" is
populated by men (albeit men who are assumed - impossibly -
to behave as nem)? And in any case, the neoclassical world
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would still be not just impracticable-for but also impossible-
for us.
Might it be that Hollis and Nell decided that arguments
along the lines of ay TATA were too abstruse to indulge in,
in adequate detail, in REM? One passage rather suggests this:
"to carry the argument a stage further.../connect/ some 'laws
of nature.with the concept of a 'material object', arguing
that this concept was itself a conceptual primitive for any
understanding of an objective, experienced world. But this,
although tempting, would be far beyond our scope". And then
too, at the end of Chapter 8 of REM, they speak, surprisingly,
of the impossibility charge as merely "so far unproven"(p.232).
But this is just a first report, dispatched in haste
before a thorough investigation could be carried out on
relations between REM and this thesis. Alas, there can be
no later edition of the latter, giving fuller coverage.
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